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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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KOMMUNIST

No 11, July 1988

Delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference on the Pages of KOMMUNIST

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[Articles by various authors under the heading of: "Delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference".]

[Text]

Problem No 1

[A. Kauls, A. Nikonov]

The food problem was described at the conference as the most sensitive area in the life of society and as the most pressing problem. Following is a talk with two delegates, whose work is directly related to the problem: Albert Ernestovich Kauls, Hero of Socialist Labor, chairman of the famous Latvian Adazhi Kolkhoz-Agrofirm; a description of the work and life of this farm were included in the materials of the roundtable meeting held at the kolkhoz (see KOMMUNIST, Nos 9 and 10, 1987. Our other interlocutor was Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Nikonov, VASKHNIL president. What, is their view, the view of a practical worker and a theoretician, on the contemporary approach to the solution of a problem unanimously acknowledged today as a priority one?

A. Nikonov. Above all, let me say something about the conference itself and its results. It provided something positive and a great deal of something essentially new. This is truly the first discussion of its kind: open, unfettered even when it came to the most important problems. As a result, I believe that it was common sense that won, the aspiration to clear the way, to remove all obstacles standing in the way to the normal development of our socialist society. Naturally, not all of this is so simple in real life. However, the very fact that such a difficult discussion was held is quite important, quite noteworthy. All too long we lived in some kind of psychological slavery, with blinkers on our eyes, not daring to look either right or left, for an "ism" stood at each step. The people of my generation know, unfortunately, from personal experience, what it meant to "tag on" such an "ism." We know, and not from books, what the terror and discrimination of the peasantry meant. That is why in my perception of the 19th Party Conference, for example, this is not a refreshing breeze but a gust of healthy strong wind. Something which had been suppressed and fettered for a long time burst out from the depth of the people and the party. It is no accident, in my view, that the conference brought up the agrarian problem as a prime one and, speaking on the sociopolitical level, the question of the attitude toward the peasantry. Actually, the proper solution of this problem determines our own lives. I do not even speak of the

shame experienced by any sensibly thinking Soviet person in hearing the question: When will you stop importing grain, meat and butter?... And all of this bearing in mind our area, human resources and, in the final account, our scientific developments which have frequently been leading in world science!

We wish to eliminate this moral oppression and, I believe, the party conference gave a green light to it....

A. Kauls. At first, when the debates were only gathering strength, it seemed that all would follow some kind of customary reformist way; with each passing day, however, we increasingly felt that the principles of revolutionary change were being restored. I believe that is the way it will develop among the people.

In my view, more discussion should have been had at the conference concerning the role and responsibility of the party members and the activities of the party apparatus. We know that today it has both a positive and a negative influence. More self-criticism should have been heard in the addresses by party workers. This, however, we did not hear. Many of them criticized ministries and other departments and agencies. In our practice, however, all of them are headed by a party member. It is properly said that whoever makes decisions must be responsible for them. But is he always? All of us were shaken up by finding out that the Russian Federation is writing off 1 million hectares of reclaimed land. This is 1 million hectares, and no one bears the responsibility! If we do not settle our party matters, above all on the higher echelon, we would hardly be able to influence the entire society and the entire course of perestroika in that spirit, as is wished by the majority of the people, the majority of party members.

What particular problem faces you now, as the head of a major agrofirm?

A. Kauls. It is to strengthen that which is beginning to show up somewhat in problems of economic autonomy and how to develop it further. If we say today that we must organize our agrarian policy, I think that it is important to consider above all the question of asserting autonomy. The problem of creating conditions for trust must be solved in its entirety.

You mentioned this 18 months ago, at the roundtable discussion....

A. Kauls. Unfortunately, the situation has changed little. To us, "on the lower level," it seems as though the administrative apparatus does not have a complete idea of its present purpose. Whereas in the past it obviously considered as its main task to ensure the meeting of state procurements—to issue us a plan and to demand of us its implementation—with the establishment of the new economic management conditions its functions are changing. What are they? We had a discussion with the chairman of our RAPO. I saw in America cooperative

associations which are being created in that country as well. Their management deals with problems which the farmer cannot solve by himself. Thus, when we create a rayon or republic agroindustrial association, we should above all consider the problems which it undertakes to solve. For the time being, our rayon authorities are unable to do so.

A. Nikonov. Unquestionably, the participation of science is needed in this case. I believe that we are currently going through a time when new forms of production organization and production relations have somewhat outstripped science, which is unable to provide sufficiently profound intensive studies leading to progress. In this sense as well the demands voiced at the conference, above all as addressed to our economic science, were just. It was hurtful to listen to them but they were essentially right.

In my view, contemporary agrarian policy must move in at least five basic directions. The first is the social: the peasantry must become truly equal with the working class and our other population strata; corresponding social conditions and infrastructure must be created; differences in the degrees of pensions and medical, cultural and consumer services must be eliminated. In other words, we must eliminate the social inequity which developed in our country in the course of many decades. This was said and, I would even say "shouted," by the delegates at the 19th Party Conference. The people in the hall unanimously supported comrades who appealed as follows: "It is time to give the countryside its due." This was also discussed at the last session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. I am pleased that we have become aware of this thought and that it was officially acknowledged on all levels.

The second area is economic: economically substantiated prices of agricultural commodities, and equivalent trade, strictly based on economic laws, on the law of value. Incidentally, this was mentioned as early as the March 1965 Central Committee Plenum. It was mentioned, an effort was made to do something, and matters stopped there.

The third area is organizational, one which we can accomplish without investments: convert to the forms of production organization which would eliminate impersonality. This applies above all to the primary labor collectives leasing equipment in different amounts and in different ways. These should not be 5-year but much longer leases, so that the people may be interested in improving the land and maintaining it in proper order. Add cooperation to this. Leasing plus cooperation.

At this point it would be interesting to hear the view of Albert Ernestovich, for your kolkhoz is, conversely, based on large complexes and processing enterprises.

A. Kauls. I see no contradiction here. Agricultural structures should be different. One must make a choice based on specific conditions, the more so since our agrofirma as well is based strictly on cost accounting principles. We have brought cost accounting down to the level of the work place.

A. Nikonov. The leasing collective is the initial cell in a cost accounting cooperative. This is followed by the kolkhoz or sovkhoz as a cooperative consisting of those same contracting or leasing collectives. In turn, this is followed by the agrofirma or the production system (i.e., cooperation among several farms engaged in the production of specific types of commodities), or the association, on the level of the rayon, or else the agrocombine, which is a cooperative on a higher level.

Nonetheless, let us answer this doubt which is today frequently expressed, including in letters to the editors: Would this not lead to a breaking up of our public ownership?

A. Nikonov. To begin with, we shall not be distributing the land. The land is and will remain public property. However, it will be leased to a responsible lessee, so that there will no longer be, as there are now, ownerless, abandoned areas. Sometimes people are frightened by the size of a production process with its structure and organization. What does leasing mean, what does family, small-group contracting mean? It is a structural form of organization of that same large-scale production. It is by no means small. It means abandoning the huge, the inefficient form of internal organization. Consider a 30-man brigade: you will never see in it the individual contribution. Yet when one, two, three or five people are responsible, it immediately becomes clear who has done what and how.

Leasing and family contracting are frequently conceived by the local managers as the latest campaign in which everyone should become involved. Percentages of "coverage" are being compared. Those who are not in any hurry to take over a bad farm are being subject to condemnation....

A. Nikonov. Where we have been truly oversuccessful has been to formalize one and all. All brigades are now described as cost accounting or contracting brigades. Their study, however, shows that they practice neither cost accounting nor contracting. Many such examples exist. This formalism, which has existed for many decades, and the hasty reaction to be ahead, to be "afloat," are very dangerous. I fear greatly that the modern, essentially new and truly efficient forms of economic management could be compromised by paying "dues to this fashion."

This pertained to the third area of agrarian policy.

The fourth is the material and technical base. I do not conceive of the lessee using pitchforks and shovels, enslaved, somewhat like a semi-indentured person deprived of spiritual needs and cultural centers. This is a primitive concept. The lessee, the modern peasant, should be provided with modern material and technical facilities. Our agrarian science has already contributed something in this respect. For example, together with designers from Minselkhoz mash, the institutes of the

VASKHNIL Siberian Department developed a set of machines for intensive labor collectives. The machinery may be one-half the usual number but it can perform several operations, making it possible for a single person to cultivate 400 hectares of land. As practical experience has already indicated, labor productivity in this case increases by a factor of 7-8 (compared with traditional technology). However, many such complexes are needed for each sector and area.

I have always felt indignant when hearing the words "help to the village." This makes me profoundly indignant. I see in those words concentrated hypocrisy, bearing in mind decades of nonequivalent exchange between town and country. It is not help that is needed, as some kind of philanthropy or sponsorship. What is needed is a proper and reciprocal cooperation between town and country, based on all the laws of socialism. The greatest help which the town can give the country is to provide it with high-quality means of production, and not the type of combines and tractors which break down after a few hours of work, but good quality equipment, good quality materials, and complete sets of them.

The fifth area is taking maximally into consideration regional characteristics. One of our difficulties is that everything has always been equalized. If, for example, in the south, in the steppes, the brigade has 30 members and the kolkhoz 10,000 hectares, mandatorily the same must prevail in Novgorod Oblast. Such stereotypes have caused tremendous harm. Agrarian policy must take into consideration the conditions of the Nonchernozem, with its low-level structure, small settlements, lack of roads and excessive moisture; we recently developed and, at the last VASKHNIL session, adopted a scientific concept for the development of the Nonchernozem. We are greatly concerned about the steppes, our main grain areas, because of a starting global warming up of the climate and the aggravation of the drought. We must be able to make skillful use of the unique natural conditions of our Central Asia and provide people with jobs also on the basis of family and leasing contracts (which, incidentally, is being practiced by the Chinese).

These are the outlines I wished to point out in discussing the possibilities of solving the food problem. Naturally, we need science, science, and more science....

A. Kauls. It seems to me that occasionally we get carried away by criticizing science. Yet science has a tremendous potential which we have still not been able to utilize. We either have no taste for it or set no scientific tasks. Let us consider biotechnology. We could double or triple potato, vegetable and fruit yields by taking a single step: ridding seeds from viruses. This is indicated by worldwide experience. Our farm has already tested this through its own practical experience.

To the best of our knowledge, your agrofirma looks like a cross between science and production. You had major plans. What have you been able to accomplish in 1 year? And was it what you were considering to do?

A. Kauls. We may have failed to achieve one thing or another but, as a whole, I believe that we have accomplished a great deal. In potato growing, we have essentially accomplished everything and have even concluded a cooperation contract with a Dutch agrofirma. We are growing potatoes on the basis of their own and our technology and combine results. This will be a positive aspect which, in the future, we shall share with others.

A production system has been created. Our specialists worked in other farms where they analyzed the soil and did everything else as stipulated in the system. Next year we shall convert to its new stage and, clearly, the range of farms participating in the system will broaden. For the time being, we have simply limited their number.

Have there been many candidates?

A. Kauls. A great deal, throughout the Union. So far, however, we have been dealing with nine farms. Good work has been done, smoothly. Our specialists and mechanizers consider that such an organization of the work is one of the variants of the accelerated application of scientific and technical progress. Anything that depended on us developed normally. However, there is also another side: all of this must be supported by equipment and fertilizer. At this point, we must frankly say that backing up intensive technologies remains an unsolved problem.

A. Nikonov. We have given a great deal of thought on how to implement scientific developments. No results were achieved for the simple reason that everything was done through administrative ways. A variety of application agencies were set up, numerous resolutions were passed and plans were formulated. Meanwhile, there was no progress. There was no interest. In general, as we now say, the entire economic management system was unresponsive to scientific and technical progress: it involved bother and trouble while possible success seemed remote....

What has essentially changed now? Two factors are essential: cost accounting on all levels and new cooperative units (agrofirmas, agrocombines, etc.). Perhaps cost accounting could put in a Procrustean bed such systems in such a way that their advantages will not become apparent. However, these two factors, combined, were what created an essentially new situation. Frankly, in terms of science this is a finding, a new stage in its life.

A. Kauls. To the best of our possibilities we try to make our contribution to the solution of the food problem. We are currently drafting a program on how to ensure a supply of potatoes for the Riga population. The city consumes 72,000 tons of it. Some of the potatoes we are processing domestically and supplying as semifinished goods: 25,000 tons. What about the rest? That is what we are thinking about: what would be the desirable variety, how much to grow of early, seasonal and late varieties, and how much to store? On the basis of such an analysis

we, naturally, shall issue our recommendations to the Agroprom; if it accepts them we shall submit specific suggestions to the farms, which could be included in the implementation of this program, and what that would require. We shall even provide them with figures as to the type of suburban farms where potato growing would be unprofitable and the areas in which, conversely, potato growing should be increased. Generally speaking, we are studying the overall situation in order to be able to supply good quality potatoes.

Is all this work being done by the kolkhoz itself?

A. Kauls. Naturally, together with other farms. However, our farm has a large number of experienced and well trained specialists, including candidates of sciences. I always feel unpleasantly surprised when a specialist seems to be pitted against the "rank and file working person." It is as though the work is being done and usefulness achieved only by those who are directly involved in working in a field or a livestock farm. Contemporary production is inconceivable without contemporary ideas and their practical implementation. This is, above all, the area of activities of the specialist.

We know that at the latest VASKHNIL session you and Vasily Aleksandrovich Starodubtsev, who addressed the conference, were made academy corresponding members.

A. Kauls. Yes, this is so.

A. Nikonov. They were elected unanimously, which rarely happens with us, virtually never. They were elected in order to bring in a new spirit into the work of VASKHNIL. They were elected quite justifiably. They are not only capable and talented managers but scientists. Both are candidates of sciences with scientific works to their credit. Above all, they have developed essentially new forms of agroindustrial enterprises. This path will, unquestionably, be followed by other farms. A contribution to science is far superior than an ordinary doctoral dissertation. Furthermore, they work on the basis of science. Both Adazhi and the association headed by V.A. Starodubtsev have signed long-term contracts with various scientific research institutes. I do not know, in their case, where is the boundary separating science from production, it is virtually absent. Actually, it should not exist. Speaking of the implementation of scientific developments, I see the future in precisely the creation of such firms, associations and scientific-production systems.

We know that in its time science was hindered and set back. Its best people and brightest minds were physically eliminated. The consequences of this were terrible: generations of young scientists grew up in an atmosphere of fear, time serving and engaging in commentaries instead of in daring large-scale research. The consequences are felt to this day, for it is difficult to straighten out things immediately. However, science is being straightened out.

Developments already exist, perhaps not on the level of a Chayanov or Kondratyev, for such people do not appear all of a sudden. However, the resolution of the 19th Conference as well as what took place 3 years ago are creating a contributory atmosphere to the healthy growth of our scientific cadres.

However, another problem as well should not be avoided. We speak of work in cleaning seeds from the virus, a project in which Adazhi has been seriously involved. However, if this experience is to be disseminated, the entire country must be covered by a network of laboratories. This requires funds. When we note painfully the major lag in our production, we should also consider the status of science. In terms of laboratory equipment, science is in a difficult situation and I am not afraid to say so. We are spending in agrarian science 0.5 percent of the value of the end product of agriculture. This is several hundred percent less than in other developed countries. What do we wish? Neither biotechnology nor electronic advances are possible without tools. Equipment is needed and we do not have it. Only 2 to 3 percent of our requirements concerning electronic facilities are being met. It is shameful. No such attitude toward science is acceptable. Science will always be behind and always try to catch up and will always lose if it is maltreated. I was sincerely pleased, as I sat in the hall, when M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the conference dealt with the need to strengthen basic science, its financing, etc.

Here is another aspect of the same problem. I do not wish to create a direct linkage here but, nonetheless, for good or for bad agroindustrial production accounts for 28-30 percent of the national income. Yet agrarian science accounts for 4 percent of all scientific outlays. Where is here the logic and common sense? Such problems must be solved.

Currently cost accounting principles are being increasingly promoted in science. Will this broaden its possibilities?

A. Nikonov. We have adopted cost accounting and believe that it is necessary. However, this too must be more firmly organized. We have studied several thousand contracts concluded by our institutes with kolkhozes. The average amount of a contract is 6,000 rubles. Science has always been blamed for dealing with petty topics. Now such petty topics have intensified. Cost accounting is necessary and contracts are needed but with major customers. The agronomist is still being kept aside (this is self-criticism as well), and the USSR Gosagroprom fund is only being set up.

We accept criticism and have a healthy attitude toward it and try to correct the situation. Clearly, however, the attitude toward science should change. By your leave, criticism alone would not take us very far.

A great deal of what is being discussed here is planned on a long-term basis. However, we must as of today feed the people, eliminate the lines.

A. Nikonov. I see as the most realistic way that of eliminating depersonalization and converting to the leasing system. A specific person must be responsible at any stage of the dynamics of the product, from the field to the consumer. If we could deliver to the people that which we are already producing there would be no lines whatsoever, there would be no difficulties, for in the case of some products, 30 to 50 percent of what we have grown is lost, does not reach the consumer.

Second: the management authorities must more rapidly convert the cooperative agroindustrial associations from bureaucratic into working agencies. Unquestionably, investment policy as well must be sharply turned to address the specific needs of the food complex.

A. Kauls. As a practical worker, I see the following optimal variant: the present state of affairs in our country must be analyzed; I may be wrong, but according to information available to me, 30 percent of our farms account for about 80 percent of the produce generated in the public sector. If such is the case, perhaps another 20 percent of the farms could be raised to the level of that 30 percent and the result would be that we would resolve the food problem (on the scale of the public sector) 130 percent. In the remaining farms it is indeed important to develop within a short time precisely the leasing, the brigade contracting method in all of its aspects.

I single out three basic features in increasing output: more advanced equipment and technology; work with people, so that there would be less controllers but every person would develop a feature in his character, as a moral value, the aspiration to work honestly; finally, every specialist should realize his purpose as a technologist and production organizer.

A. Nikonov. I would add yet another aspect. A primitive, a snobbish attitude toward the peasant which exists in our life should disappear. According to a familiar (and, in my view, harmful) tale, a family had three sons: the clever one went to serve the Tsar; the smart went into trade and Ivan the dolt was left to farm the land.... Farm labor is among the most creative, and no standard solutions are possible in agriculture. In the Netherlands, for example, no one would lease you an inch of land if you cannot show a diploma proving that you have the proper training. You would not be entrusted to work with the land.

A. Kauls. Some people may believe that rural labor is simple. However, it requires professionalism, intuition and intelligence. It is not the simple "man-machine" relationship. Yet in our kolkhoz we are not always able to pay for this work to the extent which we deem necessary: we are blocked by rates issued "from above"....

Albert Ernestovich, what specific work awaits you immediately after the end of the conference?

A. Kauls. We have our Council of Kolkhozes. It is true that for the time being we have no rights but we are doing serious work. We recently held a meeting of the council to analyze the state of affairs in the republic's agriculture, which is quite alarming. We intend to hold a meeting of the council's presidium in Aluksmenskiy Rayon, which is a lagging rayon in the republic, on a basic problem: how are the kolkhozes in the rayon solving social problems. The first secretary of the rayon has become involved in this project and a study was made. The planned meeting will be attended not only by the kolkhoz chairman but also the managers of all other rayon farms and the chairmen of the rural soviets, so that, jointly, we could try to find a solution to this pressing problem. We have asked the republic organizations to be prepared for such a serious discussion.

Naturally, the main thing is to do the job.

The Only Possible Privilege

[Ye. Auyelbekov]

I am convinced that the simple answer to the question of whether our one-party system can guarantee perestroika, the process of the qualitative renovation of society and the full achievement of the humanistic potential of socialism, in its true Leninist understanding, is "yes!" It is "yes" because perestroika began on the party's initiative, and it is only with the party's political leadership that it can be completed. It is "yes" because, having initiated perestroika, the party found within itself the strength courageously and self-critically to assess the developing situation and now, step by step, is reorganizing itself and renovating intraparty life. It is "yes," because the creation of the political mechanisms and the legal guarantees discussed in the report and the resolutions adopted at the conference have made it possible to exclude any future possibility of the violation of the Leninist principles of social management.

A manager can earn the respect of his comrades in the organization and the nonparty people only through dedicated toil and selfless service to the people. Such toil is difficult, particularly that of the personnel on the rayon, the city level. The majority of these people do not punch clocks and frequently work without days off.

This makes it even more important, I believe, to shed full light on the question of privileges, which was discussed at our conference as well. There are those who consider any discussion of the immorality of privileges as ostentation, dictated by the pursuit of easily acquired authority. Such is not the case. It may be that what we are doing so far in our oblast, on the level of asserting social justice, may be minor. Even if such is the case, in my view, minor matters are important. We, party workers, are flesh from the flesh of the people. For example, why do

we have to have some special type of housing built for us? All housing must be equally good. If everyone lives well, so shall we. If the people live poorly, this must be felt by us too. If there is difficulty with procuring meat in the oblast, and if the population has to purchase it in commission stores, why should party workers purchase it somewhere else? Meanwhile, we should not allow for party workers to be harmed in anything compared with the other categories of working people. I believe that it would be hardly useful to the cause to retain the procedure according to which, let us say, the salaries of party organization secretaries in kolkhozes, sovkhozes and industrial enterprises are significantly lower than those of economic managers.

As to the personnel of our oblast party committee, all of us live in ordinary apartments. We shop in the same stores as our neighbors, use public transport in commuting to work and, if we need it, we receive the same medical treatment as anyone else. The obkom cafeteria is on the same level as that used by workers. The numbers of our telephones, both official and at home, were published in all newspapers. Nothing terrible occurred. Telephone calls do not prevent us either from living or working. The people behave respectfully and ring up on business matters and only when they have to. However, we too must behave respectfully toward people. I believe that there is no reason not to have a guard at the entrance of the obkom building. Perhaps we shall soon see to it that such guards consist of elderly party members. The people should be able to enter the obkom building freely. If a militia man in uniform stands at the door this is not particularly consistent with the concept of home, which is the way in which working people should consider party committees on all levels.

There are those who think that if the obkom is not protected, if the first secretary is not protected from visitors and if he is not accompanied in his trips, this would disorganize the work. Nothing of the sort! Such prejudices are the offspring of mistrust in the people, and disrespect for them. This is a vestige of our past, one which we must definitively reject in the course of perestroika. The more modest and simpler the party leaders are the more will their reputation grow. We, party workers, can have only one privilege: to work more and better than others.

Kzyl-Orda is an oblast in which the Soviet system was established 5 days after the beginning of the victorious October Revolution. It is an oblast whose fishermen, answering Vladimir Ilich's call, did all they could to help the hungry along the Povolzhye. The administrative center of the oblast, the city of Kzyl-Orda, was the first Red capital of Soviet Kazakhstan. Space ships are launched from the Baykonur Cosmodrom, located in our oblast. Nonetheless, Kzyl-Orda Oblast is greatly behind in its social and economic development, compared to other areas in the Soviet Union. Suffice it to say that at the start of 1985 the share of the oblast in the overall volume of industrial output in the republic was 1 percent

and real per capita income was half the national average. Little housing was built in the oblast. The already unusually grave shortage of housing was worsened by an inequitable distribution. Medical, trade and consumer services to the population had severely fallen behind. Basic food products available to our population were below the republic average by a factor of 1.5-3. Our unemployment rate was 25 percent.

Such negative phenomena were largely the consequence of the gross violation of the standards of intraparty life, the principles of social justice, the moral foundations of the socialist society and major distortions in cadre policy. Parochial leadership, nepotism and corruption blossomed in the oblast. Politically, practically and morally immature people, frequently contaminated by patriarchal-family vestiges, were appointed to leading positions. Their appointments were based on loyalty to a specific person, landsmanship and nepotism. Command positions were given "by inheritance," to the offspring of leading officials. Theft and figure padding had become extensively widespread. All of this triggered the justified discontent of the working people and cause social apathy. Adding to all of this the ecological catastrophe which was caused by the drying out of the Aral Sea, one can easily imagine the burden of unusually difficult economic, social and moral problems with which the oblast entered the spring of renewal of 1985.

I shall not undertake to enumerate all that we have accomplished. Perestroika enabled us to arouse the people, to straighten their shoulders and firmly to mount a struggle against negative phenomena. The moral and psychological climate improved and positive changes occurred in the economy and the social area; the plans for the first half of the 5-year plan were overfulfilled in terms of basic indicators. Population food supplies improved somewhat. Waiting time for housing was shortened by 25 percent. The people truly felt the first results of perestroika and are regaining their faith in social justice and hopes for the future. Together with the Union and republic authorities, a comprehensive program was drafted and is being implemented for the acceleration of the oblast's socioeconomic progress. Steps are being taken to increase the industrial potential sharply. Sectors which are entirely new to the oblast are being developed, such as ore mining and petroleum extraction. The network of branches of light and local industry enterprises is expanding; new jobs are opening, aimed at ensuring the full employment of the active population; the production of consumer goods in increasing and a course has been set to self-support with food products.

All of this is merely the beginning of the extensive work which we must do. However, even that clearly indicates the type of constructive strength and potential for renovation that are found among the people. However, we were unable to make full use of all available opportunities. The socioeconomic and, to an even greater extent, the ecological situation in the oblast remain extremely difficult.

Unfortunately, our delegation was unable to carry out the instruction of the party members and working people in the oblast, which was to make the participants in the conference aware of their concern for the fate of the Aral Sea. A great deal has already been said and written about it. However, this has not made the situation of the people in the Aral area any easier. Many senior workers in the central departments, judging by what we know, have no clear idea of the scale of our catastrophe. Meanwhile, the sea is dying. Every year its surface is diminishing by approximately 1,000 square kilometers. In some areas the water has shrunk away from the shore by up to 100 kilometers. Millions of tons of salt remain exposed on the surface and are blown by the winds over great distances. A huge territory is being subject to desertification. The age-old taiga growth and the jungles of haloxylon, pastures and unique animals have disappeared. Since 1960 the area in forests and haloxylon has lost 2 million hectares and the area in natural pastures has been reduced by a factor of 4. The Aral has lost its transportation and fish industry importance.

The function of the sea as a heat regulator is being lost; the climate has become harsher. Snowless winters and hot summers are accompanied by strong dry winds, causing serious additional difficulties for maintaining life and material production. The sharp drop in the sources of water supplies has required the building of additional pumping stations. Huge funds are being spent to flush salinized land. More violent sand storms and snow drifts are hindering even train traffic. Agricultural production costs have increased sharply. Today the production of one quintal of milk around the Aral is five times, and Karakul wool and weight increases in cattle are ten times more expensive than they were at the start of the 1960s. Thousands of families have left their native area without obtaining, strange though it might seem, any compensation for material and moral losses.

Let me not continue to burden the attention of the readers with details of the Aral tragedy. However, I must point out the threat which it is bringing to the health of the people, the children in particular. The indicators characterizing its condition are such that even the figures which were cited in the speech by Comrade Chazov at the conference pale.

Nonetheless, Aral can still be saved. We must abandon half measures, for they will not do. The zone of the Aral Sea should be proclaimed, as is being done in similar cases in our countries, a zone of ecological catastrophe and urgent and exceptional steps must be taken to correct it. Any further drop in the sea level should be stopped no later than by 1990. To this effect Aral should receive no less than 30 cubic kilometers of water, after which steps should be taken to raise its level to its previous dimensions. In the struggle for the salvation of the Aral we are relying on the effective aid of the recently created State Environmental Protection Committee. Not tomorrow but as of today we must undertake to make practical improvements in the sanitary-hygienic situation in the Aral area and in the area

of the basins of the Amudarya and Syrdarya. Currently water outlays for irrigation are double or triple the rate. Therefore, strict limits must be set to the utilization of water resources. At the same time, we must develop in the area an extensive search for additional water supply sources. A conversion to intensive technology in irrigated agriculture and upgrading farming standards would make it possible tangibly to increase yields and reduce the area in crops and considerably lower water irrigation outlays. A great deal more could be accomplished immediately to revive the Aral Sea. However, this calls for firmly abandoning the groundless although by now extensively popular idea that the Aral is doomed.

Every single resident in our oblast lives with the faith that the difficulties of the population around the Aral and the tragic fate of this area will meet with a response in the hearts of all the peoples of our multinational country and that the Aral will be saved. This will become yet another proof of the success of perestroyka and the cause of socialist internationalism.

Perestroyka, I repeat, is not developing as energetically as we would like. The forces which are holding it back are real. The main among them is, unquestionably, bureaucratism. People who stubbornly retain their support of the command-administrative system continue to hold many of the key positions in Union ministries and departments. They pretend that they have reorganized themselves although, in fact, have long become alienated from life and from the people and are either unable or unwilling to solve many of the problems of vital importance to the people.

For example, it is my conviction that bureaucratism has taken firm hold of the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Resources. Hiding behind gross output indicators and figures on the increased volume of capital investments, it has been causing and is continuing to cause irreparable harm to the country's national economy, estimated in tens of billions of rubles. It is precisely this ministry that should assume most of the blame for the Aral tragedy and for the deplorable results of the arbitrary approach taken to the life of the million-strong population in the Aral area. It is very strange that despite the exceptional nature of the situation which has developed and repeated invitations, neither Minister Comrade Vasilyev nor his deputies have deemed it necessary to visit the area afflicted with this disaster. What is this? Is it scorn for the needs of the working people or fear of responsibility to the people for their actions? Incidentally, the public has repeatedly raised the question of taking Comrade Vasilyev to task for all of his actions. However, both he and the ministry he heads have been essentially holding for all these years a position of perimeter defense, more likely believing in their infallibility.

Or else let us consider the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, which has been steadily criticized for its inability to meet the needs of rural workers for high-quality contemporary equipment. For

more than 10 years this ministry, now headed by Comrade Yezhevskiy, is using a bureaucratic approach to solving problems related to expanding the Kzylordarismash Plant, and converting it into a powerful specialized complex for the production of rice harvesters and other agricultural machinery, despite the fact that the development of this plant is stipulated in decrees repeatedly passed by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers. However, no single official at the ministry, not to mention the minister and those around him, have deemed it necessary so far to visit the oblast to study on-site the situation of this enterprise under their jurisdiction. Is this not an example of bureaucratism?

How else other than bureaucratic could be described also the approach adopted by the Ministry of Finance and the State Committee for Labor to solving the question of giving the working people in Kzyl-Orda Oblast a 15-percent rayon coefficient for work in waterless and desert areas? Comrades Gostev and Gladkiy, who adopted a formal attitude toward our request and the instructions issued by the CPSU Central Committee and the government, refused us, citing the lack of funds. Nonetheless, out of what funds has a rayon coefficient been set for 13 neighboring oblasts which are located in more favorably climatic conditions? Why is it that in this case as well these managers I have named have not come to the oblast and met with the people and studied their working and living conditions? I believe that it would be useful to introduce the type of procedure which would call for mandatory and regular trips around the country by the heads of Union ministries and departments and senior personnel of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, and their visits to areas the situation of which is particularly bad in one respect or another. I believe that the stressed situation in Nagornyy Karabakh is, not in the least, the result of inadequate familiarity by the personnel of the corresponding party Central Committee departments and all-Union departments with the real situation in that area.

The apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers and ministries and departments have been quite infrequently staffed, until recently, with experienced and competent personnel hired from all Union republics.

We justifiably say that the success of perestroika depends to a decisive extent on surmounting equalization in rating the labor contribution of a worker. The mechanism of rewarding particularly distinguished workers could play an important role in solving this problem. Currently the question of rewards is decided behind closed doors and labor collectives and party organizations are poorly involved in this matter. Occasionally, undeserving people are included in the lists of awards. We must elaborate strict criteria, which cannot be subject to different interpretations, in order to avoid arbitrary and unfair decisions. It seems to me that it is also necessary to review the question of awarding the title of Twice Hero of Socialist Labor, and the practice of exhibiting the busts, cast in metal, of those who have

been thus awarded, in their home towns. I believe that if such a title is awarded for a second time, it should go only to rank-and-file working people. This should not be practiced in the case of the personnel of party and state apparatus, not to mention prosperous leaders, as was the case with Comrade Kunayev. His guilt toward the party, the country and the working people in the republic is tremendous. Yet, nonetheless, his bust has not been removed. What educational significance, other than negative, could this have? In general, such a method for perpetuating the memory of even the most outstanding leaders seems to me, particularly at a time of renovation of all aspects of our life, anachronistic.

In our concern to upgrade the efficiency of collective forms of work, including oblast party committee plenums, we have set up four sections staffed by its members and headed by secretaries. This year, these sections began to hear reports submitted by the obkom departments. A commission set up by the section studies in advance the work style and methods of a given department, rates its level and the department then submits its report to the respective section. It is thus that the party committee can supervise its apparatus. In the near future the staffing of this apparatus, which will be based on competition, will be subject to the same type of control. It is only after the section has recommended the chosen candidate that the obkom buro will decide whether to appoint him, let us say, as an instructor.

We must also abandon setting up party committees primarily "according to position." Today this is practiced virtually everywhere. A person is appointed to a leading position and, at the first opportunity, efforts are made to make him part of the party committee. This is improper. There should be no whatsoever automatic reaction in this case. However, it would be unwise for a person holding a given position to be deprived, for that very reason, of the right to be elected member of a party committee. In this case everything must be based on labor and the personal dignity of a party member, his reputation and his real contribution to perestroika.

Today we are advancing toward the accountability and election campaign in the party. Obviously, the members of party raykoms, gorkoms and obkoms will be elected on the basis of recommendations of primary party organizations, as was the case in electing delegates to the conference. In our oblast, for example, where nine delegates were to be elected, some 500 were nominated. Subsequently, the primary party organizations themselves selected 173; the rayon and city party activists submitted for discussions at the plenum a list of 31 people. All of them were invited and after the public discussion of each candidacy, the plenum adopted a slate of only nine candidates, subject to secret voting. Why? We were not sure that we would be electing the most worthy people and feared that the proportionality of representation may be violated. It is obvious that true competitiveness is needed so that the list of candidates be longer than the number of available positions. In such

a case, however, how to ensure the necessary representation and, at the same time, to prevent a mechanical allocation of seats? Answers to such questions are as yet to be found.

There are no problems with the appointment, on an elective basis, of cadres of secretaries of primary party organizations. The real task in that case is to choose among several candidacies of people with approximately equal merits. Difficulties begin on the rayon level, where there may virtually be no alternative choices. In that case elections would be a simple formality. Elections imply competitiveness among people who are different from one another yet, at the same time, are of equal value. The party members must have the possibility of making a real choice.

The gross errors and violations of legality and socialist morality, committed by a large number of managers during the period of stagnation, seriously harmed the party's authority. However, judging by our republic alone, perhaps, the problem of dismissing managers who have compromised themselves has not been solved entirely. Those among them who managed to "keep their heads above the water," have quieted down and do not commit any violations whatsoever. However, nor are they distinguished by their activeness. It is true that in the post-April period our area has not been an exception in this respect and an increasing number of capable, energetic and competent young officials, who enjoy a deserved reputation among party and nonparty members, are assuming leadership positions. Nonetheless, so far we have been unable to ensure an effective cadre rotation. Our promotion reserve remains inadequate. People remain in the same position all too long, forgetting their previous profession and, furthermore, turning out to be unable to march in step with our time and meet the requirements facing party cadres. In the past, as a rule workers would be dismissed for moral considerations or else one would patiently wait for them to retire. Perestroika, however, does not allow such waiting! Meanwhile, we have not learned as yet how to get rid of people who show no initiative who may not be drunks and who behave decently but also are of little use. The only thing that is left is persistently to master the skill of persuading, if necessary, a person that today he can no longer perform his assigned job and yet do this in such a way as not to insult, not to traumatize him. Perestroika can be successfully advanced only if we promptly solve cadre problems and systematically renovate the managerial corps. As we know, it is man who must solve all problem. Nothing else is possible!

Standards of Perestroika and Standards of Democracy

[R. Sturua]

This was my first opportunity to attend a big party forum and, for the first time, to be a delegate to the All-Union Party Conference, in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. I have never even attended a concert in this famous hall.

The first congress I remember was the 19th. As a secondary school student, I followed it from newsreels or documentaries. To me the congress seemed exceptionally important but had left me with a sensation of concern. Stalin looked very old and in my mind, as a child, I was worried by the thought: What shall we do without him?

I was born to a bolshevik family. Both of my grandfathers had been revolutionaries. We were proud that one of them, Vano Sturua, was one of the founders and first leaders of the Tiflis Social Democratic Organization and had accepted Stalin as party member. Our family included many people with clandestine bolshevik experience as well as noted party workers in postrevolutionary times.

In short, I became aware of party history from childhood, on the family level, so to say. To me, a 15-year old boy, Stalin's death was a personal tragedy. The 20th Party Congress was like thunder from a clear sky. Insight? No, it did not come immediately. For another year or so I was torn by contradictions, by a struggle within myself. I had always been amazed by the firmness of pro-Stalinist claims which, after decades, still exist in our society. It is an amazing phenomenon, both social and psychological, that to this day it has not been understood entirely but greatly affects the moral and political climate in the country.

Obviously, artists as well ponder over such matters, along with social scientists. Naturally, the artist solves his problems differently, sometimes as though in a way which has no direct connection with the essence of social processes. But what are the common grounds here between the cult of personality and, let us say, Chekhov's "The Cherry Orchard?" However, it was precisely that play that I chose. I wanted to make the viewer think about why intelligent and educated people had so submissively capitulated to a rather frightening personality. In my interpretation, Lopakhin would be a person trampling anything beautiful created by Russia over the centuries, the 19th century in particular.

The golden age of Russian culture. Suddenly, a new master appears, raised by those same intellectuals, and they obediently surrender their all to him. In this case the association with Stalin is quite remote. We are not discussing him but ourselves. What is this disease which hits our society from time to time and makes us so easily yield to evil? How did it happen, in the final account, that in the most enlightened government, one usurper was able to suppress the democratic gains of the revolution? Everyone kept silent, and there was no essential opposition. In my imagination I visualized "The Cherry Orchard" like a parable on destructive nonresistance to evil.

But I do not intend to stage this play, not now, at least. Today the theater is being accused of the fact that for the past year or 18 months, despite the reform, despite the

lifting of all sorts of prohibitions and despite other progressive changes, it has not produced anything outstanding. The reasons for this may be many but I shall name one: we are unable to catch up with our time. Even at the stage of the director's concept, "The Cherry Orchard" has become obsolete. Each major event in society powerfully invades our plans and forces us to review them. The theater cannot be noncontemporary. Even Shakespeare or Pushkin, on the stage, must be topical and the play must emphasize the sensitive area of our present.

I saw "Boris Godunov" in Moscow's Taganka Theater. The director's concept was understandable. It was structured on Pushkin's key feature: "The people keep silent." At the point that the character gives this replica which, according to the concept, should sound topical, a light is turned on and the replica is addressed at the audience, like an accusation which develops the idea enclosed in this key sentence. However, I saw "Boris Godunov" immediately after the party conference, where civic passion was raging.... Five years ago, this presentation could have been described as innovative and revolutionary. Now... it was not....

Strange though it might seem, during the period of stagnation, in its way the theater performed its civic functions better. There was no need to catch up with the present. In its best manifestations, albeit veiled, the dramatic art occasionally tries, through hints, to tell the people the truth, to give them hope. At that time we thought less about the purely artistic aspect of a play than about its publicistic nature. We succeeded. That same Taganka became popular precisely in that area and, above all, because of the director's publicistic sense, which was sharp and purposeful.

Today, however, political journalism itself is dealing with its own subject. It sets the tone in the process of democratization of society openly and aggressively, without hints or a subtext. It is difficult to pit literature against political journalism on the stage. The theater must go back to its own nature. At this point, however, there is a hitch. It has turned out that in the struggle against stagnation, by making use of not specifically theatrical means, we have greatly lowered our professionalism. Now, when high-level art has been given its say, it seems to me that we are short of skill. Although time is not waiting, we are unable to catch up; our time demands new words, while we are concealing our creative confusion and artistic helplessness behind stormy debates on democracy in the theater. But are we alone in this? Were we the only workers in culture who proved unprepared for this mountain of change which was dumped on us by the party conference, for example? An event took place the true significance of which has still not been fully realized by many. I include myself among them and anything I now say is, in addition to everything else, both a self-analysis and self-criticism.

Like the majority of the people, starting with the memorable date of April 1985, I was in favor of perestroika, and sincerely welcomed the party's course of economic change and democratization of social life. That is how I went to the conference, with a mood to support, to approve.... But suddenly, as though I was hit on the head, I had to **decide**, to make a choice. We have become accustomed for everything to be decided for us by others.... And long ago we accepted the simple game that if anyone asks us for advice on governmental affairs, it was pure formality, for the great happenings take place on spheres inaccessible to simple mortals, and although the past slightly more than 3 years were not wasted, and we gained the daring to make judgments and learned publicly to speak about anything we want, occasionally being quite free with our expressions.... still to **decide**!!

In all likelihood, few people were ready for such a democratic atmosphere in which we were to spend four amazing days in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. There were no rigid rules. All of this was accepted with absolute amazement! Feeling such unexpected freedom, some people plunged into exaggerations. What was particularly valuable, however, was frankness, both in understanding or failure to understand the difficulty and the inordinate nature of the "how long should we tolerate the domination of bureaucrats! Let the chiefs, once and for all, bang on the table and the problem will be solved!" (such methods of struggle also had their defenders).

All of us sincerely considered ourselves fighters for perestroika. However, what the party suggested to us at the conference caught many people unawares. I am convinced that I was not alone in secretly admitting to myself that I was not entirely prepared to accept the new democratic realities. There were times during the conference when I felt uncomfortable, feeling a kind of unpleasant residue, as though a sensation of my own guilt. It was not during the first minute or the first day that the awareness came of the historical significance of events in which I was a full participant.

A break in the mind is a difficult and conflicting process. This was confirmed quite convincingly in the past few years, particularly in creative circles. People who had long struggled for the right to participate in the solution of radical problems, having obtained this right frequently found themselves in an impasse. They passed and converted radical problems into petty civil wars, turning most serious problems into jokes and ironically speaking about their own independence.

I recently staged at the Moscow Theater imeni Vkh-tangov M. Shatrov's play "The Brest Peace." We worked long and seriously over this play. We made a scrupulous study of the documents of that time. All of this is very fresh in the memory, for which reason I unwittingly compared what was taking place at the conference with that most heated debate which had taken place such a long time ago. Both then and now a choice had to be made. At that time things were clearer: war or peace.

Today there is no desperate situation but the problem is more difficult, for it has a number of aspects, involving the creation of a new political structure. What impresses me the most about those distant times is the standard of discussions waged. On that topic two like-minded people—Lenin and Bukharin—turned to be on opposite sides. That was a lesson to us!

As a director, for example, I liked the speech which writer Yu. Bondarev made at the conference. His speech was properly drafted in accordance with the laws of public speaking, although essentially I disagreed with him. However, the man had his viewpoint and was expressing it. That is precisely why debates take place. But then there were objections when another writer, G. Baklanov, was not allowed to speak.... Was that democratic? He had drafted his own speech in his own way and he too had his own viewpoint. This viewpoint was not shared by a certain segment of the people in the hall. So what? Twice M.S. Gorbachev addressed himself to the delegates, calling upon them to control their emotions. Something similar developed in the course of the discussion on the resolutions. Some people, feeling the atmosphere of intolerance toward opponents, feared to speak out although, possibly, some of them may have had valuable ideas.

After many years of work in the theater I have learned how to analyze the reaction of the public in the hall and can quite accurately gauge the accuracy with which the show reflects the intent of the director and the mood with which any given idea, replica or action is accepted or rejected by some of the public or by the entire public, the item on which the greatest attention is paid and the emotional characterization of this attention. Professional habit applied to the Kremlin Palace of Congresses as well. What were my conclusions? The attention of some participants in the conference was focused only on the personality of the speaker. Some speakers spoke well, others were clumsy and others again were somewhat boring, and the reaction was clear, entirely consistent with the form of the address. But then someone else's viewpoint and its essence would be assessed by some above all on the basis of the extent to which they were consistent with their own. Some people did not even try to analyze the arguments of their opponent. Occasionally, the main thing was pushed aside: the fact that we were deciding the destinies of the country and not simply comparing views.

I believe that the standard of democracy which was maintained at the party conference was not all that different from the standard prevailing throughout the country, which is heterogeneous, conflicting and paradoxical. It is paradoxical because those who, by the logic of things, should have given at such a lofty party forum an example of knowledgeable debate, proved, with few exceptions, not to be on the necessary level. I am referring to the intelligentsia. The best speakers were the people who had come from plants and fields. Personally,

I was most impressed by the speech delivered by A.P. Aydak, the chairman of a Chuvash kolkhoz.

Naturally, in time everything will fall in place. Miracles do not happen. Where, all of a sudden, would a high standard of democracy appear if several generations were deprived of practical experience in democracy? Years will pass (or perhaps only months, for in periods of revolutionary change political experience is gained faster), and we shall learn how to hear out our opponent and even sincerely try to understand his views and evaluate not emotions but the persuasiveness of arguments. For the time being, frequently pluralism of opinions is replaced by pluralism of feelings, including in solving rather delicate national problems. After a while we shall learn to accept criticism not as an insult to the individual, the collective, the group or the profession but as a natural mechanism for resolving contradictions, as a mandatory prerequisite for progress in any area of activities, including party work.

It seems to me that the most pressing problem related to the standard of democracy in our country is the question of glasnost and, specifically, of the attitude toward the press. Newspapers and journals have acquired an unaccustomed degree of freedom and not all journalists are able to handle it. There have been excesses and obvious errors. However, is it they alone that define the contribution of the press to perestroika? That contribution is tremendous. Glasnost is perhaps the most real, visible and universally tangible result of renovation. We say that serious successes in the economy and the social area are still few, and that the people are not feeling any substantial improvements in their lives or, in general, that little is changing. But take today's issue of a central newspaper or journal and compare it with an issue published, let us say, 5 years ago.... Are there changes? Yes, quite substantial! Without stretching a point we could say that qualitative changes have been achieved.

Perestroika is, unquestionably, a progressive process and, equally unquestionably, a difficult and painful one. And if in any area we have taken a step toward renovation, that area should be studied most thoroughly. Its positive experience must be assimilated and the patterns and problems of the current stage in the country's development, revealed. I believe that the attitude toward the press is a very precise indicator of the extent of the true restructuring of any organization, be it ministry or party committee on any level, a measure of their self-critical attitude, for instance.

The attitude toward criticism in the press is somewhat different in an artist, compared to many others, perhaps for the fact alone that to us this is nothing new. Naturally, an actor or a musician may feel wounded by biased reviewers which, alas, frequently happens. However, we perfectly realize that we are working for the people and that the social assessment of our creative work is an absolutely natural and necessary act and that by no

means do we always create masterpieces. We make mistakes and we fail. But do party leaders work for anyone else and have there not been errors in party matters in the past 3 years? Naturally, to them such a critical attitude on the part of the press is new and nontraditional. Clearly, this is the old stereotype at work: in the past, if a newspaper would suddenly provide a negative assessment of a party committee secretary, this meant that his fate had already been sealed. Fear of criticism had become firmly settled as the harbinger of inevitable organizational conclusions. Strictly speaking, this mechanism did exist when it came to relieving a manager from his position. Today, however, criticism, openness and glasnost have assumed different qualities: they are the functional mechanism of perestroika and require a corresponding attitude toward themselves.

Now as to my main impression of the past few days. The upheaval which I experienced at the party conference may be compared somewhat to the one created by the 20th Party Congress. Today, however, the moral blow which all of us received is significantly stronger. The 20th Congress gave an assessment of the period of the cult of personality. Today we are concerned with the past because we are afraid of any recurrence of the events of 1937 and of other times. And although more than 30 years ago we clearly evaluated those events and provided them with an annihilating assessment, it quite soon became clear that this assessment was quite unanimous but that we were unable to eliminate the very opportunity for a recurrence. This may not have resulted in tragedies but did lead to a farce. The administrative-command system, which was perfectly organized during Stalin's time, remained healthy. The impression developed that everything will stay the same and that we have simply made the system somewhat more humane. Even when perestroika began and glasnost began to excite us and when we felt the intoxicating freedom of democratization, personally, I can honestly say that I could not imagine the country in which I live and which I know so well would so rapidly take a virtually unpredictable step: the decision to repair its political structure, and that I would become a direct participant in the culminating point of social action.

Even while I was reading the theses for the forthcoming conference I recalled Brecht. One of his characters said that "we make many people disgusted with our doctrine by the fact that we have a ready answer to all questions. Perhaps in the interest of propaganda we should draw up a list of questions which seem to us insoluble?" We have a rather strong habit of considering that in everything, down to the least petty matter, socialism is the right system and that our theory has answers suitable for all times. In the course of arguments and debates, over the 4 days of the party conference, we found it quite difficult to formulate a common viewpoint and a viewpoint which was essentially new and which eliminated traditions which had existed for decades and which had long become obsolete. To me that was a tremendous discovery which, in terms of my country, party and myself, was

much more significant than the political, social and moral evaluation of Stalin and events related to him. We made a choice. The choice was complex and demanded responsibility and creativity. We had been told repeatedly that Leninism is a developing theory but it was only now that I realized, sensed and felt this development. In short, this was an upheaval not in assessing the terrible past but of the reality of the dizzying changes which are not only humane in form but, precisely and above all, humane and socialist in their essence.

At one point in life or another there comes a sleepless hour or night when, all of a sudden, the need arises honestly to tell the truth about oneself, to ask oneself why is one here and what kind of world will one leave after one's death. Such self-admission is, as a rule, difficult. It is possible that the next morning one would not change one's behavior in the least and that no one would notice any change within oneself. That is precisely the impact which the party conference had on me. I do not know the type of actions through which this will be manifested. In any case, they will not be those which I was previously contemplating, for I myself have changed somewhat.

Democratization of Economic Management: The Regional Aspect

[M. Bronshteyn]

In the course of the sharp and involved debate at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, many questions of our society's socioeconomic development were asked in a new way, for so far they had never been asked. This applies above all to ways of overcoming departmentalism, creating the economic formulation for the soviets to exercise full power, the formulation of democratic principles of economic management at the regional level, and the solution of problems of interethnic relations on this basis. Our correspondent A. Ulyukayev talked with M.L. Bronshteyn, doctor of economic sciences, head of the Political Economy Department, Tartu University, and a conference delegate from the Estonian Republic Party Organization.

Question. A whole layer of serious economic problems was revealed in the course of the restructuring process. In your view, what is their central element, and to what should theory and practice pay particular attention?

Answer. Differences of assessment and approach were revealed during the discussions on the economic problems of restructuring. Everything came down to a recognition of the complexity of the problems, and of the fact that 3 years is an extremely short time in which to produce radical solutions to them. Economic laws are, one might say, the laws of large numbers, and they manifest themselves in an enormous number of facts, connections, and relationships of real economic management, which develop over a long period of time. The basic connections here are not rigidly determined, but are instead flexible, operating as tendencies.

For instance, one can underpay a person and give him a negative incentive in his work, but he will work; one can continue the negative incentive policy, and yet the poor guy will keep on working; but there will come a time where quantity is converted to quality, when he will stop working, and then almost nothing will get him back to work. That is what has happened to our village.

This "stretching out" of connections is to be seen, for instance, in the fact that, although neglected, agriculture, infrastructure, and light industry have kept on working somehow, but connections became increasingly strained. This tension has reached a point past which these connections break.

We found ourselves in a very difficult situation. The tragedy is that it was the previous leadership which stretched out and "strained" these connections, but it is the present leadership which will have to foot all the bills. On the surface the situation is even becoming worse than it was in the period of stagnation, a point to which L. Abalkin has rightly drawn attention, in my view. But this is, after all, not the result of restructuring, but rather the result of inertia from the past; it has not yet been possible to master this inertia or to take radical measures appropriate to the gravity of the situation. For example, if the law on the enterprise had been adopted now, at the present level of understanding the problems, it would have gone further and would have exerted a more effective influence on the economy. The effective implementation of decisions which have been adopted is being blocked by old planning stereotypes on the one hand, and by serious commodity-monetary imbalances, on the other.

It is also necessary to extend the principles of economic reform to the middle and higher tiers of economic management, above all to ministries and departments. It is typical that literally all the republic and oblast representatives who spoke were sharply critical of the departmental approach: it destroys nature and leads to undesirable demographic changes and social disproportions. The Estonian delegation's criticism of departmentalism goes still further; it is being made within the framework of the concept of republic cost accounting. It seems to us that the most dangerous consequence of departmentalism is the fact that it is destroying the USSR.

According to the Constitution, every republic has sovereign rights. This means that the people who inhabit it are masters of their land and of their destiny. All in all they live as they work. The departments, however, wreck this order. Why is this? They are extraterritorial and are not interested in the balance of a given region's development, but are very interested in whether there is an infrastructure ready for the next plant which they are going to build. If there is a work force—good; if not—it can be brought in. Their task is to take as much of the region's available resources as possible with minimum expenditures (not a minimum overall, but a minimum for the department).

Actually, the departments' activity is no different from that of any multinational (multirepublic, in our case) monopoly. More than this, they are super-monopolies. Few multinational monopolies have as large an operational scope as our ministries. In addition, they are backed by administrative power.

A mechanism for resisting monopolies has been set up all over the world. There is antitrust legislation in all developed countries. In their relations with the monopolies, the developing countries, the owners of the raw materials, use their national sovereignty, they use the method of contracts, as do the OPEC countries, for example, and impose quotas and restrictions. We, however, have nothing of the sort. The party authorities are the only antidepartmental force. The paradox is that we speak out against party interference in economic affairs, but at the moment it alone is helping to suppress the plundering carried out by departments.

Question. How is this negative influence exerted in practice, and what does it lead to?

Answer. An example of this practice is provided by the well-known "phosphorite case." The aspiration of the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production to increase the cheap extraction of phosphorites in the north of Estonia totally ignored their specific bedding: there is shale above the phosphorites, and it ignites spontaneously on being raised to the surface. At the moment we are unable to deal with this. There are porous strata under the phosphorites. If the phosphorites are removed, the water from Estonian rivers drains away to the sea via these porous strata. One-third of Estonia will be dehydrated. Finally, the most fertile land, valued at 200,000 rubles per hectare according to modern methods, is situated here.

The department takes into account neither this factor nor the fact that the phosphorites which have already been extracted are being used extremely inefficiently, 2.5 to 3 times less efficiently than in the developed countries. Fertilizers are not being applied directly to plants, but are scattered around. They are washed away by water and poison rivers and lakes. Such is the economically unprofitable project, fraught with the danger of ecological catastrophe, that the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production has been making every effort to push through.

There are masses of such stories in every region. In our case, however, there is an added national aspect. If you ask any 100 Estonians whose fault this is, they will not say that it is this minister or that ministry. They will say that it is Moscow's fault, that it is the result of Moscow deciding on all our affairs. The problem is taking on another, very dangerous dimension: it is becoming fraught with national alienation, and it is associated with a number of threats, above all of an ecological and specifically national nature.

The fact is that departmental development of the national economy and the location of enterprises were conducted, on a wide scale, in inhabited areas with a good infrastructure, and by bringing in any necessary labor resources where there was a local shortage. The result is that the proportion of Estonians in the local population is falling and has now fallen to 61-63 percent. The problem of becoming a national minority on one's own territory is arising in the mass public awareness.

This is what has given rise to national alienation, to a deteriorating attitude toward the nonindigenous population, and to alarmism and the real threat of extremism and a growth in centrifugal tendencies. All of this is the objective result of the departmental method of economic management. It provides no economic gain in the long run. Politically it is leading to an immense loss.

In addition, the problem is that the new arrivals often do not know, and do not consider it necessary to know, the language and culture of the local population. According to sociological studies, 47 percent of these new arrivals do not regard Estonia as their permanent place of residence. It is basically all the same to them where they live. This complicates interethnic relations. It is of importance that these issues have already begun to be discussed, for example in Yu. Lotman's article in KOMMUNIST No 6 of this year. These problems must now be worked through scientifically.

Question. What role can the development of cost accounting on a republic scale play in the solution of these complex problems, and what is the sense of the proposals which have been drafted on this count in Estonia?

Answer. The concept of republic cost accounting was, in fact, the basis of the Estonian Party Organization's proposals to the all-Union party conference. A number of delegates from other regions also came out with similar platforms, and many analogous provisions were included in the conference resolutions, especially the resolution on interethnic relations. Our concept began to be developed in the fall of last year and immediately won great popularity in Estonia. Everyone knows the word IME. (There is a play on words here, as "ime" means "miracle" in Estonian, but as an abbreviation it is expanded to mean "economic self-management of Estonia. Incidentally, with reference to a republic the term "economic self-management" is more accurate and correct, from an academic point of view, than "cost accounting," which contains a very definite element of reproduction.)

At the first stage, the concept was strong on criticism of departmentalist tendencies, but its positive program was largely naive. There were proposals on customs borders, on a republic currency unit, on having a closed economy, and on its partial reorientation toward the West.

Later, when specialists became involved in the development of the project, it became possible to eliminate this naivete. It also became possible to eliminate another weak aspect. For a long time there had been discussions on whether an enterprise should be subordinate to the Union or the republic. In the end the conclusion was reached that it should be subordinate neither to the Union nor to the republic, but only to economic and judicial laws.

There must be no republic isolation. Estonia is an organic part of the all-Union market and of the network of national economic ties. However, an equivalent and mutually advantageous trade is a condition for the effectiveness of these ties.

There are many problems in this area, such as the prices at which we sell agricultural products. Departmentalism has confused the pricing system in the extreme. This includes farms with low profitability. Where the profit-rate is higher, in other words where there is better economic management, the markup is lower. There are also markups for growth rates—once again, they are easier for those with a milk yield of 1,500 to 2,000 liters to obtain than for those who produce an average of over 4,000 liters. Moreover, all this confused machinery is wrapped in secrecy. There is no glasnost here. One cannot obtain comparative data on the purchase price of, say, milk. As a specialist in agricultural economics, even I was only able to obtain them once I became a conference delegate. It turns out that in Estonia milk is purchased in the public sector at a price which is lower by a factor of 1.3 than that in Moscow Oblast, where the weather and economic conditions and the quality of milk are approximately the same.

Why does Gosagroprom do this? In order to support the "lame and poor" about whom V.P. Kabaizze spoke so well at the conference. Some are corrupted by unearned handouts. Others, at whose expense these handouts have been given, are given a negative incentive and lose their interest in work. With a mutually advantageous exchange, everything would assume its rightful place. It is the same with meat, shale, or electrical power. The condition for a mutually advantageous exchange is therefore the reform of the pricing system, the linkage between price and cost, and consideration of world market prices.

Question. Does this standpoint not contain elements of what was called national egoism in a number of conference speeches?

Answer. No. Under no circumstances do we reject participation in all-Union programs. We propose, for instance, a sort of system of patronage, within an integrated program, over some oblast of the RSFSR, such as Pskov or Novgorod, to enhance the agriculture, construction industry, and production and social infrastructure there. There is naturally no doubt about our participation in strategic, scientific, and economic programs.

All we want is to know how much it costs. After all, no one knows how much he puts into the budget and how much he gets out. Ultimately the person who pays out the money must have a right to know where it goes: Is it for reversing the flow of northern rivers, is it for a tractor plant in Yelabuga, or is it to cover the costs of mismanagement or just pure plundering? Participation in all-Union programs must be two-fold—a financial, material input and a say, control. We need to have a precise knowledge of the direction and prospects of development of the republic's economy, and to influence that economy. At both Union and republic level there must be a system to regulate the economy, and a system to protect nature and man. This protection can be both administrative—in extreme cases such as the "phosphorite case" a straight ban will be necessary—and economic—resources being paid for at full cost.

Question. A scientific idea must be brought to the stage of practical implementation. In this respect, what are the prospects of the concept of republic cost accounting?

Answer. Detailed work is now being done in the republic to develop the concept of cost accounting in 11 sets of problems. Certain ideas are being reinterpreted in a radical manner. For example, a proposal was made to turn Estonia into a special economic zone. In the course of our work we concluded that it would be inadmissible to do a straight copy of the Chinese example. The conditions are entirely different. The success of the special zones there has been furthered by agrarian overpopulation and by extremely low wage levels, which has ensured that there is virtually unlimited manpower. This is not the case in Estonia. The transformation of Estonia into a "show-business" region, as some have suggested, is scarcely acceptable for social and moral reasons.

More thorough work has, however, produced some interesting alternatives. First of all, there is the development of foreign family tourism, for which conditions exist, especially in Tallinn, on the islands, and in the south of Estonia. This is all the more true because there is also a direct connection here with environmental protection and ecologically pure air. Cooperatives have already appeared which are engaged in this project all along the line, from ecology to tourism.

Second, there is the technopolis project for zones with special customs systems to which scientists from various Union republics and different countries would be invited to participate in the joint development of new ideas and technologies. A sort of Platonic principle, so to speak. An interdepartmental center for biotechnology has already been set up in Tartu as a sort of prototype technopolis, with Tartu University, the republic Academy of Sciences, and a number of republic rayons as shareholders. Foreign companies, Swiss in particular, are already showing interest in this initiative. This approach will make it possible to export patents, licenses, and science-intensive products, rather than raw materials.

A constant search is under way in this and other areas. Within the framework of the concept of republic cost accounting, ideas are being developed under conditions of competition among several scientific collectives. I am hoping that by the beginning of 1989 the concept will already exist in the form of a detailed document.

This concept is not only of economic importance to the republic. It also has tremendous domestic significance, because on its base and under the party's ideological leadership it has been possible to unite virtually all the healthy social forces in the republic, and to eliminate the social basis for national extremism. It can be said with confidence that the threat of growing extremism, which was very great a year ago, has been virtually eliminated.

The concept of republic cost accounting is not something specifically Estonian. It is applicable in any Union or autonomous republic, or every kray or oblast, of course with local conditions taken into account. It is already being developed in Latvia and Lithuania. There is a basis for it to be developed in other regions, too. The transition to cost accounting will probably take place in states in the various regions, based on their practical and theoretical readiness (the mechanisms of economic management). The road is a common one, but there is no obligation for the steps along it to be taken all at the same time.

Under no circumstances does republic cost accounting mean that republics will break away or be isolated; on the contrary, it is a way toward their consolidation on a mutually advantageous basis. In this case the stronger each region is, the stronger the Union will be as a whole. It will come to mean genuine political and economic cooperation between sovereign peoples. I would call republic cost accounting the economic foundation for political restructuring under the Leninist slogan of "All Power to the Soviets!"

Assert Perestroyka Through Action

[A. Korolev, I. Stroganov]

Question. Some of your colleagues are complaining that in the situation of conversion to full cost accounting, self-support and self-financing, the big machine building enterprises have found themselves in a most difficult situation. What do you think on this subject?

P. Stroganov. Well, I do not think that we are in a most difficult situation but the fact that the situation is difficult is accurate....

The rates of withholding were based on the control figures for the 5-year period and we are already experiencing a shortage of funds for technical retooling.

A. Korolev. And for housing construction as well! However, I do not think that it would be any simpler for the small enterprises to solve such problems, for we have adequate profits and we can somehow concentrate funds in the main area.

I. Stroganov. However, we have truly most pressing problems which have piled up in the course of decades. Some of them date from the day the enterprise was founded. Today we need a tremendous reconstruction of metallurgical and machine-assembly facilities. The pace at which we are replacing the equipment cannot satisfy us.

A. Korolev. In order to engage in a normal retooling and seriously talk about scientific and technical progress, 10 to 12 percent of the machine tools should be changed every year. To us this means about 600 machine tools annually. Yet we are able to replace only 120 every year. Our equipment is getting older. We have virtually no funds left for technical retooling for next year. The minister visited us and promised to help. However, this does not essentially change the situation.

I. Stroganov. In our view, the solution lies only in a revision of the rates. They are inconsistent with the needs of the enterprise, the interests of the country and, if you wish, the development of society.

All the speakers representing industry who addressed the party conference, unanimously demanded changes in rates and greater autonomy or, in any case, an autonomy no lesser than the one currently granted the cooperatives.

It is necessary to review the norms and improve the financial life of the enterprise in order for the economic mechanism to start working normally and so that we may be able to engage in expanded reproduction. This is also necessary on the political level, in order to implement the principle of full power to the soviets.

Think, is our executive committee an authority with full powers? It has virtually no housing facilities to manage, it does not actually manage anything in reality, and does not own anything. In this case Uralmash is the owner. We have our Sotsgorod, with a population of 180,000, and it has everything: housing, transportation, power and gas facilities, 17 schools, a house of culture and auxiliary farms, and even its own two electric trains. All of this belongs to the association.

A. Korolev. In the past we received more funds for capital construction than we can appropriate today from profits, based on the set rates.

I. Stroganov. For the time being, we do not know even in principle what the situation with material and technical procurements will be. We heard that a new approach will be adopted in terms of state orders. This is noteworthy. However, it will be the new one and, for the time being,

there is not even a regulation drafted as to what is a state order. On the other hand, it is being said that even state orders will not secure guaranteed procurements.

We are being told to establish direct relations. In our case, however, this is exceptionally difficult. Many suppliers have begun to refuse to supply us. We receive items from more than 1,500 enterprises; it is incredibly difficult to organize constructive "direct contacts" with all of them, with guaranteed implementation within the necessary deadlines.

At the conference many speakers spoke against the ministries, demanding that they be closed down. But then if there are no ministries there would be superministries, such as a machine building bureau, etc. Renaming would not solve the problem. Problems of linking, coordinating and procuring will not be solved merely by changing the label. Let us say that Uralmash is planning the production of new equipment, such as drills. Any machine today, roughly speaking, consists of a mechanical part, an electric power drive and a control system. The problem lies in the complementing items. In terms of drilling equipment it has become clear that Minkhim-mash and Minelektrotekhprom are neither ready nor unable to procure for us circulation systems or electric power drives.

Furthermore, the specific nature of our output is such that we have a most pressing need for and a chronic shortage of all items. We are asked to produce more and more, the maximum, as much as we can. On each separate occasion, we have a great deal of difficulty in drafting a plan which can be realistically met. The items on the plan are limited not by the customer and not by his needs, which are tremendous (or perhaps excessive), but by our possibilities, the possibilities of our suppliers.

Let us say, for example, that in order to meet all the requests of the drilling workers we should become totally reoriented toward the production of drilling systems. We would use all of our 600 million rubles to manufacture drills. The same could be said about machines for continuous metal casting.

As to consumer goods, the market is inexhaustible.

Reconstruction and retooling require foreign exchange and, particularly, freely convertible currencies of which there is an acute shortage. We could increase our export output but in order to achieve this we would need fewer state orders and have available capacity reserves.

Paradoxically, we live a rather peaceful life because in our enterprise we are short of everything, everything is in short supply. There is confusion and personnel turnover and the excessive stress does not allow the enterprises to consider their long-term future, market circumstances, a structural reorganization and changes in priorities. Uralmash is by no means a narrowly specialized production facility but, conversely, a multiple-purpose, a universal

set of machine building plants and we would like to invest our funds in the most highly efficient and most advanced facilities for the production of machines and use of the latest technologies. Only thus can we make our main output truly effective. I have been to America and have studied the activities of Occidental Petroleum. This concern has the broadest possible production program; it produces drilling equipment, is involved in the defense industry, services gas stations, is in the hotel business and even has meat processing facilities. These are all activities which bring profits, which make it possible to withstand the changes in market circumstances. It is only a broad program that allows a big concern to open branches and to invest funds in innovation processes and new technologies.

Unfortunately, we have no competition and, for most of the items we produce, we hold a monopoly. The production program is excessively stressed and there is rushing. Yet it is still not clear whether the country needs all that urgently all those machines which we are asked to produce.

A. Korolev. The fact is that the ministries and the Gosplan try to maintain the old level which was reached and are not interested in new equipment. They approach this problem warily and use any available reason for requesting the production of the old models. No orders are placed for new kinds of machinery.

We have suggested to customers the following: considering our excessive stress, let us give you not 400 drilling systems but, let us say, 290, but of better quality, better made, more reliable, easier to assemble, which would make your productivity higher.

No, they say, thank you, we prefer to have 400 of the old models.... We have our own accountability and assembly plan.... Yet we cannot produce 400, for this would demand more metal and higher labor intensiveness. The result is that the customer urges us to produce obsolete material-intensive goods.

Question. What role does the labor collective council play in formulating the strategy for the life of the enterprise and the adoption of the production program?

A. Korolev. For the time being, our experience in the new style of work is small. We are debating and seeking.... Our first general meeting of the labor collective council of the association indicated that we had prepared for it improperly. The chief economist came and presented a report on profits, rates, withholdings, where everything went, how much of it was used, etc. The people objected: we have never handled millions of rubles and we do not know how to allocate them. Perhaps a different system may be necessary.

We had to repeat our preparations, but this time properly. There was a display of slides, and speakers used posters to explain each separate figure and where would all the sums go. Hundreds of questions were asked, there were debates, and a common viewpoint was not reached immediately.

Naturally, our council would like to deal more not with current affairs but with strategic problems of life of the collective, with the development of the enterprises, the social area and long-term developments, and not with splitting a few pies. We would like to work on long-term plans, on the plan for the 5-year period, but how can we do such work when only 6 months are left until the new year and we have no idea about what we shall be doing in 1989. We do not know when we shall be issued the annual production program and its volume. This applies to reconstruction and modernization. We must know where to channel our main funds and what types of production facilities, shops and sections to develop. We must have an idea as to what we shall be producing in 1 year, 2 or 5. What type of new equipment will be necessary and where to procure it, at home, in the socialist countries or on the free market? We must know how much it will cost and how to find the necessary foreign exchange. Furthermore, everything must be taken into consideration: our own possibilities, those of the partners, bank loans, foreign financing and the prospects on the world market. Above all, our autonomy must be real and complete. There is not all that much freedom. This year our collective refused to adopt the plan suggested by the ministry, for it failed to reflect our real possibilities and exceeded the plan which had been adopted by the labor collective. We were entirely within the law by refusing that plan. What happened? The ministry and Gosplan were "hurt," as though obeying the law is not a mandatory prerequisite in economics and what is mandatory is to observe some kind of unformulated but quite rigid polite behavior, which consists of making the enterprise totally rightless. They were "offended" because the plant took a very serious attitude toward its rights, as stipulated in the Law on the State Enterprise. Yet we are simply unable to accept increased and excessive plans, for they lead to economic catastrophe.

The labor collective must have the last word and the sooner this is realized the better. There are no semi-economic methods. Methods can be either economic or not. We have tried many other methods. It is important to realize that planning at enterprises, based on their real possibilities, needs, wishes and intentions, means true state planning. If we indeed wish to advance and not turn in circles, we must realize that the level of planning in the country can be improved only by adopting a serious approach to enterprise creative planning. We must upgrade both the level of economic analysis and that of planning. Without reorganizing economic life on the level of the labor collective we can keep talking as much as we like about the economic reform.

Question. How is Uralmash solving problems of democratization and the necessary concentration of power and decision making?

A. Korolev. My understanding of this problem is as follows: a ship aboard which there is no captain, navigator or engineer but full democracy for the seamen is in poor shape. Where would this ship be sailing? It would be a success if it could even leave the harbor.... Everything must be done sensibly. We must not bring democracy to a point of absurdity, to a condition in which it becomes a toy in the hands of demagogues.

Truly attainable objectives must be set and we must work for their implementation. Everyone must be interested in this. The result would be a high income which should be allocated sensibly and equitably. We would willingly give funds to the soviets, so that it is they and not the plant who would manage them and would build housing, schools and hospitals.... In such a case the authority of the Soviet system would be enhanced, since it will have the ways and means of influencing the real life of the people.

Question. Are problems of environmental protection within the range of interests of the labor collective? What trends are being noted in this area? How deep is the understanding of the need to solve such problems?

I. Stroganov. The ecological situation in the Ural cities is critical. Pollution and emissions are excessive and trigger the indignation of the public. But let us cool down emotions and think constructively: What can we do? For 50 or 70 years we did not think of nature. We built enterprises with no treatment facilities, without tapping effluent water and gasses. Today such problems have been shifted from the ministries to the enterprises and their collectives. We are being systematically fined and threatened with the closing down of branches and shops, but what can we do? How can we work, fulfill the state orders and feed the people?

The need to finance enterprises in order to protect the environment makes the economic situation of enterprises even worse, for cleaning waste requires tremendous capital investments for which, alas, for many years, there have been no real customers. We must urgently develop an "ecological technology" cost accounting sector. For the time being, the crisis of the environment, which was created by the entire state in the course of decades, is now being shifted to the individual labor collectives. Industry can simply not withstand this, let us look at truth in the eyes.

We have estimated that we must allocate 200 million rubles for environmental protection. Two hundred million! Well, let us assume that we have found the money and will appropriate it. But who will use it, who will convert such funds into truly functional ecological technology?

How can we simultaneously achieve production modernization and reconstruction, improve the environment and revive the social sphere? Our plants, which are limping along, cannot assume the burden of ecology, a burden which must be assumed by the entire society.

We must deal with the ecology, we cannot avoid it. However, we must deal with it on a rational, a constructive level. We must have a long-term program and ensure its systematic implementation. The way we see it, the Soviet authorities should undertake the implementation of this program and control over it should be assumed by the people's deputies. The enterprises should make withholdings for the local soviets for ecological purposes. There must be an ecology tax. As to what to build, how to build it and who should build it, it is the soviets and their organizations which must deal with this matter.

Question. As participants in the 19th Party Conference, what did you take back to your plant, what is it that made the greatest impression and to what problems do you address your minds?

I. Stroganov. I was fortunate to be a delegate to the 27th Party Congress, so that I can make the comparison. The conference was a totally different and, in my view, an unprecedented event. Most important historical decisions were made. For a long time to come we shall be considering and discussing them. In my view, the question of changing the political organization of the society should have been discussed more profoundly and completely. These are problems of the role of the party, the power of the soviets, the mechanism of electing and promoting managers, and of dividing and combining powers. These are most important problems which will define the development of society. More thought is needed on this matter and the step which we must take is exceptionally serious.

A. Korolev. The spirit of the conference was exceptionally democratic and unusual in terms of our yardstick. The speeches were unusually free and sharp and the fact that all of them were published was a good thing.

There was little discussion, particularly by the workers, of problems of changing the political system. Personally, I found myself unprepared for such a discussion and did not immediately understand what the CPSU Central Committee general secretary was suggesting. I can now see that the suggestion involved a very interesting and promising procedure which goes far in the matter of democratizing the party and society.

Let us take our Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon, for example. Now the raykom secretary must go through the soviet of people's deputies, who number some 300 in the rayon, and it is the people who will elect (or not elect) him. Let me tell you that this is a most difficult test in the course of which the people remember everything: sociocultural life, sponsorship of the countryside, transportation, food and distribution of goods.... If he is elected, he will

function in an entirely different quality. His authority will be inordinately enhanced and, at that point, he will be someone with a mandate from the people, a leader of the people and not an official. This is the essential innovation. Today the position of raykom secretary is not enviable: the secretary is responsible for everything. People come to him with all of their troubles yet he has little possibilities. After the elections he will have other rights and other possibilities. He will be the rayon's leader....

Creative and Selfless Labor Is the Main Thing

[B. Paton]

The documents of the 19th All-Union Party Conference justly emphasize the need significantly to enhance the role of science. Unfortunately, science has still not become the most important structure-forming production factor and scientific and technical progress has not become the true foundation for the conversion of the economy to intensive development.

Naturally, the significance of science had been acknowledged in the past as well. However, by no means were words always followed by practical actions. As a result, we developed a serious lag in an entire series of most important areas of research and the pace of scientific and technical progress in the national economy slowed down inadmissibly, compared with the developed capitalist countries. These dangerous trends were the price paid for complacency and tolerance and, sometimes, the sacrificing of the truth to circumstantial considerations and a certain arbitrariness.

Today it should be a question of activating all factors leading to the intensification of scientific activities, accelerating the development of major basic results and achieving a real breakthrough in technology and the fastest practical utilization of new knowledge. It is exceptionally important to concentrate ways and means on priority areas of research, aimed at the development of equipment and technology on the level of the best world models and, above all, making them superior to the latter.

Furthermore, we must say most definitely that efficient steps must be taken to ensure a faster development of science. Reality has convincingly proved that no economy can be achieved here, particularly in the area of basic research. However, the current situation does not give grounds for optimism. M.S. Gorbachev's report noted the abnormality of the fact that the share of the academic sector of science, which generates the essential volume of basic research, accounts for no more than 6.8 percent of allocated funds. This is approximately half the level which the developed capitalist countries had reached at the start of the 1980s. In terms of absolute amounts, disparities in the overall annual outlays for

science are even greater. To maintain such a lag in the future, and to finance science on the basis of the "residual" principle is entirely inadmissible economically as well as politically.

As an alternative to budget financing of science, some delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference suggested to convert science to self-financing and self-support. Domestic and foreign experience lead to the conclusion that such an idea must be considered with a great deal of caution. What is justified for the sectorial scientific research organizations should not be automatically applied to academic institutions and VUZes in which basic research is concentrated. Such practices would lead to the failure of basic research, for it by no means is it always closely related to current production problems and, consequently, will obviously operate at a loss from the cost accounting viewpoint. In the final account, this would exhaust the political stock and will therefore lead to stagnation and lagging in applied developments.

A characteristic feature of basic research is the fact that the fast practical utilization, the effect of which is tremendous, will affect only an insignificant part of such research. Nonetheless, all of it lays the foundations for the further development of science itself as well as for its numerous practical applications. Failure to understand this and efforts to ascribe to basic research a circumstantial nature will inevitably lead to a degradation of the body of "big" science.

Therefore, the need to maintain the financing of basic science from the state budget and, furthermore, substantially to increase its volume, is unquestionable. The procedure for budget allocations for research is a different matter. This should be changed, radically at that. In particular, it should stipulate the competitive principle, a thorough expert evaluation of topics by scientists and, finally, be oriented above all toward support of scientific research programs in priority areas. To a certain extent, the organization of large-scale basic research on high temperature superconductivity was a prototype of such an approach.

The USSR Academy of Sciences is currently drafting all-Union scientific programs for 17 of the most promising areas. It is essentially a question of setting up a system of state programs for basic research with budget target financing. In our view, this is a most important organizational means of improving the development of powerful scientific breakthroughs, which are so necessary to the country, and which were discussed at the party conference. Let us reemphasize that in this case cost accounting is not an acceptable alternative.

It is particularly important for the state scientific programs to fully reflect the sometimes quite extensive theoretical developments and potentials available to the

republic academies of sciences. On this level a great deal could be accomplished by the USSR Academy of Sciences, its presidium and its departments.

We must put an end to the classification of science into "first class" and "second class." The unified Soviet science must always be on a single—world—level. Naturally, no single republic academy can accomplish this along the entire research front. It is also obvious as well, however, that each one of them must have its own personality, i.e., areas in which it would occupy leading positions in the country. Such a principle must become the foundation for the pursuit of our scientific policy.

The formulation of scientific programs should be related to a thorough expert evaluation of their promising nature, content and area, making extensive use of the competitive principle in setting up the leading organizations and in the allocation of financial and material-technical resources. Unquestionably, the competition must involve not only academic institutions but also VUZs and sectorial scientific research establishments. Such steps in restructuring the management of science must be supplemented by granting the scientific collectives total autonomy in the utilization of a portion of their budget allocations for research of an exploratory nature. The unpredictability of results in this case is particularly high. However, should a result appear, its impact on scientific and technical progress could be unpredictably great.

The question of backing science with all types of resources has assumed exceptional urgency in our country. In terms of the level and quality of availability of means of experimentation and laboratory areas we have fallen substantially behind the developed capitalist countries; the capital-labor ratio per scientific worker in the USSR Academy of Sciences is at no more than one-third that of the United States. Furthermore, the scientific equipment is largely morally and physically worn out. Small quantities of such equipment are manufactured in the country. Its variety is limited and, above all, its quality is lower compared to foreign equipment. Essentially, this situation makes success in the implementation of our scientific programs dependent on purchases of scientific equipment at foreign markets which, as we know, are also rather limited.

The attitude toward the condition of capital construction of scientific projects, considered as something secondary and not particularly mandatory, is a reflection of the overall adverse situation prevailing in support for research. This narrows the scale of research, reduces the pace at which it is conducted and slows down supplying the economic sectors with the latest equipment and technologies.

The elimination of such a lag is a task of prime significance, the more so since the needs of science in absolute terms cannot be compared to similar needs of industrial sectors and are only a minor percentage of the latter.

Cadres are the very foundation of science. Unfortunately, here as well by no means is everything in order in our country. In a number of cases even high positions are held by people who may have a great deal of merit but are weak in science. Such "leaders" are dangerous above all because they create around them an atmosphere of mediocrity and lack of inspiration. The result is a stagnation in some scientific areas, a stagnation which could be quite lengthy. What to do? I believe that we should listen to the view expressed by Academician P.L. Kapitsa who, having observed from very close such situations and having personally suffered from them, noted that "it is a familiar fact that however much an ungifted person may be supported, he will never accomplish anything leading and major in science.... The leadership of the academy must find, recruit and support the most talented people and should engage in such work even more than it does in the area of work topics."

Unquestionably, the role of personality in science is of decisive significance, the more so if this personality is that of the director. We agree with the idea that the director of an academic institute should be a major scientific personality. His work is difficult and sometimes unrewarding. For that reason, it is no secret that the "problem of the director" exists and is a difficult one. Steps must be taken to strengthen his prestige and propagandize more energetically the role of the leader of a creative collective in the development of science.

The question of the term of office of a director is of topical significance. Suggestions are currently expressed on limiting the term of the leading unit of the Academies of Sciences, including institute directors, to two 5-year terms, similar to the stipulations of the 19th All-Union Party Conference concerning elected party and soviet authorities. In our view, this approach is unacceptable in terms of an institute director, who is the key figure in the research process and the head of a scientific school. I believe that artificially terminating the activities of a major scientist who is doing fruitful work as a director, would have an extremely adverse effect on the situation in the respective institute and cause serious harm to scientific exploration. The same applies to department heads in academic institutes.

Ensuring the steady recruitment of young talented researchers in science should be a subject of special concern. The solution of this most important problem directly determines the fate of our science. Every true scientist must deem it his high duty to be profoundly interested in the fact that after him the scientific area would not decline but continue successfully to develop.

The time has come to eliminate, once and for all, the numerous obstacles which stand on the way of young people in science, and which are not directly related to their creative activities. In particular, it is high time to make a distinction between "talent" and "residence permit." Assigning young scientists to major scientific centers, including in foreign countries, so that they may

upgrade their professional standards and become familiar with the highest achievements, is of great importance. Domestic science is familiar with numerous examples proving the usefulness of such assignments.

Nor should we avoid the pressing problem of low receptiveness by enterprises of the latest scientific achievements. This was one of the greatest difficulties of the past, of which we have not been rid to this day. Furthermore, alarming symptoms of a further deterioration of the situation are visible.

It may seem that converting to cost account and self-financing should motivate production workers to pursue new developments and ensure their speediest possible application. In practice, however, the reverse is frequently noted. The very first experience of work under the new conditions revealed the dangerous trend of enterprises and associations starting to save on the already rather modest outlays for new equipment. Most of them are interested only in developments which enable them to eliminate tight spots without the elimination of existing technology, i.e., which lead to instant results. The expenditure of funds on exploratory projects and major long-term problems which, furthermore, include a certain share of risk, is something few enterprises engage in. We are currently coming across cases in which enterprises are not only refusing to conclude new economic contracts but are even terminate the financing of projects under development, citing the lack of funds. Toward the end of the first half of 1988 the financing of 14 contracts was terminated for the Electric Welding Institute imeni Ye.O. Paton alone. A series of such examples affecting other academic institutes may be cited.

Unfortunately, the reality is such that in the majority of cases profitability is achieved, so far, by no means as a result of scientific and technical progress. That is why here as well additional radical steps must be taken on the governmental level. In particular, we could consider a system of accelerated write-offs and tax benefits for programs related to technological retooling and other steps which would stimulate the receptiveness of enterprises to the achievements of science and technology.

Unquestionably, perestroika in economic management and the radical economic reform should, in the final account, lead to an improvement in the situation. However, we must take the time factor into consideration. Unless what we describe as the new economic mechanism begins to operate at full capacity, it will be quite some time until each enterprise will feel the inner need for the latest equipment and technology. The economic, political and moral cost of this may turn out to be excessively high.

Here is another quite important matter: the successful solution of the political and economic problems of perestroika requires the creation of an information infrastructure consistent with such tasks. Contemporary

efficient means for the study of production possibilities and requirements and the efficient exchange of information among enterprises are becoming, in addition to automation and robotics, the most important factor in intensive economic development.

In this case, however, progress is hindered by negative trends in the production and, particularly, the use of computers, the considerable lack of coordination among ministries producing such equipment and, above all, the absence of a clear concept concerning the development of an information system in the country. The formulation and implementation of a corresponding national program, similar to programs for food, energy or new materials, would contribute to correcting the developing situation and surmounting the lag in this important area of contemporary scientific and technical progress.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference also emphasized the need to take decisive steps to improve the management of scientific and technical progress and to surmount departmental barriers. One of the ways which was indicated was the creation of intersectorial scientific and technical complexes (MNTK). More than 2 years have passed since such complexes appeared. However, virtually all of them are experiencing serious difficulties and some of them are on the verge of collapsing.

What explains the fact that such a very necessary and progressive method is working so poorly? The MNTK were planned as consisting of major all-Union research centers which could achieve breakthroughs in priority areas. From the very beginning, however, they proved to be doomed to depending on the ministries. From the very first days, the intersectorial nature of the MNTK developed an antagonistic contradiction with the sectorial economic management system. There frequently is a struggle between the MNTK and the ministries, a struggle which is uneven. We believe that in many cases the very concept of the MNTK has been distorted and it was in such a distorted aspect that they were described in some of the legal regulations which control their activities. The MNTK must be intersectorial above all in terms of the nature and scale of activities. They must supply new and truly revolutionary technologies which would ensure breakthroughs in entire areas of our economy. Consequently, in our view, the number of MNTK should be substantially reduced and some of them converted into scientific-production associations.

At the same time, we must provide a satisfactory solution to problems of financial and material and technical support of their activities. I believe that they should not be approached only with a yardstick applied to ordinary state enterprises. In a number of cases state orders must become the basis of MNTK activities and their influence in the sector, naturally providing that such orders are clearly defined and truly advantageous to all participants in the process of creating and assimilating innovations. We are convinced that the MNTK will operate at full

capacity and will justify the hopes placed in them as leaders of scientific and technical progress. This requires the proper functioning of the radical economic reform.

Essentially new results and most important discoveries could and will unquestionably appear in most unexpected areas of basic research, above all at the intersecting points of different sciences. Real possibilities to this effect exist in our country. All that is needed is to provide the necessary conditions for fruitful work in science, as M.S. Gorbachev stipulated in his reports to the 19th Party Conference. Scientists must create and they must be given comprehensive help in this area. At the same time, their responsibility and what is demanded of them must be drastically enhanced. The main thing is work, creative and selfless work, without which the revolution, which is what perestroika is, cannot be carried out.

On the Path of Renovation

[G. Smirnov]

Question: Every day and every hour perestroika is making a new contribution. We expect such new developments and are impatient for their advent. We study and become accustomed to them as they become part of our daily life.

The conference was such an expectation of new developments: thorough preparations were made for it and great hopes were put on it; its proceedings were closely followed. What are your impressions from the conference and did it justify your expectations as a social scientist, director of a famous institute and party member?

Answer. Yes, novelty has become a mark of our time although, by virtue of its very nature, it is difficult to become used to it. If that which we sometimes describe as new does not amaze us then it is hardly truly new. No such thing can be said about the conference. Through its proceedings it most clearly proved the full accuracy of the conclusion which was included in the theses on changes in the social atmosphere in the country. The conference itself became a product of perestroika, a phenomenon of democratization and a clear embodiment of socialist pluralism.

In such an assessment of the party forum, I recalled a question which I was repeatedly asked by Western journalists: What is the situation with a multi-party system, and would other parties appear in your country? To sum it up, briefly, I answered: Currently we do not have economic, social and political grounds for the creation of any other party, nor of an alternate program. In general, I asked them, why do you have such a firm conviction that a multi-party system will provide as extensive an opportunity for considering and, above all, meeting the

interests of the popular masses as our one-party system? The conference proved in action the work of the mechanism of real consideration of different views.

Question. In your view, what was the main contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory that was made by the 19th All-Union Party Conference?

Answer. The most essential, in my view, that was accomplished, on the theoretical level, was bringing to light the third part of the single formula of the strategic course charted by the party: reaching a higher qualitative standard of socialism through acceleration and renovation. We have written and spoken a great deal about both acceleration and renovation. Never before, however, have we described on a party-wide level, in such a concentrated aspect, the nature of such a qualitatively new socialist society. Finally, now this general formula has been given a specific content.

Let me remind you, without going into details, the basic features of the qualitatively new status of socialism, as formulated in M.S. Gorbachev's speech. Socialism means a system of true and real humanism in which man is truly the "measure of all things;" it means an efficient and dynamic economy based on the best achievements of scientific and technical progress; social justice; high standards of culture and morality; full democracy; equality among all nations and ethnic groups; and, finally, a system in which aspiration toward peace is organically inherent in its nature and interests.

Question. In the past 3 years these views have been discussed in publications. What is the novelty of this characterization?

Answer. It is one thing when any given feature such as, for example, humanizing, social justice, or national relations is considered separately, and something entirely different when all of this is structured within a complete, an organically interrelated set of features which now must become not only an ideal but the practical target of policy in all social areas—economics, the development of science and technology, social relations, health care, public education, culture, and so on. We can see how, facet after facet and layer after layer social relations are being enhanced and considered from the viewpoint of how they can and will be improved.

It is important to note yet another aspect: giving a specific content to the overall formula of a qualitatively new condition of socialism has been quite timely. With increasing frequency the press has published articles with attempts at critically analyzing errors and deformations which have taken place along our way. We are becoming accustomed to this with difficulty. However, without the development of criticism perestroika is inconceivable; without criticism, as M.S. Gorbachev's report noted, no revolutionary awareness can be achieved. Furthermore, it was stated at the conference that "in addition to criticism of exposed shortcomings

and an indication of what we must reject, we have an equally great need for constructive, for positive guidelines which will define the ways and means through which practice can come closer to the end objectives and ideals of socialism." This was quite accurately put.

Question. Could you tell us, in connection with the meaning of the definition of the objective of our renovation, what specific problems will be facing the social sciences?

Answer. Their simple enumeration would be difficult. Nonetheless, let me name some of them: humanism, social relations, mutual respect, and relations between man and society—not an abstract society but a society in terms of the meaningful identification of all of its institutions, the comprehensive development of the individual, and so on.

Let us consider, for example, socialist humanism. A long time ago we raised the slogan "Everything for Man!" We formulated it and calmed down, without developing this concept profoundly and systematically. Thus, we did not consider the sum of the requirements of today's people. We did not provide it with a scientific description and breakdown. We did not follow development trends. We do not know what it consists of, this present sum of needs of the different social groups and strata; we do not know how able society is to meet such needs, how to do so and how. These three elements—the sum of requirements and the social possibilities and means of their satisfaction—have not been analyzed by the scientists quite fully. Nor did we have sufficient empirical data for such studies. Sociological studies conducted in the past were of a strictly local nature and failed to provide an overall picture of contemporary society. Nor could such a picture be obtained from the reports of the then existing Central Statistical Administration. Today, if we wish to make a scientific study of the problem of the humanistic ideal, we need, above all, a specific organization for the study of real processes in the area of social requirements. Socialist humanism will remain a general statement unless we solve the problem of the comprehensive development of the individual, a problem which is controversial and complex.

Or else let us consider the question of the variety of forms of socialist ownership. Until very recently this problem had not been solved. It is only now that we have reached the conclusion that under socialism there are far more forms of ownership than we thought existed in the past. This includes state, cooperative and enterprise ownership, ownership which is the foundation for individual labor activity and ownership by various social organizations, i.e., a variegated range of ownership relations. Such an interpretation of the variety of forms of ownership under socialism provides unlimited opportunities for upsurge in the economic activities of enterprises and other economic organizations.

Question. Yes, unquestionably the different forms of ownership are a good thing. In your view, however, what is it that makes all these forms specifically socialist? In other words, what is your view on the criteria for the socialist nature of such a great variety of forms of ownership?

Answer. We are simplifying matters by trying to label "socialist" or "antisocialist" any kind of social phenomenon. We thus create for ourselves a mass of fictitious problems. I am convinced that not all social phenomena can make the conversion from a bourgeois to a socialist quality. Many social phenomena are of a universal nature. This particularly applies to culture. Otherwise, in general, why should we value Horatius or love Pushkin? In the rich variety of human life not everything can be labeled "socialist" and "nonsocialist."

Question. Nonetheless, what is the situation with socialist ownership and its criteria?

Answer. I believe that under conditions in which so-called command positions in the economy are in the hands of the socialist state and when public ownership of the land and of the fixed capital in industry and agriculture exists, all forms of ownership, even those which may sometimes be viewed as alien grafts on the system of existing production relations, are socialist. I do not see in the forms of ownership existing in our country (other than the "accumulations" of clandestine millionaires, naturally) any which could be classified as capitalist.

Let me mention yet another complex and, unfortunately, little studied problem, the problem of interest. A real scientific knowledge in the social area begins when researchers ask what reasons motivate the actions of an individual and what interests mold his stance or, to be more precise, when do the ties which may be quite heterogeneous, quite complex and contradictory, between the views of an individual and the interests of a group become apparent, and when do the laws governing the behavior of a given group become clear? All of this is of decisive importance in understanding the nature of human behavior and the mechanism of interrelationship between the individual and the group, between the individual and society. Obviously, anyone who wishes to understand the "mechanics" of interests should aspire to understand the profound changes which socialism has brought to us and the deformations which took place in our country as a result of the lengthy and grave lack of attention to the existing interests of the people in their entire variety and complex intertwining. The scientific study of this problem was neglected in our country. Thus, to the best of my recollection, the question of combining individual with public interests was raised, as a theoretical problem, only sometime on the eve or even after Stalin's death. To this day we still have not learned how practically to combine the interests of the individual, society, social groups and the family. Unless we learn how to do so, we shall not be able to solve our

problems. The need to combine the various interests with a view to achieving socialist progress was also discussed at the conference.

Therefore, a number of scientific problems face the social sciences; they include a great variety of difficult, complex, sharp, basic and topical problems.

Question. In connection with the broad range of theoretical problems which were brought to light and included in the documents of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, what plans are being earmarked currently in the activities of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism?

Answer. Above all, the task of writing an honest and truthful history of our society and of the Communist Party. We recently celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Soviet system and will soon be marking the centennial of our party. In terms of the global standards of history, this is not such a long time. Nonetheless, within that time we have experienced repeated "bursts" of true enthusiasm on the part of the masses, extensive heroism and dedication, and experienced grave errors, defeats and tragedies. The attentive attitude toward this experience is one of our main tasks. This is no simple matter, not only because this experience is unique and complex, but also because a great deal in our historical science was falsified. In order to suit his interests, Stalin demanded that history be rewritten. The time from the very beginning of the century and through the Patriotic War is presented in the familiar textbook "*History of the VKP(b). Short Course*," from the viewpoint of the notorious concept of the "two leaders." The role of Stalin and some people close to him in revolutionary activities was exaggerated while the names of many of Lenin's fellow-workers were deleted. It is thus that a lie, a deliberate and destructive lie, was born.

In order to eliminate all such distortions we must, above all, present the facts accurately. We have started work in this direction. We have drafted a scientific list of "blank spots" in party history. These are problems which are not entirely clear even to professionals: they were either insufficiently documented or conflicting information exists on their subject. All of this must be thoroughly clarified.

Furthermore, we have conducted a series of special studies of individual stages in our party history: industrialization, collectivization and others.

We recently held a discussion on the nature of the ideological and theoretical struggle within the party in the 1920s and, specifically, the role which was played at that time by party leaders such as Trotsky, Zinovyev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov and others. A number of stereotype concepts about these individuals had to be revised. Their political views and ideological concepts themselves were frequently a reflection of the views held by one or another segment of the party, and not of the party alone. Thus, we find in the views expressed by

Trotsky, Zinovyev and Kamenev on the destinies of our revolution a reflection and a refraction of the ideas which were popular in Western social democratic circles and which did not conceive of the start of a transition to socialism other than after reaching a highly developed level of civilization, for which reason they believed that socialism in Russia, given the country's backwardness, could not be built. Incidentally, to this day this is a viewpoint supported by the Polish theoretician Adam Schaff. It is difficult to determine the positions which were held by Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinovyev, on the one hand, and Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy and Stalin, on the other, and to understand why Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy subsequently assumed a hostile attitude toward Stalin. This whole thing can not be painted in only two colors. This problem demands extensive research.

We are currently writing a multiple-volume party history and a popular science outline of CPSU History. We intend to publish all party documents, such as minutes of congresses, plenums and conferences. We are preparing the publication of the sixth edition of V.I. Lenin's Complete Collected Works, and a third edition of the works of Marx and Engels. We hope to publish the history of the Comintern. The question of publishing the works of G.V. Plekhanov in 30 volumes has been raised on the practical level, although we find the solution of this problem difficult. I believe, however, that with the help of the Leningrad Plekhanov House and the USSR Academy of Sciences, we shall be able to deal with it.

Question. So far you have spoken of the work of the institute in the area of history as a science which deals with the past. History, however, is also past, present and future. Can you tell us about studies conducted by the institute on problems of the contemporary socialist society and its future development?

Answer. The point is that the various branches of our institute dealing specifically with such problems are few. Created toward the end of the 1960s, they remained actually static and dealt essentially with superimposing works over that which had already been written by the classics (which was typical at that time of many works in the social sciences). Today the theory of scientific communism must be set on a real foundation and we must concentrate on the study of what is occurring in life. The study of our society is not simply a difficult but a unique project. For example, a single family may have members representing all social categories: teacher married to a tractor driver with children who are either workers or highly skilled engineers, etc. A given family may have splendid housing but a modest budget, etc. There is an incredible interweaving of social status, income and education. However, we have not carried out any kind of profound and systematic research on this problem....

Question. Is this a reproach addressed to sociologists?

Answer. It is not. It is a question of the fact that in as much as the institute deals with the problems of contemporary society, we must also engage in collecting empirical data. The sociologists study specific processes but think little about the type of correlation that their studies have with the overall process of the establishment of the new system.

Question. Are specific studies short of a theoretical foundation?

Answer. Sociology does have this weak spot. Incidentally, this is mentioned by the sociologists themselves. What we must do is either combine sociological knowledge with scientific communist theory (which is the most accurate) or equip scientific communism with its own information-sociological service. In our institute, actually, no study of the problems of contemporary socialism is possible without such a service.

We are currently drafting the monograph "*The Leninist Concept of Socialism*," and the book "*Democratization of Intraparty Life*," the collections "*K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin on Democracy*," and "*The CPSU on Perestroika*," and the book "*The Mechanism of Obstruction: History, Action, Ways of Elimination*," were recently published. We plan to deal extensively with national relations.

In a word, a great deal of work lies ahead....

Power to the Soviets

[A. Zhalis]

The slogan "Full Power to the Soviets!" was extensively heard both before and during the conference. However, in defending this unquestionably accurate slogan, some of its supporters went so far as to claim that in our country the soviets were totally helpless, enjoyed no respect, had no power whatsoever, and so on. I categorically object to such evaluations. One is either totally blind to the real state of affairs or...we are dealing here with an obvious speculation. Obviously, some officials, including in the soviets, find it more convenient to justify their idleness and helplessness by referring to the conditions of the period of stagnation, which has become almost fashionable.

Yes, the soviets were replaced in many affairs by the party committees and in frequent cases the solution of local problems was blocked by the opposition of central departments. However, I agree with M.S. Gorbachev that true communists worked and did what they could even during the period of stagnation!

Actually, who had directly forbidden us to develop trade, consumer services and the communal economy, or to strengthen the material facilities for culture? No one! Personally I, in nearly 20 years of my work in the ispolkom, do not recall such a case. It is true that 5 to 10

years ago comprehensive economy was applied in the development of the social area, in the area of culture in particular. In our city of Klaypeda we did not observe this, and nothing happened to us. I did receive a reprimand but we went on with our work. In this sense Lithuania is no exception.

Responsibility and initiative are the main prerequisites for the restoration of full power to the soviets. Any manager, a soviet official even more so, must always think above all about the people and their needs. Occasionally, however, if this is demanded by the work, he must also take a justified risk. This, however, frightened many people and still does: taking a risk without clutching at one's position, like a safety belt.

Naturally, today the conditions which are being provided are entirely different from those which prevailed 3 to 5 years ago. They allow us to do a great deal more than in the past and with less risk. The following question is legitimate: What kind of a system is it in which the authority is unable to meet the needs of the people without taking a risk? This is truly a paradox. The purpose of the economic reform and the reform in the political system was to surmount it.

At the conference as, actually, even before it, a great deal was said about the need to enhance the role and authority of the soviets. I fully support the thought that for a long time the role of the soviets themselves had been reduced and that virtually all problems pertaining to their competence were solved by the ispolkoms. Yet it is precisely the deputies who are to become the masters of the city.

How is this to be achieved? Suggestions have been formulated to release the deputies for a certain period of time from their main job, to lengthen the length of sessions, and so on. Obviously, all of this should be tried. However, I am deeply convinced that unless we lay an economic foundation for power of the soviets, nothing would help. Why is it that virtually all problems have been solved and to this day are still being solved by the ispolkom? Because, above all, a great deal of things, particularly in the area of capital construction, depends on ministries and departments which are in Vilnius, Moscow, and so on. Who can be shuttling around such ministries? Not the deputies of the city soviet! It is we, the personnel of the ispolkom, that ran around with our requests. We then submitted our plans to the deputies. What could they change in such plans! We had only as much capital investments as we had been able to "extract," and nothing more.

As early as the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, M.S. Gorbachev expressed the following very important thought: "Why should we not consider and apply a system under which industrial construction may be allowed to a ministry or department only if, at the same time, it would put at the disposal of the territorial authorities funds for the development of the social area

on the basis of substantiated rates." These accurate words were expressed more than 1 year ago but, unfortunately, the economic rates were not formulated. This idea was reflected in the conference, which is an encouraging fact.

For example, 1 year ago, at a city soviet session, having already coordinated the matter with the labor collectives, we resolved that each enterprise should withhold annually for the city soviet 30 rubles per worker, to be used in solving town-wide social problems. This would enable us, by the year 2000, to build in the city a number of major projects. With an above-plan ceiling of manpower in the labor collectives, "payments" per newly hired worker could reach, in our estimates, 12,000 rubles. As we know, this is practiced in other cities as well. The financial possibilities of the city soviet could be increased also by making certain withholdings for the town budget from income earned by the enterprises from exports.

At the session we resolved that if an enterprise is building and expanding its production capacities, as much as 5 percent of the capital investments used for such purposes should go to the city to solve town-wide social problems (naturally, not including the share of the enterprise's participation in building engineering facilities). These suggestions were supported by the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

We are convinced that capital construction in the city should be planned exclusively by the city soviet and not the Gosplan, a ministry or a department, for it is precisely the city soviet that is more familiar than anyone else with the needs of urban residents. We suggest that the capacities of construction organizations at our disposal (approximately 40 million rubles annually) be used exclusively in accordance with our plans. The deputies should determine how much and when to build housing for enterprise personnel and what other projects to build in the city. It is self-evident that our construction workers will be able to work beyond city limits as well.

All of this, naturally, is not a claim to the ultimate truth. It is our deep conviction, however, that it is precisely such a trend that must be followed. The introduction of economic rates and the procedure we suggest for planning capital construction will help to upgrade the activeness and assert democracy in the work of all deputies. Let them meet and argue as to where and how to spend the money. There can be no democracy and autonomy "in general." They must be based on a firm material foundation and make use of economic management instruments.

I admit that I was bothered by the fact that little was said about this aspect of the matter at the conference. I also noted the fact that no single chairman of a council of ministers, deputy chairman of a supreme soviet presidium or executive committee chairman spoke at the

conference. Something else I failed to understand: Why is it that scientists—economists, jurists and even the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium—did not do extensive work on this matter in advance and did not discuss it with soviet officials? In effect, this fundamental problem of the work of soviets remained unsolved.

Or else let us consider the question of demarcating the functions between party and soviet agencies. Until the conference no one had truly studied this problem and no one had suggested anything specific. In this case as well neither the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium nor the Council of Ministers proved to be on the necessary level.

The idea of combining the position of chairman of the soviet and first secretary of the respective party committee initially created in me, as it did in many delegates, doubts. I admit that to this day, after I have calmly thought about the course and results of the work of the conference, I still have some doubts. That is why it seems sensible to me the fact that there are two stipulations on the resolution of the reform of the political system on this matter: the fact that this is a question only of recommending first secretaries to hold the position of soviet chairman, and the fact that they be recommended for this position "as a rule."

As to the details, in my view, it is the population that must elect, by direct vote, the chairmen of city and rayon soviets. The following question may arise: Are all voters—residents of a city or rayon—able properly to assess the qualities of a candidate for such a position? I believe that in this case the only way is to meet with the people, to explain to them one's platform and program of action. This is the essence of democracy and, if you wish, of a real and fruitful electoral campaigning, when the best among the best are to be selected.

This also raises the rather difficult question of how to ensure that the soviet deputies can properly control the work of soviet apparatus. So far, for example, I am unfamiliar with any full answer to this question. A great deal of thought will have to be given to it. It is obvious that the deputy cannot deal with everything, not to mention doing this during his working time. Yet if he were to abandon his job for a lengthy period of time the labor collective may suffer and the deputy himself, under the conditions of cost accounting, could be deprived of his earnings. Obviously, he must be paid for the time spent in carrying out his duties as a deputy, let us say 4 to 5 days monthly, from the funds of the soviet. I repeat, the details of all of this must be decided by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The conference called upon the party members immediately to undertake the practical implementation of the plans, without waiting for additional instructions. Even more so than the previous party fora, it had aimed all of us toward solving social problems. I believe that this today is the main thing. Our city soviet is concerned with two problems: the first is housing. Some 13,000 people

are waiting for housing in the city. This year we built approximately 2,000 apartments. In order to solve the party's task concerning housing by the year 2000, we must build no less than 2,400 apartments annually. We are adding to the capacity of the main construction organizations the great potential of construction by the enterprises themselves in addition to individual house building. The second, which was clearly voiced at the conference in M.S. Gorbachev's final speech and in the resolution, was that of food supplies. However greatly Klaypeda was praised for the work of its trade organization, nonetheless both the variety and quality of food products leave a great deal to be desired. We are a city of fishermen yet the citizens do not even have enough fish. Generally speaking, the food situation in the republic, in my view, is not brilliant. Both problems must be solved immediately. I repeat: we do not need outside bosses for the city. All we need is the right to handle the funds ourselves.

Going back to the slogan of full power to the soviets, let me emphasize the following: it would be a grave error to understand the transfer of many power functions from party authorities to the soviets in the sense that command-administrative and pressure methods will now be in other hands. This is not the case! For example, one cannot order industry, which is something, we believe, understood by everyone today. The enterprises must solve by themselves the problem of what to produce and how to do it. The local soviets must determine what to build and where to build. Issuing commands in other areas of life would be equally inadmissible, for if this were to happen no progress would be possible.

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The Socialist Legal State

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[Article by Academician Vladimir Nikolayevich Kudryavtsev, director of the State and Law Institute, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and YeLena Andreyevna Lukasheva, doctor of juridical sciences, sector head in the same institute]

[Text] Now that there is an active debate about how to remove the obstacles standing in the way of the restructuring process and to give powerful new impetus to the revolutionary process of renewal, and now that an active search is being conducted for strategic areas in which our society can be improved, it is becoming increasingly evident that there is an urgent need to carry out tasks linked to the reorganization of the political system and the creation of a socialist legal state.

The formation of a legal state is inseparable from the development of democracy. Socialist self-management of the people can be made a reality only under a rule of law which excludes arbitrariness and anarchy as well as any manifestation of willfulness on the part of officials. The legal state is not only one of the supreme social values intended to affirm the humanist values of socialism, but is also a practical instrument for ensuring and defending the freedom, honor, and dignity of the individual, a means of combating bureaucracy, parochialism and departmentalism, and a way of exercising socialist popular power.

The establishment of the principles of a legal state is meeting with resistance, and will inevitably continue to do so: After all, it calls for the destruction of fixed ideological stereotypes, the complete renunciation of administrative-command methods of leadership, and the elimination of judicial nihilism, voluntarism, and subjectivism. From the point of view of theory an important role as an internal factor is played by the circumstance that for a long time Soviet juridical doctrine considered the very idea of a legal state inapplicable, for it had been proclaimed in the period of bourgeois democratic revolutions. In reality, this dogmatic approach only reflected the negative attitude toward the general human values which had developed in the 1,000-year process of advancement of humanist thought, and had summed up the very rich historical experience of social progress and people's freedom and equality.

I

The idea of the rule of law has ancient roots in the life of people, society, and state: it was born as a counterweight to the autocratic and arbitrary personality of the ruler. Plato wrote: "I see a quick death for a state in which the law has no force and is under someone's authority. Where the law is lord of the rulers and they are its slaves, I foresee the salvation of the state and all the benefits which only the gods can bestow on states." Aristotle elaborated similar views: "Wherever the authority of law is lacking, there is no room for (any) form of state structure. The law must rule supreme...." "But what is the state if not general law and order?" asked Cicero.

These ideas were later developed in detail by the foremost bourgeois political thinkers who contrasted the indisputable nature of law with feudal arbitrariness (C. de Montesquieu and J. Locke). In Russia, A.N. Radishchev, A.I. Gertsen, N.G. Chernyshevskiy, and other revolutionary democrats subjected the lawlessness of tsarism to devastating criticism.

The philosophical basis for the state ruled by law were formulated by Immanuel Kant, who regarded the state as "an association of many people subordinated to judicial laws," and who considered that the legislator must be guided by the requirement that "...What the people cannot decide with regard to themselves, the legislator cannot decide with regard to the people." In Russia the

principle of the rule of law in social relations developed in the work of liberally oriented academic lawyers—N.M. Korkunov, A.F. Kistyakovskiy, S.A. Kotlyarevskiy, P.I. Novgorodtsev, G.F. Shershenevich, and others.

The value of the idea of a state governed by law lies in the assertion of sovereignty of the people, as the source of their power and the guarantee of their freedom, and in the subordination of state to society. This idea was expressed thus by K. Marx: "Freedom consists in transforming the state from an agency standing above society into an agency entirely subordinated to this society; indeed, in our time the greater or lesser freedom of state forms is defined by the extent to which they limit the 'freedom of the state.'" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *"Soch."* [Works], vol 19, p 26).

Unlike liberal trends, Marxism-Leninism never overestimated the role of bourgeois democracy and rule of law. It noted the class limitations of bourgeois political and legal institutions and, at the same time, noted the definite potential which they open up for the working people's struggle for social liberation. "A broader, freer, more open form of class struggle and class oppression," V.I. Lenin wrote, "is an immense help to the proletariat in its struggle to eliminate classes altogether." (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 33, p 80). The components of this "more open form" are general suffrage, a republican and democratic state structure, sovereignty of the people, functionaries who are answerable to the people, and so on. F. Engels noted that "For us... it is an immutable truth that relations between rulers and the ruled must be established on the basis of law...." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 41, p 125).

The ideas about a bourgeois legal state, ideas which occupied a notable place in the political and legal doctrine of social democracy, were never fully put into practice. This was hindered by the social conditions of a capitalist society which inevitably gives rise to instability, unemployment, discrimination against various population groups, and violations of legality and democracy. As far back as in the twenties, the British historian A. Taylor said that it is impossible to establish a legal state without democracy. This is true: the supremacy of the law may easily turn into a reactionary force if the law itself does not reflect the will of the people, their vital interests, and democratic aspirations.

Socialism creates completely new economic, social, and political conditions in which the formation of the state is inseparably linked to the democratization of the whole of social life and the exercise of true popular power. In this context, the practical opportunities for developing a socialist legal state, the specific features of such a state in each country, and the time-frame and aspects for its development—are not determined in a uniform manner; they are closely related to the specific historical situation.

In the Russia of October 1917, not only was the power of the bourgeoisie and landowners overthrown, but the existing legal statutes were also destroyed. A new socialist legal system based on the principles of equality and social justice gradually began to develop in the country. One of the first legal documents—the Guiding Principles on Criminal Law of the RSFSR (1919) stated: "An armed people have dealt and are dealing with their oppressors without special rules and without codes. ...The experience of struggle is, however, accustoming them to common measures, leading to a system, and engendering a new law." The transition to the new economic policy laid the ground for the idea of legality to establish itself. The resolution of the 19th All-Russian Congress of Soviets (1921) stressed that "the new forms of relations created in the process of revolution and on the basis of the economic policy conducted by the authorities must find expression in law and be protected by judicial procedure." (*"Syezdy Sovetov RSFSR i Avtonomnykh Respublik RSFSR, Sbornik Dokumentov"* [Congresses of Soviets of the RSFSR and its Autonomous Republics. Collection of Documents], vol 1, Moscow 1959, p 188). Lenin noted that practical implementation of the socialist state's fundamental tasks by the methods of Soviet power "on the basis of its laws, is necessary and adequate for the final victory of socialism." (op. cit., vol 36, p 174).

The consolidation of legality in the historical conditions in which the world's first socialist state found itself was an extremely painful and difficult process. It was necessary to overcome legal nihilism, which had been exacerbated by the petit bourgeois mentality of broad population strata; the methods of "war communism" had to be renounced, as had the aspiration to act along the guidelines of "revolutionary expediency" alone. The legal standards of most functionaries in the state, economic, and party apparatus was low. Theories about the rapid withering away of law were widely held.

Nevertheless, it was in precisely this period, during V.I. Lenin's life, that the legal foundations of the Soviet state were formed one after the other. The first law codes were adopted in the early twenties. The role of courts and the legal profession increased, the extraordinary organs were abolished or reorganized, and the sphere of state coercion narrowed. The procuracy was created, its main purpose being to supervise the legality of actions by state administration agencies. An active search was conducted for effective legal forms to regulate political and socio-economic processes. The development of socialism began to take a normal course.

At the end of the twenties a completely different situation, and one which was a gross contradiction of Lenin's ideas and methods of building socialism, began to develop in the country. It is obvious that the reasons for this were of a complex social and historical nature. Nor must one disregard the circumstance that the Soviet political system had not developed political and legal mechanisms which would have ensured the rule of law in

social relations, and which would have served as an obstacle in the way of the personal power and command-administrative methods which were gradually assuming a decisive role in the country's leadership. This "legal defenselessness" in the political system served as one of the important reasons for those tragic events in our history which we are talking about today with anguish.

When we evaluate the lessons of the past we rightly pay a great deal of attention to Stalin's psychological characteristics, to his criminal activities and those of his circle, and to their immense guilt before the people. It is, however, no less important to answer the question of why this became possible. Can a social system entirely depend on the psychological qualities of its leader, and should it not be equipped with reliable methods of protection against the abuses, arbitrariness, willfulness and unchecked behavior of any official or organ? It is common knowledge that in his last articles V.I. Lenin persistently sought political guarantees and organizational measures necessary to attain this goal. They were not implemented at that time.

The authoritarian leadership methods introduced by Stalin were inevitably associated with limitations on democracy and gross violations of civil rights. Under these conditions law was regarded as a set of commands, prohibitions, and restrictions, rather than as an expression of the extent to which individual and society were free. "...Socialist law," wrote A.Ya. Vyshinskiy, "is... a method of subordinating people and classes to the order established by the ruling class in a given society, and beneficial and suited to that class." Ideas about protecting the individual's honor and dignity and preserving civil rights and liberties were entirely eliminated from the "official" theory of law and legal practice. The most important democratic values developed by centuries of progressive political and juridical thought were violated on: the independence of courts, the prescription of innocence, the adversarial principle and humanism. In cases concerning state crimes the accused were deprived of a defense and the right to appeal sentences; their relatives and associates were also repressed. The activity of the extrajudiciary organs was unconstitutional.

The abandonment or gross flouting of elementary legal principles resulted in irreparable human losses and grave political and moral consequences for our society. After all, law is indissolubly connected with morality, and is supposed to assert the ideas of liberty and respect for the individual, and to promote the achievement of social justice. Disregard for the law alienates socialism from morality and its fundamental values; it inevitably leads to the deformation of the socialist system, which in turn gives rise to new lawlessness. It would, of course, be naive to attribute all these phenomena to the imperfection of legal mechanisms. One should also take into account the low standard of society's political culture, the related blind belief that the "leader" who personifies

the entire social system is right, the oversimplified interpretation of socialist ideology, and the bureaucratization of the power apparatus.

Deformation of the political system is impossible or at least made substantially more difficult when society is sufficiently civilized in the legal sense; this presupposes reliable safeguards for the inviolability of the individual, freedom of opinion, and protection of man's honor and dignity, and erects barriers in the way of any restrictions on democracy. These conditions did not exist in the twenties and thirties. They are now developing and becoming established. This has placed the practical creation of a socialist legal state on the agenda.

After the 20th CPSU Congress, which exposed the arbitrariness and lawlessness of the personality cult period, important steps were taken to restore the Leninist principles of socialist legality: there was wide-scale rehabilitation of innocently convicted people who had been liquidated by the extrajudicial organs, and the oversimplified procedure for examining cases of crimes against the state was abolished. The state security and internal affairs organs were placed under the control of the party and the supreme state authorities.

However, broader measures to consolidate legality and protect civil rights and freedoms were not implemented. The reason for this was primarily that the nationalization of essentially all the relations and institutions of civil society, a process which had developed over many years, had not yet been overcome. The political structures remained as they were, the democratization of social life was not further developed and continued to be minimal despite a number of important steps, and dogmatism continued to rule ideological life.

The decline in the law's prestige, and the lack of respect for it, penetrated deep into all areas of social life. An anything-goes attitude and disregard for the law on the part of managerial and bureaucratic strata resulted in legal nihilism among the population, which, in its turn, led to a rise in violations of labor discipline and of the spread of drunkenness and drug addiction, apathy, and brutality. All of this further deepened the pre-crisis situation in which the country found itself.

II

As we engage in the consistent democratization of all areas of our life today and develop socialist self-management of the people, we must above all concentrate our efforts on restoring respect for the law and on asserting and observing the principles of legality. There is, however, much more that needs to be done: to create new political and legal mechanisms which are in constant operation, which **rule out the very possibility of socialist principles being deformed in the future, and without**

crises. New political and legal thinking, which must be consistently made a part of practice and life, is necessary to this effect. That was the way the 19th Party Conference formulated the issue.

The creation of a socialist legal state presupposes the "denationalization" of social life and its emancipation from petty regulations and interference by state authorities wherever various social formulations are quite capable of coping with the matters to be resolved. In order to ensure genuine popular power, **the state must be subordinate to society**, it must express society's interests. In its legislative activity it must be guided by the democratically expressed will of all the people. It is very important to develop self-management principles in economic and political life, to restructure the economic mechanism, and to guarantee enterprises' independence and labor collectives' rights.

The assertion of the principles of a socialist legal state has now become a most important condition without which it will be impossible to free society of everything connected with the consequences of the personality cult, command-administrative management methods, the alienation of working people from the system, bureaucratism, and deviations from the Leninist norms of party and state life. In order to achieve this, it will be necessary to resolutely rethink widespread conceptions of the correlation between state and law, and to renounce the stereotypes which have developed over decades in this sphere.

For many years Soviet legal science asserted the tenet that the state had unconditional "primacy" over law, which was regarded as the mere instrument of state power. This apparatus became the "creator" of laws. This role was also assigned to the "leader" in person, who was, for instance, called the creator of the 1936 USSR Constitution. This has given rise to widespread formulations, such as the assertion that the state "grants citizens" a broad range of rights, and the conviction that these rights are a sort of gift from state to people. Such apparently innocent expressions in actual fact represent an ideological consolidation of the people's dependence on the will of the legislator, who can "grant rights" if he wants, but can also restrict them at his own discretion. Thus a paternalistic mentality was inculcated which deformed the people's sense of justice, encroached on their dignity, and cultivated far from the best human qualities.

Relapses of this approach have not yet been overcome. That is why the idea of a socialist legal state is not only the basis for defining practical measures and principles for restructuring in the legal sphere, but also a **most important ideological and moral milestone in the reorientation of people's awareness, the de facto establishment of their sovereignty, and their determining role in state activity.**

The formation of a legal state calls for the consistent implementation of a number of fundamental principles. The first of these should be called **the rule of law in all spheres of social life**. This is an inseparable feature of socialist civilized life, as well as a manifestation of true people's power and democracy.

In a socialist legal state a law passed by the supreme power agency, with all constitutional procedures having been observed, cannot be annulled, amended, or curbed either by departmental acts, including government directives, or by the decisions of party authorities, however high-level and authoritative these may be. All party organizations and their agencies must operate on the basis of and within the framework of the USSR Constitution, the constitutions of Union and autonomous republics, and laws. If departmental directives or party decisions differ from the law, the law must prevail. Only thus can its true supremacy be ensured.

In this context the question of the quality of laws and their consistency with the interests of society and individuals obviously arise. Our economy and the social and spiritual areas have suffered considerable damage from ill-considered and scientifically unsubstantiated legal acts which have fettered the initiative of economic organizations and citizens. The public consciousness has yet to overcome its assessment of the law as a primarily prohibitive, if not punitive, form of influencing the individual's behavior. This stereotype destroyed. The law is effective when it supports people's social activeness, and when it guarantees and protects their interests by linking them to those of society. It is no coincidence that administrative-command methods aimed at coercion turn out incapable of ensuring firm discipline and legality in the final analysis.

Active work is now being done to regulate and improve legislation. However, its quality continues to be inadequate; many recommendations made by academics are ignored. In our opinion, this fact alone explains the difficulties which have arisen in the process of applying the Law on the State Enterprise (Association). It is well known that the system of state orders leaves the enterprise virtually no place for "free maneuvering." Another example which can be cited is that of the law on the procedure for appealing in court illegal actions by officials, which infringe citizen's rights. This law fails to make it possible to appeal in court against decisions made by collective bodies, which significantly reduces the effective protection of civil rights and strengthens the position of the bureaucrats. The press did, after all, draw attention to this danger more than once during the preparation of the draft law!

Upgrading the quality of law is directly linked to the restructuring of the USSR Supreme Soviet's work. This was discussed in detail at the 19th Party Conference. Apart from structural changes in the supreme organ of power, which will undoubtedly be the subject of wide-scale discussion, it is necessary to decisively democratize

the actual procedure by which laws are passed: it must be longer in duration and include the reading of draft laws two or three times, as well as comprehensive evaluation of different opinions. The parade of "unanimity" must be completely ruled out.

A provision must be drafted on the procedure for preparing and passing laws. We think that issues which concern national interest cannot be resolved by decrees of Supreme Soviet Presidium or, in other words without the participation of the deputies and the population. Finally, not only nationwide discussion of laws but also referendums, including local ones, must become common practice.

The idea of the rule of law in social life as an inseparable feature of the legal state must not, of course, give rise to a blind faith in the omnipotence of the law, to some kind of legal fetishism, or to "juridical euphoria." It is a paradox that along with legal nihilism another idea is quite widespread: in order to solve any urgent problem it suffices us to pass a law, if possible one with severe sanctions. In reality, however, social processes depend on a complex system of factors—economic, political, ideological, sociopsychological, and moral. These processes may be influenced merely by activating a comprehensive system of measures, of which the law is an extremely important element but by no means the only one.

The second legal and moral-political principle which characterizes the legal state is that **the state itself and its agencies are bound by the law.** This means that a state which passes a law has no right to break it itself. This principle stands in contrast to any form of arbitrariness, willfulness, and total permissiveness.

A disparaging attitude toward the law prevailed for many years in our society. The principle that the law is binding for all, regardless of rank, merit or official position, was violated. A system of exceptions to the rule and of letting people go unpunished gave bureaucrats a free hand and led to abuses and, at times, also to crime.

Let us recall two tragic chapters of history. After the war, in 1950, Stalin and those around him committed a gross violation of the fundamental legal principle that a more severe law is not retroactive (this principle had been laid down in the 1924 Code of Criminal Proceedings, still in effect at that point). What we are talking about is the "Leningrad case," in which A.A. Kuznetsov, N.A. Voznesenskiy, M.I. Rodionov, P.S. Popov, and other eminent party and state functionaries were arrested. At that time the death penalty had been abolished. Half a year after their arrest, in January 1950, the death penalty was reintroduced for "traitors to the motherland, spies, and subversive saboteurs," and in September of that year it was applied to those convicted in the "Leningrad case" (they were all rehabilitated after the 20th Congress).

This practice was to be repeated more than a decade later, under N.S. Khrushchev, the only difference being that the crime for which the lives of two convicted persons were illegally taken was a common felony (currency dealing). All of this openly flouted the democratic legal principles developed over the centuries, and was a shameful chapter in our legal life. It is necessary to recall this in order to draw lessons from the past and thus develop the new legal state. It must be understood that **society will not have any guarantee that the tragic events will not be repeated until such time as the law is regarded as an unshakable barrier** in the path of any unlawful state or party decisions, whatever "strategic" considerations or lofty motives (genuine or false) they might be guided by.

It is clear that the law is not only binding for state leaders, prosecutors and courts, and personnel of state security organs and the militia; it is also binding for economic management functionaries, and for every official and citizen. There are no "minor details" which can be disregarded when the letter of the law is being put into practice. Meanwhile, even in the conditions of restructuring, many ministries and departments are clearly still inclined to feel that they are free from the requirements of the law.

For many years the Soviet public has been conducting a struggle against gross ecological violations and errors: the thoughtless creation of "artificial seas," the destruction of the unique environment of Lake Baykal, and the construction of ecologically harmful enterprises beside Yasnaya Polyana and other museums and reserves. There is continuing air pollution in major industrial centers, the situation regarding water resources is becoming difficult, and the state of our major lakes and inland seas is giving rise to alarm. Yet for over 20 years now a fairly well-developed nature protection legislation has been in operation in our country! In a truly legal state this situation would not only be intolerable, but simply could not have taken place.

Today, unfortunately, we are witnessing the impotence of supervisory authorities, as well as the aspiration of departments to operate without regard for the law: to preserve command-administrative methods of economic leadership, reduce to naught the Law on the State Enterprise, and erect obstacles in the way of the cooperative movement and individual labor activity. It would be naive to explain all such bureaucratic distortions as being merely the result of legal illiteracy on the part of officials. More serious phenomena are involved: the syndrome of official invulnerability which has established itself, and the disrespect for the law which has permeated every pore of our life. It is more difficult to eliminate them than to eliminate legal illiteracy. However, this must be done.

The party agencies have a great role to play in overcoming legal nihilism and developing respect for the law.

This must be promoted by a clear demarcation of the competences of party and state apparatus and elimination of duplication in their work. The 19th Party Conference severely condemned the practice whereby party organs continue to give instructions about all issues of economic life for which they have no responsibility. The party bodies must be in the vanguard of the struggle to establish respect for the law everywhere, and to ensure the legality of actions by all sectors in the socialist political system.

In this respect it is difficult to overestimate the legal service's role in the national economy, which is in a highly unsatisfactory position today. The staff legal counsel of enterprises and institutions must become a full representative of the law; no decision carrying legal force must be made without his sanction. However, there are no staff legal counsel at all at many enterprises, and where there are, their rights are limited.

The third principle of a legal state is the **immutable freedom of the individual**, his rights, interests, honor, and dignity, and the protection and guarantee of all this. The law is the embodiment of the standard of freedom. K. Marx noted that legally recognized freedom exists in the form of law in the state. "...Laws are positive, clear, and general rules in which freedom takes on an impersonal, theoretical existence that does not depend on the arbitrary will of an individual." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol I, p 63). A most important function of the legal state is to ensure freedom of the individual by means of the law.

The USSR Constitution lays down a wide range of rights and freedoms for Soviet citizens—economics, political, sociocultural, and personal—and enumerates their basic guarantees. We are justly proud of the achievements of socialism in ensuring and defending human rights; our country has ratified the international pacts on these issues and rigorously observes them. All this does not, however, give us any right to close our eyes to the defects of a legal mechanism which is designed to eliminate and prevent all kinds of violations in the area. One of the shortcomings of this system is the lack of a clear legal basis for citizens to exercise a number of constitutional rights and freedoms: freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and demonstrations, participation in resolving issues of state and social life, freedom of conscience, and so on. The constitutional norms on these matters have been defined, but many of them are not backed up by the current legislation, and come up against difficulties when put into practice. Indeed, for a long time the very significance of political freedoms and specific legal guarantees in this sphere was clearly underestimated.

For many decades our political practice has not really had to face such problems as "unplanned" meetings, demonstrations, or pickets, the free criticism of any person or institution, and citizen's initiative and independence in most diverse issues of daily life. The initial

reaction of local authorities to such phenomena is dismay, shock and attempts to resort to the well-tried old method of prohibition. Matters must be arranged differently in a legal state. Its obligation is to comprehensively promote the exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms by citizens. Is it necessary to regulate the various forms of activity in which civic activeness is expressed? Yes, undoubtedly; but this should not be regulated according to the principles of Shchedrin's governors, but rather a clear definition of the boundaries beyond which the activity of some citizens begin to infringe on the rights and freedoms of others.

In this context there is need for redrafting those articles in the criminal code which deal with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, while the legislation on freedom of conscience and on entry to and exit from the country must be updated. A law must be passed on the procedure for holding meetings and demonstrations. In supporting and developing socialist pluralism of opinions and interest, the state must ensure that there are firm guarantees that they can be exercised. Serious attention is due to the issues of developing and ensuring the collective rights of nations and nationalities, the rights of social organizations, including informal ones, and the rights of labor collectives.

Regretfully we note that certain legal acts in the area of protecting citizen's rights have had little effect. For instance, for almost 3 years there has been an article in the criminal code dealing with persecution resulting from criticism, but during this period only 13 actions have been brought, and in only one of those has an official been punished. Is it that we have no such cases? Of course we do. Reprisals for criticism and the compromising of those who do not "tow the line" are a fairly widespread phenomena. Yet the citizen who brings a criminal action against the "suppressor" of criticism mostly finds himself in a humiliating and unfavorable position; he is opposed by the "perimeter defense" of local law enforcement organs and party and state authorities. The legal protection of human rights—a most important democratic procedure in civilized society—is frequently perceived by the philistine consciousness as a manifestation of a trouble-making, scandal-mongering and bad character. However, **by defending his own rights each of us is simultaneously defending the legal foundations of our society.**

The restructuring process is expected to destroy the system of relations between apparatus and citizen in which the latter plays the part of petitioner even when it is the fulfillment of his indisputable rights and legitimate interests that are involved. Bureaucratism is undoubtedly the obstacle here, and the masses have a fairly clear understanding of this. Out of 11,000 people in 15 areas of the country who were polled twice—in 1986 and 1988—by sociologists from the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee, 54.7 percent of workers and 48.3 percent of leading functionaries regard the struggle against bureaucratism, formalism, callousness, and other negative phenomena a paramount task.

The restructuring of our entire life will not take place all at once; it will take a long time. However, the implementation of measures dealing with protecting and defending civil rights cannot be postponed. Everyone understands how important it is to rapidly get rid of shortages in society and to fill the shelves with various goods. Is it any less important that everyone should have confidence in the reliability and protection of his rights?

The mutual responsibility of state and individual is the fourth principle of the legal state, and one which expresses the moral principles of relations between the state which holds political power and the citizen who participates in making this power a reality. Insofar as it assumes specific obligations to its citizens and social bodies, as well as to other states and the entire international community, the state must also define the extent to which its official representatives are answerable for actions which they take in the name of the state or its authorities.

In a legal state the executive authorities must be answerable to the legislators. Presently this is being observed quite infrequently. For example, according to Article 131, Point 3 of the USSR Constitution, the Council of Ministers implements measures to guarantee and protect citizens' rights and freedoms. In the entire history of its existence, however, the government has never once submitted a report on this most important area of its activity to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Under our conditions "the rule of law" means that the party and state, and all their agencies recognize the primacy of law, are subject to the law, cannot evade its injunctions, and **are politically, legally, and morally answerable to the people if they do not fulfill the obligations they have assumed.** Forms of control could include referendums to assess the work of the party and the government, accountability reports which the state administration would deliver to the highest authority, and so on. In order for social control to be fully exercised in this area it is necessary for open and accurate information to be available on all important political, social, and economic events and processes, and on the activity of state and economic organs and social organizations. There has long been a pressing need for wide-scale publication of social statistics and for legislation to be passed on information matters. Regular public opinion polls and interviews and speeches by party and state officials to the population, should be introduced.

A legal state is inconceivable without clear-cut and specific legal measures defining the answerability of officials on all echelons of the party and state leadership. The press has stressed on more than one occasion that illegal actions leading to the dismissal of managers and supervisors who have caused direct harm to society should be described precisely, while formulas such as "for health reasons" or "retirement" should not be used. There is a specific person or group of persons behind

every failure to accomplish a particular matter, and without individuals having to bear real responsibility, we cannot expect ministries, departments, and party agencies to act more efficiently. The actual mechanism of this kind of political and legal answerability still has to be worked out.

The individual's answerability to society and the state is no less important. Today there is rightful concern about a decline in the feeling of responsibility on the part of a significant section of the population. We believe that this phenomenon is a product of the long period of stagnation, a decline in citizens' interest in public and state affairs, wage-leveling, contradictory and inconsistent measures taken by the state in the economic and spiritual areas, and a system of restrictions that has checked individual independence and initiative. The only possible way to surmount the citizen's estrangement from authority and public and state affairs and to increase responsibility for one's actions is to free the individual, giving him the opportunity to overcome mistrust and all kinds of fears and misgivings—recurrences of society's mentality of previous years—and restoring the individual's complete confidence in his state.

The legal state should possess effective forms of control and supervision over the enforcement of laws and other legal acts. That is the fifth principle of the legal state.

There are various forms of control in our country: courts, supervision by prosecutors, arbitration and public control. However, they are not particularly active. Suffice it to say that despite the large number of state forms of control and court and administrative authorities, most complaints and proposals made by citizens are addressed to party organs, newspaper editors, and radio and television.

The main role in resolving the conflicts that arise in various areas of life should be played by the courts. This is understandable. After all, the courts act in accordance with such democratic principles as independence, collective decision making, glasnost, the presumption of innocence, the settling of disputes by adversarial means, the equality of parties, and the right of appeal. A series of fundamental principles have been worked out over the centuries-old history of legal proceedings, principles that are of considerable practical significance today: one cannot sit in judgment on a case to which one is a party; more than one witness is required; the refusal of justice is inadmissible; every citizen has a right to have his case examined by a competent, independent, and impartial court that has been established in accordance with the law.

The procedures involved in legal activities are very closely linked to the nature of a political system and a society's level of democratic development. Marx wrote: "...Just as torture.....is inseparably connected with the medieval criminal code, so is a free, public trial an

essential feature of a code that is inherently public and dictated by freedom and not by personal interests." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 1, p 158).

The formation of a socialist legal state presupposed the further democratization of legal proceedings. The deformation of our legal system led to the decision making center for legal decisions being shifted from the courts to the organs of preliminary investigation. Many courts simply rubber-stamped the conclusions of the prosecutor's investigation of a crime, the indictment, and the supervision of legality (including in court).

In one of his last works, V.I. Lenin wrote: "It must be remembered that...supervision by the prosecution has no administrative force and no decisive say on any administrative matter.... The only right and duty of the prosecutor is to submit cases for the court to try." This is very relevant to our time..for example, with regard to the introduction of court control over the legality of a sanction to carry out an arrest, and over cases where the prosecution prolongs custody of an accused person. The high standing of the courts; legislative, political, and moral conditions which ensure that they are independent; the subordination of courts to the law alone; and expansion of the functions of the legal profession as a self-governing association, are all inseparable attributes of a legal state.

According to Article 121 of the USSR Constitution, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet exercises control over the observance of the Constitution. Unfortunately, this aspect of the Presidium's work (if indeed it has ever been put into practice) has not yet been subjected to glasnost. Other forms of control must also be sought. The conference approved a proposal on the creation of a committee for constitutional supervision. Of equal significance, in our view, would be the investiture of the USSR Supreme Soviet with the right to invalidate any departmental regulation which contravenes the Constitution or other laws, in the examination of specific cases.

The formation of a legal state is one of the most important areas of reform for the Soviet political system, and an indispensable guarantee of this system's democratic development which will avert the possibility of its deformation or deviation from the principles of socialism. It is no less significant in foreign policy, as it signifies the firm adherence to international norms and obligations which our country has assumed. The idea of a socialist legal state is the result of the new political thinking which carefully preserves, develops and enriches mankind's democratic values.

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Statistics Is Not Paper Shuffling

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[Article by Pavel Fedorovich Guzhvin, chairman, RSFSR State Statistical Committee]

[Text] The all-Russian census of members of the RKP(b) was conducted at the beginning of 1922. Special surveys were used in this connection. One of the forms (No 38), drafted by the Statistical Department of the Central Committee, containing 59 item-questions, was filled by V.I. Lenin on 13 February. On the following day he sent a special letter to V.M. Molotov which, among others, read: "Having filled the form...of the latest census of RKP members, I arrived at the firm conviction that the way statistical work is organized by the Central Committee....is totally unsuitable." This letter was not for publication and Lenin did not spare his feelings: "Statistical work in your department is either being headed by a dolt or somewhere in these "departments" (if that is how institutions under the Central Committee are identified) important positions are being held by dolts and pedants...." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 392). He suggested that this and the accountability-allocation departments be thoroughly shaken up. "Otherwise we ourselves ('fighting bureaucratism,...') are fructifying in front of our own noses a most shameful bureaucratism...."

We know how extensively and skillfully Lenin used statistical data in his scientific work and practical activities as Sovnarkom chairman. He described socioeconomic statistics one of the most powerful tools for socialist knowledge (see vol 19, p 334). He appealed that it be introduced among the masses under the conditions of socialist democracy. Why is it that, although repeatedly emphasizing the tremendous role of statistics, such an attempt, which might have indicated a specific application of this tool of knowledge, was described by Lenin as dealing with trifles?

During that time the RKP(b) Central Committee was in charge of assigning cadres—thousands of party workers—and, through them, the tremendous army of non-party people. Naturally, this required a certain minimum of statistical data. However, the organizers of censuses included in the forms a number of questions which were clearly not pertinent. The collection of those forms and the consolidated figures, the overwhelming majority of which were totally useless, as well as the statistical processing of the data, required a great deal of effort and time. Above all, this did not help to solve the problem of cadre assignment. Furthermore, in Lenin's sharp expression, this was "totally messed up by stupid bureaucratism!"

This example provides a clear lesson of the way in which, instead of a contribution to social knowledge, favorable grounds are created for bureaucratism. One of the reasons for this is the low level of discrimination in the choice of statistical indicators....

Today, as it determines the fate of the country, the party closely ties it to the implementation of a radical economic reform. This includes a complex set of problems. The basic among them is to convert from primarily administrative forms of management to primarily economic ones. Does statistics always help in this? We must agree that sometimes it even hinders it. In order to determine the nature of such hindrances we must analyze the way administrative management methods affected statistics themselves and the consequences which this entailed. It is important to trace the historical establishment of statistical information in the system of national economic management. Naturally, it was born long before the revolution. Lenin highly valued and studied some figures of *zemstvo* statisticians, noting the break down in their work.

The history of Soviet statistics starts with the governmental decree (of 25 July 1918) which established the country's Central Statistical Administration. Another major role was played by the Decree On Current State Industrial Statistics (4 January 1919). Until then censuses and selective and monograph studies were conducted. After that point, the basic method for obtaining statistical information was the reports submitted by enterprises and organizations.

The strengthening of the Soviet system in the 1920s took place under the conditions of the new economic policy, based on Lenin's plan—under the conditions of the extensive promotion of economic methods in managing the national economy. It was precisely then that the new method for obtaining information, consisting of regular reports, was applied. The state ordered all enterprises—state, cooperative or private—to submit, free of charge, accurate information on their activities. This was unusual and, to a certain extent, even “unnatural,” particularly from the viewpoint of the private entrepreneur, who had become accustomed to the strictness of commercial secrecy. Possibly, it was precisely for that reason that Lenin suggested that extreme legal steps be taken toward those who would not submit such reports on time.

The command-administrative management system began to be established in the second half of the 1920s. This led to peculiar consequences in terms of statistics. Under a system of strict bureaucratic administration, the threat of harsh measures, including jail “for failure to submit reports,” was truly hanging over not only the private entrepreneur but every manager or bookkeeper. All objections related to the new method for obtaining statistical information were gradually dealt with and the system was established once and for all.

The pernicious effect of administrative-command methods of management in terms of statistics was manifested in something else. Once firmly established, unexpectedly the new method created the insurmountable ability for accountability to spread in all areas. As a rule, the first step in performing their functions by administrations,

people's commissariats and other governmental departments, was to organize extensive accountability. As early as 1926 G.K. Ordzhonikidze, RKI people's commissar, formulated as one of the immediate tasks “the merciless elimination of the flow of paper accountability, which made it impossible truly to control the work of the respective authorities and was only burdening and spoiling the Soviet machinery, increasing its bureaucratic distortion.” It was thus that Lenin's warning of the possibility that in the field of statistics bureaucratic aspects in the activities of the apparatus would appear, began to be fulfilled. Under the conditions of bureaucratic administration accountability began to resemble the mythical genie released from the bottle, and was no longer responsive. A variety of means were used to restrain it. Above all, gradually the concept of state accountability was established (supported by state statistical authorities), while any other accountability was considered illegal.

State accountability has a tendency to grow. All possible means are used to apply pressure on statistical authorities; new forms are approved and new additional indicators are introduced. From time to time accountability is revised and one-time reductions are made. One such revision was in 1958. At that time the volume of accountability was significantly reduced after which, however, once again it began gradually to swell. A revision of all forms of state statistical accountability took place in 1986. On that occasion 1.2 million forms were totally eliminated and the number of indicators was reduced by one-half. The volume of accountability information submitted by enterprises was reduced by 40 to 50 percent.

However, even after such an “amputation,” state accountability remains quite cumbersome. For example, within a single year an industrial enterprise must submit an average of more than 320 reports, filling 90 different forms and at different times. This means roughly one state report daily. A *kolkhoz* submits 210 reports annually. For all sectors of the national economy of the RSFSR there are some 2,000 forms of reports approved by the USSR and the RSFSR state statistical committees. The statistical authorities firmly support the conclusion drawn at the 19th Party Conference to the effect that the administrative machinery would benefit by substantially reducing accountability.

Nonetheless, in this area the volume of accountability remains within controllable limits. “Wild,” and illegal accountability, which knows no limits, is the real calamity. A struggle has been waged against it throughout our entire history. It has been condemned and abolished and a variety of penalties have been used against its “authors,” those who demand such accountability. Between January and May 1986, on two separate occasions the CPSU Central Committee considered matters related to eliminating the collection of data not stipulated by state accountability regulations. All state authorities and party and social organizations have been categorically forbidden to ask for any kind of information

not approved by the statistical authorities. Enterprises, associations and organizations are equally forbidden to submit such accountability.

We must frankly say, however, that for the time being such steps have not had a suitable effect. In 1986 the statistical authorities in the country caught and eliminated 28,000 different forms of illegal accountability; more than 30,000 were eliminated in 1987. For example, for 15 consecutive years Glavreduralstroy collected from each one of its construction organizations about 30,000 indicators of daily, weekly and monthly data. Incidentally, with such total information, over the entire 15 years, this main administration did not fulfill its plan a single time. A study of the work of the Sovkhoz imeni 60-Letiya SSSR in Krasnoyarsk Kray, last February, established that a variety of superior authorities had ordered it to fill 20 illegal forms containing more than 30,000 indicators annually, or 2.5 times more than all indicators contained in all "legitimate" forms. A total of 107 forms of "wild" accountability, totaling 120,000 indicators annually were revealed in January 1988, submitted by enterprises of the Ryazan Oblagroprom (let us point out that the Gosagroprom authorities are frequently exceeding all records in terms of inflating the volume of illegal accountability).

Many such examples could be cited. This has been quite extensively reported in many of our newspapers. However, illegal accountability is like the mythological many-headed Hydra which grows new heads to replace those which have been cut off. Obviously, this is a major obstacle to the implementation of the economic reform and the assimilation of economic management methods. It hinders us from ensuring the reliable accuracy of truly necessary data. In this area, what steps should we take in the course of perestroika?

Statistical information is one of the tools in national economic management. It has its specific features based on the laws of statistics as a science. However, in order to better clarify its ability to grow without limit under certain conditions, the study of statistics and accountability should be closely related to that of the management system.

Administrative-command management methods were born during the period of war communism. What distinguished them? There was a clear presence of apparent unity of will. If an order has been given the action of subordinates must immediately follow (one way or another). This creates a feeling of satisfaction in the leading unit, particularly if the desired objectives are somehow brought closer. If the necessary speed, quality, and so on is not attained, one can presume with full justification that the wrong commands were given or that something was not taken into consideration in their formulation. It is precisely this that triggers the need to ask for additional accountability data so that, on their basis, to refine the content of administrative orders. And since in our past practices the objectives which were set

quite frequently considerably outstripped the actually attained levels, the administrative apparatus, operating under the command system, was always thirsty for more statistics. Hence the trend toward increasing the volume of state accountability and the enviable durability of the "illegals."

Furthermore, let us point out that under such circumstances the apparatus shows a persistent aspiration to obtain all accountability data as soon as possible in order to be able to issue a "more accurate" order sooner. In this case what is ignored is that some and, in some cases, the overwhelming percentage of executives are not suitably interested and that their statistical work is careless. All of this amounts to precisely what Lenin described, in the 1920s, as occupying oneself with bureaucratic trifles. In a number of cases this game turned into a game of chance and today one can hardly hope that getting rid of it will be easy.

The following question arises: Why is it that economic management methods turn out insufficiently competitive, compared to commands? In what do they lose? The main feature here is that an economic measure does not provide an immediate result. It appeals to the interests of the people and its purpose is to awaken within them a creative attitude toward the project, to be a kind of seed for initiative. A manager who has taken such a step must "nurture" the initiative carefully and patiently, guide it into the proper channel, and protect it from the dry winds of reports and unnecessary orders. Naturally, this approach as well needs urgent and a certain different type of statistics. However, its volume should be as low as possible and the meaning of the indicators must be similar to those, let us say, needed by a physician in treating outpatients.

In the area of economics, V.I. Lenin recommended the drafting of "a kind of index-number in assessing the condition of our entire national economy" (op. cit., vol 53, p 122-123). He said indignantly that in terms of current industrial statistics he was obtaining information "multa non multum—much in volume but little in content!" (ibid., p 122). At this point he immediately indicated that what are needed are "10 to 15 figures similar to such index numbers as have been used in foreign statistics for quite some time" (ibid., p 123). Said recommendations apply to the national economy as a whole. Each sector, naturally, requires its own set of indicators. The main thing is that their fewest possible number would make it possible infallibly to determine "the state of health" of a given economic sector and the extent to which it was developing in accordance with long-term planning.

As proof, let us turn, for example, to a specific sector in the agroindustrial complex, such as livestock breeding. Its level of intensiveness is impeccably characterized by the speed at which animals are raised. On this account, half-jocularly Marx noted that "No, naturally, there is no possibility of delivering to the market a 5-year old

animal before it has reached the age of 5. Within certain limits, however, by changing the way of caring for the animals, one could make them ready for their purpose within a shorter time" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 24, p 267). The average daily growth indicates the speed with which a given animal is advancing "toward its purpose." The average indicator for a herd could be that same "index number" for that sector. Actually, in Leningrad Oblast farms, in 1987, it averaged 889 grams per head of cattle. Compared with possibilities, let us frankly say, this is a low level. However, it is double that reached by farms in Pskov Oblast. It is also important that other quality indicators in the former oblast are better than in the latter: productivity per cow is higher by 80 percent; the cost per quintal of growth, conversely, is 32 percent and per quintal of milk 27 percent lower. In Leningrad Oblast the farms as a whole fulfilled their plan for meat sales to the state whereas the Pskov Oblast farms failed to fulfill it. In 1987 beef sales were profitable in Leningrad Oblast but not in Pskov.

A manager which has at his disposal such a monthly indicator, on the level of the individual farms, for example, will be as well armed as a physician who has in his hands the fever chart of the patient. Similar to the physician who will treat, above all, those with high fever, in this case the manager will unfailingly concentrate on the sector with a low average daily weight increase and will try to provide personal assistance.

To convert to primarily economic management methods means, above all, to put a total stop to playing at reports. Statistical data could be considered strong medicine which, if applied in immoderate doses, acts as a narcotic with corresponding consequences. Unwisely applying it, under certain circumstances, the administrative machinery could develop a fictitious view on life and greatly weaken real ties with specific targets. It is by no means accidental that among all the kolkhoz chairmen who addressed the recent Congress of Kolkhoz Members, about 10 of them criticized, one way or another, the work style of the leading authorities of the APK: The land needs an owner, they emphasized, and the owner needs an efficient and reliable assistant and not clerks with their numerous memoranda (let me personally add, drafted on the basis of unnecessary accountability).

Nonetheless, the inflation of statistical accountability and, particularly, the wild outburst of illegal accountability are not all that directly related to the administrative-command forms of management. Let us point out that throughout all the stages of our peace-time history, there have been frequent calls to eliminate them, to free initiative, and so on. As was pointed out, as early as in the materials of the 1926 15th VKP(b) Conference, "bureaucratism has been a tremendous evil throughout the entire existence of the Soviet system. This evil is becoming increasingly dangerous today...." The task was then set to take "a more decisive step in freeing the lower levels in the production system from petty supervision,

control and accountability." Once again, after the 20th Party Congress, the same tasks were formulated with equal strength. Nor were they excluded from later agendas.

Under some circumstances, unfortunately, scientific work which would enable us reliably to regulate the work of the apparatus on the different management levels, was not conducted on a sufficiently profound level. Science simply neglected such problems. In an effort to solve the problem of improving management, the energy was concentrated more on all kinds of reshuffling of the various units within the system, without adequately profound theoretical development of the principles and methods of practical activities on one level or another and with specific specialists operating on their respective levels.

For example, a novice appointed to work in the administrative apparatus on the primary, the lower level of the system, is virtually unarmed in the sense of the theory of an efficient organization of labor in the new sector. Let us say that he has come from production work and has brought with him, like his own shadow, the habit of working under conditions of petty supervision. It would be wrong to believe that he would reject it immediately. Based on his own production experience, he will try to find faults in the previously issued commands and replace them with new commands, which, once again, will lead to engaging in all kinds of illegal accountability. A similar situation develops, with different features, whenever cadres are moved to the next levels in the administrative system.

The problem of a profound scientific work on the principles governing the activities of each of the units within the administrative apparatus and the laws governing its development as a whole and by economic sector remains quite topical under both administrative and economic forms of management. A substantial part of it is the theory of statistical information involving extensive computerization, which would create a scientific base for determining the optimal volumes of information and more reliably freeing management from its excesses. In accordance with the enactment of the Law on the State Enterprise, a great deal is changing in the management system and cost accounting is confidently making its way in this area. This could become a reliable obstacle to the growth of useless statistics. The press has persistently expressed the view that it would be expedient in the struggle against illegal accountability to strengthen the economic responsibility of ministries, departments and organizations for the damage caused as a result of its use.

The skeptical reader may express the following doubt: Are such unnecessarily abundant statistical data all that dangerous in themselves? Let me reemphasize in this connection that we are discussing statistics as an instrument for planned national economic management. It is precisely as such that it must be strictly regulated in

terms of content and volume. In terms of scientific objectives and satisfying human curiosity, obviously that nothing could be considered excessive. A certain use could be made in this case of knowing the number of smokers, of people who like horse racing or gliding, etc. Incidentally, this was not denied by Lenin. In 1921, in criticizing the then existing Central Statistical Administration for its sluggishness, he wrote that perhaps "in terms of scientific work it should provide every couple of years such materials but that is not what we need.... One must be able to single out what is **practically** important and urgent...." (op. cit., vol 53, p 122).

The predilection which the superior levels of the administrative system have for such information greatly impoverishes their perception of reality. Reality is presented to them most frequently in its consolidated and averaged aspects. In this case the entire gamut of features of individuality and of original and specific social phenomena pales. In the language of philosophy, abuse of reports makes prevalent deductive forms of the study of reality. In an effort to study it and to move from the general to the specific, the manager occasionally remains on the level of the general. Individual phenomena come in tremendous numbers; to select what is typical and to study it takes time. Yet, a new general report has just arrived. Furthermore, as one begins to study it, one comes across puzzles, the answer to which spoils the quality of the work of the administrative unit in charge of analyzing the situation.

Here is an example. As enterprise reports confirm, intensive technology was applied in growing winter wheat over more than one-half of the area in that crop planted in Voronezh Oblast in 1987. Here the crop averaged 34.7 quintals per hectare, compared with 22.3 quintals for the remaining area. As we can see, this addition of 12.4 quintals (56 percent!) is tangible. Nonetheless, in 74 farms "intensive" fields averaged 20 or less quintals of grain per hectare. Therefore, although the overall results instill optimism, the results of 13 percent of all kolkhozes and sovkhoses do not appear intensive in the least. In this case the quality indicator turned out to be lower than the results of entirely "ordinary" technology. Most frequently, however, it is the optimistic average data that are considered.

Naturally, this is not the fault of statistical reports alone. Under the conditions of insufficient democracy and excessive bureaucratic administration, the "sensory organs" of the leading management units become correspondingly attuned: one can hear the "rustling" in the upper levels, while the cry of the heart on the lower levels does not reach the upper strata. Most convenient types of relationships with the leadership are those of all kinds of average indicators, such as the one on intensive technology applied in Voronezh Oblast.

Along with the deductive form used in the study of public production, the inductive method should be properly applied as well, which calls for the study of life on

the basis of individual factors and phenomena, and the ability to see the sky reflected in the individual drop of water. Here again a substantial reduction of accountability could help. It would motivate the personnel of the administrative apparatus to seek on-site information by talking to the people who are directly involved in the work, not waiting for the cry of the heart to be heard through the central press organs.

The constant responsiveness of the "sensory organs" to signals issued on the upper levels is manifested suddenly in the original motivation of the "need" for additional reports. It turns out that such reports are needed by one administrative level or another not in the least to promote the work but, above all, to respond to orders and possible questions of the superior management.

In addition to statistics, V.I. Lenin highly valued national economic accountability, the role of which he enhanced. All of us recall his statement that "socialism means, above all, accounting." In his familiar work "Will the Bolsheviks Remain in Power?" he wrote that "national **accountability**, and national **accounting** of production and distribution of products are, so to say, something like the **skeleton** of socialist society" (op. cit., vol 34, p 307). These Leninist ideas are quite frequently repeated. However, the profound meaning of their truths has unfortunately not become fully asserted in our national economy. This is partially hindered by that same "liking" of the administrative apparatus for an endless expansion of accountability. The stronger the aspiration to have as much data as possible in the upper echelons, the weaker becomes the interest in primary accounting in the areas where the specific work takes place.

Furthermore, in this case deviations from the Leninist interpretation of statistical information within the administrative system are based on the weakening of democratic principles in the organization of the production process. True accountability is possible only on a mass scale. In our reality, as a rule, it is merely the job of the bookkeeping services. Furthermore, for many long years such services were considered of very secondary importance. It was only recently that the salaries of their managers were raised to the level of the personnel of other respective subdivisions. It is no accident, for example, that in the RSFSR 70 percent of the chief agronomists in enterprises and organizations have higher training; the respective figures are 65 percent for chief engineers and 73 percent for chief agronomists, compared with only 20 percent for chief bookkeepers.

Weak efforts are made to strengthen the material base of accounting. In agriculture, for instance, there is an acute shortage even of scales and the produce received from fields and farms is frequently recorded on the basis of gauging, estimating, etc. In other sectors technological processes frequently do not include automatic measurements and counting the produced quantities. Yet a true mass accounting, based on extensive openness, could

prevent not only petty but many large-scale abuses. In Uzbekistan, between 1978 and 1983, account padding in state records on purchases of unginced cotton totaled 4.5 million tons. One can imagine how imperfect was the primary accountability in the farms, leaving the cotton growers totally ignorant, to make such a thing possible on such a mass scale!

Technical progress is slow in making its way in accountability. For example, cosmonautics opens great opportunities for land surveyors. The respective instruments on satellites enable us to provide very precise information on arable land, land in crops and other types of farmland. So far such latest technology has not been put to widespread use by Gosagroprom surveyors. They are still using the old measuring methods. KOMMUNIST has rightly pointed out shortcomings in this area, which are the reason for the inaccuracy of statistical data on land use and efficiency of crop growing (No 3, 1988, p 65).

It would be very useful to redirect the efforts currently made by the administrative personnel in expanding statistical accountability to the sources of national economic accountability and intensification of primary accountability above all. Statisticians are blamed (quite frequently justifiably) for being insufficiently accurate and objective and for the fact that statistical figures do not always reflect the essence of economic phenomena, thus hindering the study of economic processes and trends. One of the main reasons for this is the weakness in the organization of primary accounting. Its proper organization will substantially strengthen that same "skeleton of the socialist society" which Lenin mentioned, particularly in its structural aspect.

It is universally acknowledged that the failure of previous attempts at reform made in our country were related above all to the lack of expanded development of the principles of democratization. The democratization of society has been described as the heart of restructuring, for its success is determined by the active participation of the broadest possible toiling strata in the restructuring taking place today. However, no independent and creative activity by the people, based on a scientific plan, is possible unless every person is equipped with a knowledge of the situation which objectively develops at the proper time, mandatorily in a state of its dynamics, with the entire complexity of relations within the national economic complex. It is statistics, above all, that must provide such a possibility to the citizens of our society.

Until recently the most complete source of statistical information, aimed at a broad range of readers, was that of statistical yearbooks for the country as a whole and by Union republic. Similar collections were published by oblast, kray and autonomous republic although, it is true, less regularly. Furthermore, on a half-annual basis the newspapers published official reports which reflected the course of the implementation of plans for social and economic development. Occasionally, both in the center

and in the local areas various topic collections were published dealing with demography, industry, agriculture, and so on. All such publications acquainted the people with only part of the materials at the disposal of the state statistical authorities. Groundless restrictions were imposed on broader publications. The extents of such restrictions varied at different times as we can judge, for example, by the size of the Union yearbook: some years, it would total 63 printer's sheets (1968) or else, suddenly, it would "lose weight" by shrinking by nearly one-half (1983).

Today such restrictions concerning the publication of statistical data have been lifted. Furthermore, the task was set of substantially increasing the openness of statistical information as one of the extremely necessary trends of democratization, and of involving the working people in the administration of governmental affairs. To this effect the statistical authorities have set up information-publishing centers operating on a cost accounting basis. Official information on the implementation of the plans is now being published on a quarterly basis. Every month the press provides a great deal of data on the situation in industry, agriculture and other sectors. The state statistical committees of the USSR and of Union republics issue on an almost daily basis, for use by the mass information media, special press releases containing a variety of current statistical data with the right for their immediate and full publication or use as substantiation of their articles. The journal VESTNIK STATISTIKI has begun to provide supplements, displaying much greater originality, containing primary data related to one event or another. In general, the framework of statistical publications has been thoroughly expanded. This process is continuing. In particular, we are resuming the practice of publishing monthly statistical press bulletins which contain a variety of data and economic surveys.

In this connection, we must acknowledge that so far such an increase in statistical glasnost has not triggered mass attention. Some interest is shown in statistical publication in scientific circles and among the personnel of the administrative apparatus, most of all when it comes to areas dealing with their own economic sector. So far, however, one does not see in a public transport vehicle someone reading an official Goskomstat report containing a number of interesting statistical data, which are no less relevant than materials on various historical subjects, which are read so eagerly. In my view, the reason is that such materials are essentially being presented to the general readership in approximately the same manner in which they are being prepared for official use.

Not so long ago the overwhelming share of statistical data were developed to meet the needs of planned management. In this area as well extensive experience has been acquired in terms of their most successful elaboration, classification and compilation from the viewpoint of making production or economic decisions. As a rule, priority was given to various types of global

indicators, such as national income, volume of output, areas in crops, capital investments, etc. Many statistical agencies proved unprepared to meet the firm demand of broadening glasnost. Actually, it is of little use to disseminate among the masses statistical data in the same type of abstract and, let us be frank, boring presentation as is submitted to the planning and management authorities. It is no accident that, speaking of the openness of statistics, Lenin called for "popularizing it so that the working people would gradually learn to understand and see how and how much to work, how and to what extent to relax...." (op. cit., vol 36, p 192). Unfortunately, it is difficult to find in today's statistical publications answers to such ordinary questions. The actions of people are closely related to their economic interests. Unless statistical data affect such interests, one way or another, they would hardly be topics of necessary attention. The task is for even in the case of the most complex and overall summations for the reader to react to them on the basis of his own interests. Unquestionably, at that point statistical publications could compete in terms of popularity with adventure novels.

We must master the methods for making statistics popular. This task is no less difficult than, for example, that of presenting to the people the laws governing cosmology. In this case this is an even more important task, for it is a question, let us say, not of the age of the universe (which is a rather abstract question) but of processes which touch upon the interests of the people. Those who popularize the laws governing the life of the universe do not have to express their attitude toward the matter in the least, whereas in our case, obviously, we cannot avoid this.

It would be expedient for the state statistical authorities to include among their personnel, in addition to professional statisticians, experienced journalists who would be at home in methods used in the statistical presentation of economic reality. Nor would it hurt the corps of journalists to train writers who would lively react to an initially dry-looking statistical report and would be able to relate it to daily affairs. During the period of unjustified restrictions concerning statistical publications, the journalists became accustomed to doing without them. As a result, by old habit, to this day they frequently ignore such publications. In the first half of this year, the RSFSR Goskomstat sent to various central newspapers and journals more than 130 press releases; no more than 35 of them were used in press publications.

The task of surmounting economic stagnation and the assertion of the constructive creativity of the people in all areas of social life calls for decisively promoting awareness of socioeconomic statistics among the people. This will be a reliable compass in understanding by all of us the entire complexity of such a necessary combination of private with social and national interests.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On Measures for Radically Improving Statistical Work in the Country" directs us toward

the reorganization of state statistics. The tasks are being formulated on a broad level. We must increase the influence of statistics on the acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development. The role of statistical authorities must be increased in the management of the national economy. In this case it is particularly important to improve economic analysis, to ensure the accuracy of accountability and the objective nature of information, etc. Every matter must be the subject of special consideration. At this point we would like to single out problems which directly affect the radical economic reform, the democratization of social life and delays in making decisions, something which so greatly holds back the development of perestroika.

The soonest possible cleansing of the administrative apparatus from the statistical garbage which has accumulated as a nutritive environment for bureaucratism, which can create only a smokescreen instead of lighting a fire will, unquestionably, substantially influence state statistical work itself, which will be able to cope faster with the difficult problems it is facing.

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Drawing In! Pressing Problems of State Finances
18020017k Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11,
Jul 88 (signed to press 18 Jul 88) pp 66-73

[Article by Konstantin Grigoryevich Kagalovskiy, candidate of economic sciences, head of sector, Central Interdepartmental Institute for Upgrading the Skill of Leading Construction Personnel and Specialists]

[Text] A number of innovative ideas were expressed and specific suggestions made on the intensification of perestroika in the course of the debate which developed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference on the revolutionary renovation of all aspects of life and society, unprecedented in terms of openness, frankness and principle-mindedness. A number of questions raised by the delegates, containing different and frequently opposite viewpoints are of a debatable nature and demand further interpretation. Now, after the conference, their discussion must be continued, guided by the principled resolutions of the party forum. With this issue, KOMMUNIST opens a new section on "Rereading the Proceedings of the Party Conference."

"We heard the statements by a large number of speakers. The minister of health, for example, said that funds are needed. The same was said by the scientists. A great deal of funds were demanded for education. Taking our metallurgical industry as an example, it is clear that it has become obsolete to a large degree. Therefore, here as well funds are needed. However, we cannot solve all problems in one fell swoop. Perhaps it would make sense to draw in,

to concentrate the efforts on one specific program" (V. Yu. Nizhelskiy, conference delegate, gas works employee, Orsk-Khalilovsk Metallurgical Combine).

One of the most difficult problems of the economic reform is ensuring the financial recovery of the national economy. Grave concern for the financial situation of the enterprises and the country at large was expressed in the speeches of many conference delegates. For quite some time a review of expenditures has been necessary. For a number of years state budget outlays increased faster than revenue. This led to the appearance and development of a state budget deficit, which undermines the stability of the ruble and of the entire monetary circulation, triggers inflationary processes and holds back socioeconomic progress.

The restructuring of the economic management system is accompanied by radical changes in the financial area. The enterprises are converting to self-financing. The principles governing their relations with the state budget are changing and changes are also planned in the structure of state revenues and expenditures.

In order to assess the changes which are taking place and determine the further development of perestroyka in the financial system, which should become one of the leading elements in the new economic mechanism, we must find out what occurred in terms of finances over the past 20 years and clarify the reasons for the weakening of their influence on production efficiency.

Despite difficulties with the implementation of the plan for the various items of state revenue (thus, in terms of the turnover tax, this plan has not been fulfilled since 1982), until 1985 the USSR Ministry of Finance regularly reported the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the state budget revenue plan. The situation changed in 1986 and that year the plan for budget revenue was fulfilled 96.3 percent; it was fulfilled 98 percent in 1987 (in absolute amounts underfulfillment was, respectively, 16.2 and 8.8 billion rubles).

The worsening of the financial situation during those years was related to a significant reduction in income from foreign economic relations. As a result of the sharp decline of prices of petroleum and petroleum products on the world market, the budget which had been shaped over the past 20 years under the conditions of a steady increase of income from foreign trade lost a substantial share. The budget revenue also reflected the campaign of the struggle against alcoholism, which was started in the country in 1985. Budget losses from a drop in the turnover tax on alcoholic beverages was about 10 billion rubles in 1986. The overall effect of these factors led to a loss of 4 percent of budget revenue.

In themselves, the indicators of the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the state budget, like indicators of the fulfillment of any plan, characterize only the surface of economic phenomena. Let us try to find out what is

behind them: is it a temporary breakdown caused by an accidental development of circumstances or a manifestation of profound processes which have been developing in recent decades within the financial system?

The intensification of negative trends in the economy in the 1970s affected finances as well. The financial situation worsened. Financial stress, resulting from the disparity between available resources and demand for them, increased.

The initial symptom and one of the main reasons for "poor financial health" was lower profitability in material production. Industrial profitability, as a correlation between all monetary income (profit, turnover tax, etc.) and the value of fixed production capital and material working capital, dropped by more than one-half since 1970 (from 35.5 percent in 1970 to 16.9 percent in 1986). There was a decline in agricultural profitability. By 1980 agriculture was a losing sector. The nominal growth of its profitability in subsequent years may be explained essentially by higher purchase prices.

Reduced profitability which, in itself, limits the financial possibilities of the economy, was combined with increased needs experienced by the national economy for financial resources. In order to maintain the production level which had been reached, greater monetary outlays were needed: the funds found their way in the growing stocks of commodity-material values and in the increased volume of capital investments to support the attained level of output. Production costs increased particularly rapidly in the primary economic sector—agriculture—and in the extracting industry sectors (the fuel-power complex in particular). For example, more than 90 percent of the overall volume of capital investments in the extracting sectors go into maintaining the level of extraction reached. Furthermore, the installation of new production capacities is becoming increasingly costly to society.

It may appear that by accumulating huge funds within the budget (the 1988 budget revenue is planned as totaling 443.6 billion rubles), it would be relatively easy to choose the areas in which to spend such amounts. This, however, is not the case. To begin with, in a certain sense, budget allocations are considered "free of charge" by their beneficiaries, for which reason they are always "insufficient." There is a constant need for resources and some requests remain unfulfilled. Second, although the specific types of budget expenditures are based on decisions (to finance or not to finance, and to do so to a greater or lesser extent), all budget outlays may be classified into several groups, the amounts of financing of which are socially predetermined values. This means that under prevalent socioeconomic conditions, regardless of the revenue base of the budget and the financial situation in the country, it is difficult to reduce the overall expenditures per group below the level already reached. Furthermore, the outlays per such groups are growing steadily.

This applies, above all, to development costs (industrial capital investments). As a rule, on each management level, demand for such funds exceeds the possibility to satisfy it. This is related to the fact that the socialist economy has still not developed an economic self-restricting mechanism which would motivate enterprises and ministries voluntarily to give up the implementation of projects if their economic efficiency is insufficiently high or reliable (in the capitalist economy such a self-limiting factor is the possibility of suffering a loss and going bankrupt). At the same time, a number of economic and social motivations exist, which encourage economic managers to ask for greater capital investments. The creation of new capacities seems preferable as a means of solving many production problems, eliminating bottlenecks and producing needed goods. Increasing the size of any economic organization enhances the prestige and social status of its management, frequently leads to higher salaries, and so on.

Each request for capital investments, naturally, is substantiated. In practice, however, the accuracy of such substantiation leaves something better to be desired. For example, one could lower the estimated cost of construction by "forgetting" to include in it infrastructural or other related projects. This makes it easier to obtain the permission to build and to include the project in the plan. In any case, the lacking funds will be procured as time goes on. As a rule, a started construction project must be completed, which "ties" to it future financing. A virtually unsated demand for capital investments, which exerts a steady pressure on the budget, develops in the economy.

Such a situation increases the need to appropriate substantial funds for urgent financing aimed at eliminating disproportions. Without going into a detailed discussion of the reasons for their permanent appearance, let us note merely two of them: the first is the sluggishness of the existing administrative-bureaucratic management system, which is unable flexibly to react to changing conditions and promptly to take measures when disproportions are merely beginning to develop and have not as yet turned into a hindrance to further progress. The other reason is the weakness of commodity-monetary relations which, by virtue of their underdeveloped nature, do not signal the appearance of disproportions or ensure the efficient redistribution of resources needed for their elimination. One way or another, every year and in one area or sector of the national economy or another disproportions appear, the elimination of which can no longer be postponed. Currently this applies to the sociocultural area. Starting with the mid-1960s, the share of budget outlays for its financing began steadily to decline. By 1985 the budget share of expenditures on education and health care had dropped below the 1940 level. The consequence was that the growing needs of society remained unsatisfied, which adversely affected all processes in social life.

The underestimating of pressing problems in the sociocultural area and the residual method of allocating

resources for it were criticized at the 27th CPSU Congress. Corresponding resolutions were passed and additional resources are being sought to this purpose. Nearly 40 billion rubles over and above the stipulated figure in the 5-year plan are being channeled into the social area. The share of budget outlays for sociocultural measures is increasing. It is to be hoped that this trend will be preserved in the future as well.

Such a shift of resources in favor of the sociocultural area has already taken place once in our country's history. By the mid 1950s the sociocultural area had found itself in a pitiful condition. As a result of the steps taken by the party, additional appropriations were made to finance it. The share of expenditures for sociocultural measures increased by 10 percent of the budget between 1955 and 1965. At that time, as is the case now, the development of the sociocultural area was paralleled by an extensive program for housing construction.

Having once increased expenditures for the upkeep of the sociocultural area, it is difficult to reduce them. The notorious residual method of financing it essentially applied only to increasing such outlays. Although their share in the budget substantially declined, there was no decline in absolute terms.

The group of expenditures which drastically increased over the past 20 years has been that of subsidies of agricultural products. Between 1965 and 1985 they increased from 3.2 billion to 56 billion rubles and their share in budget outlays, from 3.1 to 14.5 percent. Such budget expenditures have not been stopped to this day. The planned subsidies for agriculture for 1988 total 66 billion rubles, or 14.9 percent of all budget expenditures. The amount of other budget subsidies is also increasing (for the upkeep of housing, goods for children, etc.). The entire sum of subsidies planned for the 1988 budget totals 90 billion rubles. They eat up 20 percent of budget expenditures. Of late the press has extensively discussed the suggestion of eliminating food subsidies. At the same time, the monetary income of the population will be increased to compensate for price increases. Without undertaking an assessment of the positive and negative aspects of this reform, let us note only that its implementation, if carried out consistently, and if the losses caused to the population as a result of higher prices are fully compensated, the burden of subsidies on the budget will not become any easier. In this case the sum total of subsidies in terms of price differentials will be channeled into increasing the population's income¹. Therefore, the release of budget resources by reducing subsidies, in our view, is not possible at this time.

Therefore, even with a worsened financial situation, it would be difficult to ensure a practical reduction in essential budget outlays. Furthermore, budgetary needs for outlays are growing and forcing us to seek additional financial resources.

Because of reduced profitability, the share of budget revenue from the production area has dropped from 75.2 percent in 1965 to 63 percent in 1985 and most of it was replowed into material production. Whereas in 1965 47.8 percent of all budget revenue from the production area was reinvested in the form of financing the national economy, by 1985 the figure had already reached 89.3 percent.

How could the budget solve such a situation? This can be achieved through the so-called other income, which increased from 17.7 billion to 136 billion rubles between 1965 and 1986. Such other income comes essentially from two sources.

The first is income from foreign trade. Between 1965 and 1985 such income increased by a factor of 7.6. It was influenced by the prices on the world market, particularly those of petroleum, which favored our country in the 1970s.

The second major source is using the funds of the state bank to finance budget outlays (including increased population savings and cash emissions). This makes it possible to accumulate funds within the budget without the additional creation of real values. Although all other income goes into the budget as "income from the socialist economy," the latter part cannot be considered real accumulation. It is "fictitious" income which only creates the appearance of a balanced budget.

In the 1970s the growth of other income took place essentially from foreign trade. During the 11th 5-year period the amount of funds attracted from the credit system began to grow as well. A substantial increase in such funds occurred in 1986 when it became necessary to compensate for the lowered turnover tax and for foreign trade revenue. At that time most of the increased budget outlays were financed through budget deficits which, in our estimate, now account for 15 to 17 percent of budget revenue.

With glasnost, we no longer have to play hide-and-seek. Admitting honestly the existence of a budget deficit is not enough. The time has come to realize that this problem is of prime significance.

Since the existence of a budget deficit was carefully concealed in domestic publications, there is no clear knowledge on the subject of its influence on the economy. Budget deficits exist in the majority of developed capitalist countries. Under the conditions of a market-oriented economy, whenever available production resources are found (unused production capacities and unemployed manpower) the budget deficit increases solvent demand and thus, to a certain extent, triggers a growth of output. If the volume of output is limited to demand for goods, increased demand triggers a corresponding increase in supply. However, the Keynesian model cannot be automatically applied to a socialist

economy. The contemporary socialist economy has neither available manpower nor production capacities which could be put to economic use by this method. The volume of output is limited not by demand for goods but by availability of production resources. Under those circumstances the budget deficit and the corresponding increase in total solvent demand can only widen the gap between supply and demand of commodities and services, thus worsening the economic situation.

Cost accounting presumes the direct correlation between enterprise outlays for the satisfaction of their economic interests and results of economic activities. It may appear on the surface that, in practical terms, such correlation exists. Officially, withholdings for economic incentive funds and the size of the wage fund have long depended on one indicator or another, which reflects results of enterprise economic activities. In reality, outlays for the satisfaction of the enterprise's economic interests (payroll, development of the enterprise, financing the current upkeep of the nonproduction area and other expenditures related to daily operations) remained virtually independent of the results of economic activities. In the worst possible case, all such expenditures, other than capital investments, did not drop below the level already achieved. Even if an enterprise turned from profitable to losing, which was frequently the case, the wages of its personnel did not decline, as a rule. Nor were expenditures for the upkeep of the nonproduction sphere. The worsened activities of the enterprise did not affect the financing of its polyclinic, kindergartens and housing-communal economy. The influence of this factor was also extremely weak on the financing of capital investments. Changes in the results of economic activities are reflected only on the financial relations between the enterprise and the superior authorities, for "surplus" funds are appropriated by one means or another and shortages are covered, but expenditures needed for meeting vitally important economic interests remain, as a rule, unaffected.

The reasons for the stability of such expenditures are found in the existing forms of coordinating the interests of workers, enterprises and society. Having decided to work in one organization or another, consciously or subconsciously the people rely on a certain degree of satisfaction of their economic interests which they defend. All activities undertaken by enterprise workers are subdivided into traditional and nontraditional. The implementation of official obligations on the work place, with a normal degree of labor intensiveness for the specific worker, is a traditional form of economic behavior. As a rule, as long as the worker considers the level of satisfaction of his economic interests normal or at least admissible, his behavior does not depart from traditional behavior. However, should the worker feel dissatisfied, his behavior could change. In such a case nontraditional forms of behavior could appear. This is manifested, in particular, in a sharp increase in cadre turnover, appeals to superior authorities, a substantial lowering of labor intensiveness and a negligent attitude

toward official obligations, as well as even temporary work stoppages. The dissemination of nontraditional forms of behavior threatens the uninterrupted flow of the production process and, in a more general sense, disturbs the balance of interests of the participants in public production, based on the satisfaction of the interests of the individual worker on a normal, i.e., on a level acceptable to the individual.

Changes in external circumstances and fluctuations in the results of activities of the enterprises themselves constantly trigger the danger that the level of satisfaction of economic interests will deviate from the "normal." In this case the financial mechanism acts as a kind of shock absorber for the enterprise, alleviating the consequences of adverse changes. That is precisely why it is so difficult in practice to make enterprise expenditures for the satisfaction of economic interests dependent on the actual results of economic activities. The financial system, as it ensures, regardless of circumstances, the existing level of enterprise financing, maintains a state of socioeconomic balance. Budget outlays for development, the elimination of disproportions, sociocultural measures and subsidies, are related to the performance of such functions by the budget.

We are well familiar with the negative effect of the automatic satisfaction of economic interests regardless of real results, and its destimulating impact on the motivations of the workers. We would like to point out another adverse consequence of such an organization of the financial mechanism. The financing of outlays regardless of real income is characteristic for all levels of the economic hierarchy (including the enterprises and the state budget), and inevitably leads to increasing the overall solvent demand over the supply of commodity and services. Usually, this phenomenon is known as commodity-monetary or material-financial imbalance. If price levels are on the level of balancing supply with demand, there would be a steady growth of prices and inflation. Since the state deliberately tries to maintain firm "stable" prices below the balance level, a particular variety of inflation, a "suppressed" inflation appears. In practice it is manifested in the well-familiar scarcity phenomena (lack of commodities in stores, lines, speculation, etc.). If stable prices cannot be maintained, "suppressed" inflation turns into open inflation. Both varieties are caused by a single reason: maintaining the socioeconomic balance by financing outlays for the satisfaction of the economic interests of all participants in the production process regardless of the results of their activities.

However, in addition to the financial system, various social mechanisms exist, which ensure socioeconomic balance. This involves a system of democratic institutions, which make it possible to coordinate the social and economic interests of all participants in public production democratically; the agitation and propaganda system, which influences through persuasion the awareness

of the people concerning their immediate and longer-range interests and forms of behavior and, finally, the coercion machinery. All of them, as a rule, are used on a parallel basis. However, the extent of their activeness varies. Between the 1930s and beginning of the 1950s the coercion apparatus played an essential role in blocking nontraditional forms of behavior. After Stalin's death the role of direct coercion, based on terrorist methods, weakened substantially. Only a few forms of administrative restrictions were retained (the residential permit, sanctions for violating the legal period for finding employment, etc.). During the period of stagnation the effectiveness of the influence of agitation-propaganda methods weakened substantially. Nonetheless, we have still not developed a system of democratic institutions consistent with socialism. As a result of the weakening of the mechanisms which were earlier in effect and the underdeveloped nature of the democratic forms which must replace them, increasingly the socioeconomic balance was secured through the financial system. This method, however, weakens its influence on efficiency and leads to an intensification of inflationary processes.

One could abuse financiers as much as one wishes but the roots of our financial problems go far beyond the range of activities of the respective ministry. Their solution requires, above all, the democratization of all social life. This alone would enable us to relieve the financial system from the excessive load it must carry today. This, however, does not mean in the least that the financial workers should remain idle. Already now, within the framework of the economic reform under way in the country, we need a radical restructuring of the financial mechanism. The main feature here must be that of increasing the financing of economic management, the standardization of the rules regulating financial relations between enterprises and superior authorities and a conversion to a uniform income tax rate.

It is important substantially to reduce the share of financial resources centralized within the budget. In 1986 71.4 percent of the national income (as compared to 54.1 percent in 1970) went to the budget. It may have seemed that converting enterprises to self-financing should lower this figure. With a view to reducing unnecessary redistribution, the 1988 plan called for lowering budget outlays for capital investments, the financing of working capital and other outlays, totaling 14 billion rubles. This would account for slightly over 2 percent of the planned volume of the national income. Such reduction cannot seriously influence the degree of centralization. The problem cannot be solved with cosmetic repairs. An essentially new approach is needed in establishing the range of activities of the budget.

Given the limitation of budget resources, the problem of the social choice inevitably arises. How to solve this problem and to compare the various choices in terms of spending budget funds? For example, how to decide what does society need today, for instance: increased

outlays on defense or channeling such funds into increasing pensions and building kindergartens? These are political decisions which must be made by the political system and not by economic institutions. The substantiation of such decisions and their consistency with the true needs of society directly depend on the efficiency of the political mechanism, which ensures the identification and coordination of social needs. That is precisely why the USSR state budget is considered at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, while territorial budgets are discussed at sessions of the soviets of the respective territories. Nonetheless, the existing procedure for the elaboration, consideration and approval of the budget does not, in our view, meet contemporary political and economic requirements. Essentially, all basic decisions are predetermined by the draft budget submitted by the Ministry of Finance. As a rule, in the course of its consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet, assignments in terms of income are raised somewhat and additional resources are channeled into increasing outlays for socio-cultural and consumer needs. The suggestions of deputies deal essentially with specific problems. No essential problems of the policy of state revenues and expenditures are considered.

The range of competence of the budget should include financing nothing but the needs of society which cannot be satisfied by the socialist market mechanism. The budget must finance exclusively expenditures the expediency of which has been established on the basis of political decisions.

Changing the principles for the formulation of the budget is a difficult and time-consuming process. It can be started with an expert evaluation of all budget expenditures. Strict expert evaluations could lead to the identification of more or less inefficient expenditures in virtually all sectors. A temporary limitation of capital investments in the production area should be undertaken. This should not mean limiting the growth of investments but ensuring their absolute reduction. We must substantially reduce the number of losing enterprises. One of the possible ways for this is closing them down and leasing their fixed assets to cooperatives. Positive experience in this area has already been acquired.

Improvements in the financial situation call for concentrating the efforts on solving the problem of the budget deficit. The first thing to be done to this effect is to make its size public. If we are unable to eliminate the budget deficit, we should at least establish its upper limit in the Law on the Budget for the planned year, which is passed annually by the Supreme Soviet.

Footnote

1. Actually, a small percentage of subsidies has already been "saved" with no compensation whatsoever by changing the channels through which some meat and delicatessen items are sold and which are now sold at cooperative prices.

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05003

Man, Science, Humanism

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[Article by Ivan Timofeyevich Frolov, academician, president of the USSR Philosophical Society]

[Text] Today we face the pressing problem of the purpose and responsibility of science, its status in society and the attitude toward it. Legitimately, great attention was paid to these problems at the 19th Party Conference. The increased role of science and the influence of scientific and technical progress on all aspects of life qualitatively change science and technology themselves and the nature of their interaction with society. The link between scientific and technical development and social development is becoming increasingly closer. Essentially, today it is no longer possible to speak of any whatsoever major scientific and technological projects which could be considered separately from social phenomena. The punishing effect of technocratic approaches, which still prevail in our awareness and activities, is quite substantial. People, society as a whole and nature are punished (as all of us have witnessed). That is perhaps the reason for which today the public is increasingly and more sharply reacting to the future development of science and the trends and aspects it will take.

The new image, the new type of science and the new image and type of scientific and technical progress, combined with man and ecologically measurable, precisely describe the features of their social content and social relations.

In this area the trend toward the integration and interaction among sciences is manifested quite strongly. Unquestionably, their differentiation as well is continuing. Ever new areas and even scientific disciplines are making their appearance. Nonetheless, the biggest discoveries take place in areas where sciences intersect, for which reason great attention must be paid to their integration processes.

The humanizing of science as a whole is increasingly becoming the factor which determines such processes. The question arises of the need for "high contacts" between new equipment and technology, on the one hand, and man, society and nature, on the other, and of doing intensive work precisely in that area. This would enable us to structure accurately and economically a strategy for scientific and technical research.

Today increasingly so-called global problems—ecological, demographic, food, resource and many others—are entering the area of scientific research. The importance

of accurately formulating such problems and organizing their study, with the entire interconnection among components, including social ones, is obvious.

I believe that this enumeration alone leads to the conclusion that today philosophical and social problems of science and technology assume a special significance. In my view, it would be worth discussing some basic aspects of their development.

The study of philosophical and social problems of science and technology, as described above, was initiated in our country very recently. Nonetheless, they have their own history and traditions which enable us to do such work on a contemporary level.

We speak a great deal of the various deformations which occurred after Lenin, in the 1920s and 1930s and subsequently, which also include the development of our science. We are studying everything which Lenin left to us as his philosophical legacy and, above all, his testament: the idea of the alliance between philosophy and the natural sciences. We know that subsequently this alliance was substantially undermined, in the course of which some philosophers played a substantial negative role (M.B. Mitin and the likes). Usually, we end with this statement, forgetting to say that before them it was necessary to, as they say, "tear off the heads" of other, of progressive philosophers, and put on the head of philosophy, this great science, the "dunce cap" and only then daringly aim it against genetics and cybernetics, and even against the theory of relativity (such works were indeed published in their time).

We are familiar with quite intensive debates (although, in truth, this is rarely mentioned) on the subject of so-called mechanicism and menshevik-oriented idealism. This was the first round, when the "dunce cap" was already being put on the head of philosophy. Very many outstanding scientists were removed at least from active work and no longer participated in the debates. A new generation of philosophers took over, who rushed to do precisely that about which philosophers are being abused in general.

In my view, this requires a particularly strict differentiation, as clearly confirmed, in particular, by the history of our genetics, about which a particularly great deal is being written, for before defeating genetics it was necessary for philosophy as well to find itself in the same situation.

Those who abuse the philosophers forget to point out that, nonetheless, on the eve of the notorious "August VASKHNIL Session," at which genetics was routed, a philosophical discussion took place in 1947. It assumed the nature of a philosophical preparation for the events which followed. Philosophy obtained substantial negative impulses precisely as a result of this discussion and we are as yet properly to assess all of this, including the Herostratic role played by A.A. Zhdanov.

Dialectical materialism, which Marx, Engels and Lenin considered a weapon for the revolutionary-critical transformation of reality, entered a totally alien role of justification and defense of all that existed, and was used to gloss over the contradictions in real life. This was also related to the fact that it had been already properly prepared by Stalin, as early as the 1930s, when the entire wealth of Marxist-Leninist philosophy was squeezed within the squalid formulas of the fourth chapter of the party history's "*Short Course*." It was precisely this presentation of dialectics that dominated philosophical publications for many decades. Consequently, even that which was accurate and important took the aspects of sad cliches. The more the authority of such dogmatic philosophy was officially enhanced, the more it declined in real social life. It was for this reason, unfortunately, that it was difficult to have the public accept the true accomplishments which were numerous in our unfortunate philosophy.

Characteristically, the scornful attitude toward philosophy was closely related to the overall Makhayev-style view on the intelligentsia, the scientific intelligentsia in particular. Most lofty statements were made whereas in fact...ignoramuses, intoxicated with their power, were unable to "permit" the dynamics of scientific and technical progress. The financial sources for the development of basic sciences were being undermined; whereas in applied science one could still, somehow, convince such people, with the help of immediate practical results, in basic science everything was converted into talks about the "wasteful use of money," scientific "parasitism," and the fact that the USSR Academy of Sciences was "unnecessary." A pragmatic view had never been able truly to appraise any national accomplishment, the more so when it pertains to culture. The result was an extreme backwardness in the most important areas of technical progress and the development of the latest technologies. It seemed that everything should have developed in the opposite direction: it is precisely socialism, freed from the pragmatism of self-seeking private ownership relations, that should maximally ensure strategic breakthroughs in the area of scientific and technical thinking. In fact, as a result of the deforming influence of the subjective factor, today socialism is once again forced to catch up with the capitalist countries in scientific and technical development in the latest areas, such as microelectronics, robotics, the information industry, biotechnology, etc.

After the 20th Party Congress, in the mid-1950s, a rebirth of philosophical research began and, in its present shape, in many or even the majority of its areas, our philosophy marked its beginning precisely at that time. There was an intensive revival of what had happened under Lenin and of what the old philosophers had done, those who had worked with him. Research was developed on the philosophical problems of the natural sciences as well. Sergey Ivanovich Vavilov, president of the Academy of Sciences, was the initiator of the establishment of a special sector on such topics at the Institute

of Philosophy, and headed its work at the start. Bonifatii Mikhaylovich Kedrov was at the origin of this trend and contributed greatly to its establishment and development. The new trend was given major support by outstanding Soviet scientists, such as P.L. Kapitsa, N.N. Semenov, B.L. Astaurov, A.I. Berg, D.K. Belyayev, V.A. Engelgardt and others. An all-Union conference was held in 1958, attended, along with philosophers, by leading representatives of the natural sciences, including biologists and mathematicians. This marked a turning point. It strengthened the alliance which prevails to this day.

This alliance was working, although many philosophers found themselves in a difficult situation. Some years, some of them simply "transferred" to other areas, becoming programmers, biologists, etc. Many research problems were traditional and some "went beyond" the boundaries of philosophy and came close to mathematics. Through mathematical logic philosophical topics were related to computer science. We criticized the positions of logical positivism. It is true that a certain caution was displayed as well, for in terms of their purely "technological" developments, the logical positivists had accomplished a great deal. This had a certain influence on us as well. Nonetheless, we did not want said trend to be reduced to one of pure logic and the study of the logic and methodology of scientific research, constantly emphasizing that we needed a broader conceptual and social context, comprehensive studies of man and global problems, of the ethics of science, and so on.

Unfortunately, the formulation of such problems was not backed by true social need. Furthermore, in a number of cases the opposite was noted: a drastic opposition on the part of practical workers and politicians to the new approaches and ideas which stemmed from the social sciences. In 1967 the CPSU Central Committee issued a resolution which contained an expanded and detailed program for the further development of the social sciences in the individual sectors. This was a good program and the steps it contemplated were good and substantiated. However, the good words were not backed by actions and the steps which had been planned were only partially taken. Many of the suggestions and initiatives formulated by the scientists began to encounter, quite soon, mostly silent but strong opposition also on the part of those who were directly responsible for the implementation of this resolution. A variety of labels were tacked on to scientists who tried to formulate new problems, ranging from "gnosiology" and "anthropology," to accusations of nonparty behavior and non-class approach (such as, for instance, in the formulation and solution of global problems).

Nonetheless, even this "unrequited" science survived. Intensive work was being done (we cannot fail to point out the important role played here by the Scientific Council on Philosophical Problems of the Natural Sciences, which was set up by the USSR Academy of Sciences). This work was reflected in a large number of publications, articles and books, including some jointly

written by philosophers and many of our natural scientists among those who had always considered problems of world outlook and methodology important. Let us note the development of philosophical problems of physics, astronomy, biology, and mathematics, and general problems of the methodology of science. Recently successful studies have been initiated in the area of the philosophical interpretation of the technical sciences, engineering and design. Work on problems of the methodology of history and the humanities has been intensified.

As a result, in my view, we have developed an independent and strong trend in which world science as well is interested. I believe that a certain indication of the fact that we had achieved something in this area was the 8th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, which was held in Moscow in the summer of 1987. I shall not discuss this in detail, for this work by the congress was reflected in this journal as well (see *KOMMUNIST*, No 14, 1987). Let me merely note that, as is frequently the case, the results of our studies on the philosophical problems of the natural sciences and, in general, of philosophical and social problems of science and technology are valued more highly in the West than at home. Such works are being followed very carefully and many of them are being translated. A typical example is the recently published book by the noted American Sovietologist Lauren Graham, a substantive book which has been quite successful: "*Science, Philosophy and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union*," a book which should be translated.

I am saying all this because of the frequently narrow negativistic attitude toward the work of a virtually entire generation of scientists is manifested. Naturally, I am far from saying that everything has developed and is developing as it should. A great deal has been done in some areas while in others the work is merely beginning. In this case philosophers are frequently and justly criticized. For example, no basic research has been organized not only in terms of the study of social problems created by new equipment and technology, the information industry and microelectronics, but also in the development of gene engineering and the new medicine. One would think that philosophers in general have opposed such studies. This, however, is not the case. It is simply that these problems are quite complex and demand great efforts and, therefore, proper social encouragement.

In addition to good knowledge of philosophy, special training and specific knowledge of the research topic are necessary. The former shortcomings and errors concerning genetics and others were caused by the fact that the people who worked in those areas described themselves as philosophers without knowing what they were talking about. Another type of philosophers, who had made intensive studies of the natural sciences, came to us 30 years ago. Today they are inspired by the overall atmosphere in the country and the intolerance of what used to be, as well as by the passionate desire to do everything

properly. However, I fail to see any particular changes in the training of our young people. No specialists in philosophical and social problems of science and technology are being trained in our country. Unless steps are taken, we shall soon lack an adequate number of skilled cadres who could intensively work in this area. For the past 20 years I have been raising this question with the administration of the philosophical department of Moscow State University, with no results so far.

It is true that in this type of research one could hardly do without enthusiasts and it is hardly possible simply to train a person, precisely, I believe, the way it is impossible "to train someone in philosophy." Some kind of specific turn of mind is required. However, proper training and the study of philosophy and the natural sciences are, unquestionably, necessary.

The specific nature of such research is that all of it is interdisciplinary. Today we cannot properly organize our work without the participation of academicians V.L. Ginzburg, N.N. Moiseyev, I.V. Petryanov-Sokolov, K.V. Frolov, A.L. Yanshin and others. Without the participation of these natural scientists, the entire set of problems immediately crumbles and research becomes purely abstract. We need deeper studies, a professional outlook. The project cannot rely on a few specialists. It is important to find specialists through the scientific councils and other academic organizations and to involve VUZ scientific forces. Such dynamics must be maintained on a steady basis. However, we also need good structures. They should be substantially detailed and deal directly with the philosophical and social problems of science and technology. Actually, why do we need huge institutes employing 400 or more people? We could count on the efficient work of between 50 and 70 people, concentrating on the forces which already exist within the academic institutions.

Time changes the approach to the study of philosophical and social problems of scientific and technical progress. For many years studies in that area continued, although during the period of stagnation they were hindered in various ways. Today the situation is changing and the relevance of the problems raises a large number of new tasks. A comprehensive program has been drafted for research on philosophical and social problems of science and technology, and assigned priority status by the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium.

I must point out that this program covers, in its broad aspect, a vast area: the laws governing the development of science and scientific and technical progress; social problems of scientific and technical progress; development of basic sciences and scientific and technical progress; sociocultural and methodological problems of new equipment and technology; finally, comprehensive problems of contemporary science and conceptual and methodological aspects of global problems. This trend

has now taken shape and is developing. One of its quite strong components is that of research on philosophical problems of the contemporary natural sciences.

An all-Union conference on the comprehensive study of man was held at the beginning of this year. This is the area in which we intend to develop to the utmost. "Society. Man. Science and Technology" are, actually, the range of problems of particularly important interest in terms of the interaction between the social and natural sciences. The USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium has adopted a program for the comprehensive study of man on a priority basis.

In the course of its constructive and positive work and in aiming to solve the global problems, we proceed from the priority of universal and humanistic values. Obviously, it is to the extent to which we now feel justified to speak of the need, possibility and reality of the assertion of the new way of thinking, to the same extent we must speak and do speak now of the need, the possibility and the reality of asserting the new humanism and its new forms which would be consistent with the new way of thinking.

Extensive theoretical work remains to be done in this area, the purpose of which is to prove that the view formulated by Marx about humanism as **real**, as being efficient and opposite to abstract utopianism, is now obtaining a new scientific development. In this case we must bear in mind that when it is a question of Marxist humanism, we have in mind not only that which was asserted in the 19th Century but, mainly, what has come to us along with the features of the contemporary world, the appearance and aggravation of global problems and the assertion of the priority of universal human values. This demands the reinterpretation of the dialectics of the universal and the class aspects in the concept of real humanism. By becoming enriched with new approaches, real Marxist humanism can be described as new. This is emphasized to an even greater extent by the fact that we consider it as a developing system of views, bearing in mind that in the future many new elements could appear, elements about which today one cannot speak with definite knowledge.

If the new thinking focuses on the concept of an interdependent and interacting world, i.e., if it proceeds from the fact that the world is one, it thus asserts that this world is the world of the **integral** man. We speak of the priority of such approaches and of the assertion of universal human values as main and decisive. By this token, however, we also assert the priority of the values of the world of man and, considering man on this level, we can no longer pit people against each other on the basis of any type of factor which may be dividing them. This does not mean that we ignore such factors. Under the new conditions, however, the conditions of developing economic, political, scientific and cultural interrelationships, which are increasingly uniting the world and establishing its integrity, it is important to learn how to see also what is common, not only what unites mankind

but also what characterizes man himself. Putting social relations, on which the new thinking is based, outside of man and outside the new features we find today in man means to separating such thinking from the main thing: from a humanistic foundation on which we must rely. In this sense as well we speak today of man and his future as a global problem.

An exceptionally large number of new and interesting aspects for study and consideration become apparent precisely when we break down the global, the common features which characterize contemporary man and his future. This applies not only to the socioclass "neutral" viewpoints of the consideration of man, which pertain to his biological, his genetic nature. However, this too should not be underestimated, the more so since in connection with the aggravation of many problems, including ecological ones, the biological nature of man is being tested ever more severely.

The most urgent task that has appeared is that of the adaptation of man to the present environment, which has greatly changed as a result of anthropogenic influence. This influence is so deep that it is already affecting a number of many, including genetic, human structures, i.e., it is threatening his heredity and, therefore, his future. Furthermore, successes in, shall we say, the development of gene engineering and biotechnology and the arising possibility of using methods of gene engineering developments on man create the exceptionally dangerous threat of manipulating the human genotype for antihuman purposes.

It is important to learn how many contemporary and very progressive scientific trends should develop under circumstances in which man is increasingly becoming the target of scientific studies and possible manipulations. Under the conditions of the intensive development of new technologies, including the new medicine, which makes it possible to invade intimate aspects of the functioning of the human organism, a number of interesting and important global problems arise, which will unquestionably assume a central role in the imagination of researchers and moralists as early as the end of this century and, no doubt, at the start of the next. The situation in science will be largely determined by debates and research precisely in that area. Its trends are quite frequently described as the ethics of science, the ethics of scientific knowledge. One can correspondingly define this new trend of research as the study of the socioethical and humanistic principles and regulators of scientific knowledge. Whereas the new thinking asserts the priority of humanistic values, here as well, in the realm of science, it is also important to proceed from the assertion of the priority of socioethical values and, therefore, the possibility, need for and a certain control of scientific research.

To an ever greater extent contemporary science is nearing an entirely unprecedented situation: having come out of the struggle against medieval fanaticism, the Inquisition, and so on, and freed from what was fettering it,

once again it must face an entire forest of possible prohibitions, restrictions and standards and set up for itself, paradoxical though it might be, certain "taboos," and accept its own "chains." We even know that specific recommendations have been formulated and prohibitions imposed in biomedical research, which operate on the level of moral concepts of an extrajudiciary nature. In many countries, however, many such principles have already been reflected in laws as well.

Our task, it seems to me, now is, as we draw attention to the new problems, to try to do everything possible so that an awareness of the danger presented by a number of studies does not appear after the fact. Perhaps we shall have enough sense to prevent this danger. Although, studying publications and aware of the moods prevailing in the global scientific community, I see very few encouraging features. The movement has been started, it is irreversible, but for the time being it is conceived as something alien to science, allegedly blocking the freedom of scientific knowledge and able to hinder scientific and technical progress. This lack of understanding developed on a scientific basis, so to say, assumes the very dangerous forms of science-oriented complacency. The ideas being discussed greatly affect that which we describe as the realm of human spiritual life—the realm of morality. Perhaps our basic activity on this level in the immediate future should be aimed precisely at this problem. We cannot remain indifferent to the essence and human significance of acquired knowledge, i.e., of the moral, the ethical principle in science.

In asserting the priority of man and humanistic values, which also includes science and scientific and technical progress, it is important to develop the ethical self-awareness of the scientists. I would even say that whereas the development of science and technology could be conceived, let us say, in the sense of a mathematical progression, in order for everything to follow a trend favorable to mankind the ethical self-awareness of the scientists must develop in a geometric progression. Otherwise we would be faced with the notorious gaps and, once again, encounter a number of essential difficulties which would be much more dangerous than those we are dealing with today.

We cannot fail to be interested by something else as well: the extent to which public opinion and social awareness are ready for the new situation in science, related to the development of gene engineering, robotics and others. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to the study of these problems. Naturally, at the present time they are difficult and hard to understand by the broad public. However, not so many years ago, problems pertaining to, let us say, nuclear power were equally puzzling and entirely mysterious. For the time being, we are essentially talking of the benefits which are awaiting us. The consequences are discussed to a lesser, I would say to an inadmissibly lesser extent. At one point works by philosophers were even deleted from various collections under the pretext that they were frightening the people and hindering the development of an important trend.

At whom was this aimed? And who was to be frightened? Today we are trying to organize some cooperation with numerous foreign scientific associations and societies dealing with socioethical problems of biomedical and gene engineering. However, we have almost nothing with which to reciprocate.

In order to raise socialism to a qualitatively new level, unquestionably, we must develop new trends of scientific and technical progress and new high technologies. This presumes a "high contact" between them and the new level of development of man, his culture, his social self-awareness and his responsibility. For the time being, the awareness of the broad masses is clearly unprepared to assimilate the new technologies. This is our tremendous omission, the result of an improperly organized propaganda of the latest problems in science and technology. Without fear of "frightening" or "publicizing," we must break down these old stereotypes and actively influence the shaping of an awareness and see to it that problems of scientific and technical progress become the object of attention of our entire people.

Why, for example, could one see in the FRG entertaining sketches and funny situations about people subject to the use of the methods of gene engineering? This is understood by everyone. In our country, many scientists are occasionally unable to formulate the problem. We must acknowledge that the wide public in the West is better informed and knows more about difficult problems. Naturally, however, one cannot accept this statement in full. For example, housewives may be stopped on the street and asked: "What do you think, is such work necessary?" Naturally, there are scientific problems in which the scientists themselves must be the final judges.

It is obvious, however, that today science is developing as a social institution and it is by no means useful to isolate from society any major problem. Nor is this possible. It is important for the people properly to perceive such problems and not exclusively in happy, in optimistic notes. In his time, V.A. Engelgardt aptly said that this is an area of "ahs" and "ohs:" "ah, how nice this is;" and "oh, how terrible this is." It is important in this case to find a certain balance by openly discussing arising opportunities and possible negative phenomena.

I would particularly like to emphasize that it is work precisely in both directions, "on two fronts," so to say, that is important: against the absolutizing of private research, taking it out of the overall global context and against a certain "science-phobia," according to which scientists are blamed for ecological difficulties and all kinds of diseases, depicting matters as though scientific research does not improve but worsens human life. The name Americans give to such critics of sciences is "whistle-blowers," people who trigger the alarm and stop there. Unfortunately, this phenomenon is beginning to become popular in our country as well and is frequently based on the statements of one or another man of culture, who may even not know the problem but has

only heard about it at various meetings, encounters, and so on. In some cases, this is a reaction to fashion: for example, frequently the word "nature" is replaced with the word "ecology" ("we are thus violating the ecology"...).

This lack of understanding and false concept of science and of scientific and technical progress show the dangerous trend of spreading instantaneously, literally like a fire, against a background of general ignorance. Unfortunately, an undeveloped mind is exceptionally prey to all kinds, including antiscientific, sensations. I believe that in this case philosophers as well as natural scientists are to blame. We must deal more not only with scientific research but also with the propaganda, the popularization of true science and truly scientific views and exert greater influence on mass awareness. We have become accustomed to the fact that science in itself is good. In many cases, however, this must be proved, for a number of destructive and opposite trends are being developed. Furthermore, the mass consciousness frequently is negatively oriented toward science as a whole ("the criticism of science").

The knowledge (general political, world-conceptual and philosophical) which is taught in secondary schools and, something particularly disheartening, in VUZes, is frequently not an antidote. The fact that although philosophy, including the philosophy of science, is taught in VUZes and still negativistic moods remain so widespread is a severe criticism of us as well. To us, philosophers, this is the harshest possible lesson. Today we think a great deal over this problem, particularly, within the framework of the comprehensive program we discussed, and special areas have been earmarked for the study of this problem.

We need a type of education and upbringing consistent with the spirit of the new requirements of scientific and technical progress. Since we are speaking of ecological education, it is equally important properly to educate the people in the spirit of the best possible perception of science and scientific and technical progress. The need for this has appeared at the present stage. A new textbook is currently being prepared for publication—*"Introduction to Philosophy."* Taking into consideration the shortcomings of the past, the authors have tried to structure it in such a way that we could show to the people in the form of a dialogue or discussion the way we should perceive the contemporary world and modern man, culture and science. The perfectly simple answers which were found in the past are no longer suitable and put in a dangerous situation both science and those who study it.

Gradually we are becoming accustomed to the variety of viewpoints and learning to respect the view of others, even though we may not agree with them. However, in order to live a rich social life each individual opinion must be substantiated and considered. All of us must

display the ability for a conscious and sensible orientation in the reality surrounding us. However, man is not born with this ability. It must be developed. The best school is the mastery of the highest achievements of philosophical culture (which, unfortunately, is low in our country). Let me point out, incidentally, that it has been decided to publish a series "From the History of Domestic Philosophical Thinking," which will include works by the following Russian philosophers which have not been published in our country: V.S. Solovyev, S.N. Trubetskiy, S.L. Franko, N.O. Losskiy, P.A. Florenskiy, N.A. Berdyayev, N.F. Fedorov and A.A. Bogdanov.

The "*Introduction to Philosophy*" covers a large number of topics and problems, the definitive solution of which lies in the distant future; a variety of viewpoints are presented and the reader is invited to discuss them. It is only thus, the authors firmly believe, that a person can develop the habit of true philosophizing and master the dialectical way of thinking, which is the core of the new thinking to which we appeal today, in this time of revolutionary perestroika and renovation of our life.

Let me emphasize yet another important circumstance which guided us. Marxist humanism, on which the new political thinking is based, undertakes the defense and assertion of universal human values. This makes it necessary to adopt a largely new approach to the interaction between Marxist philosophy and the other trends in contemporary philosophy. Without belittling in the least the importance and relevance of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and the defense of our class positions, the Marxist philosophers must, nonetheless, play a more active role in keeping in touch with the trends in philosophical and sociopolitical thinking which are our allies in the assertion of humanistic ideals and values, and express the interests and aspirations of large social strata and groups in the struggle for social equality and justice and for democracy and the survival of mankind.

We must acknowledge that some trends in contemporary non-Marxist philosophy have contributed a great deal of valuable features in the interpretation of the varied and largely unique experience acquired by mankind in the course of this century. For that reason the position of self-isolation adopted by our philosophy is not the best possible. We need a frank and interested dialogue with supporters of other contemporary trends. It is precisely this type of dialogue that we are trying to conduct.

Many years ago the idea of the possible development of a unified science of man was formulated. This idea was frequently raised and discussed, including at broad fora. It seemed, however, that no practical progress could be anticipated on this level.

It looks as though as of now the urgent need is already appearing of shaping a new type of science in which research approaches would not be separated from value

approaches, from their socioethical foundations, and the results of research and research trends themselves would still have, as we now say, a human dimension.

Exclusive reliance on science and technology, something which appeared in the middle of our century for many reasons and on many grounds (this was particularly characteristic of the 1960s), in which occasionally anything next or related to the interaction between equipment and technology, on the one hand, and society and man, on the other, above all, yielded a number of negative results. This was manifested, in particular, also in the Chernobyl event, in our country. The lessons of the past may be interpreted as anyone wishes and a mass of explanations may be found, some of them subjective, for various facts and actions. However, also clearly present here is the stereotype of an awareness which, unfortunately, has still not been eliminated: the purely technocratic view on the development of science and technology.

I have had the opportunity to participate in the work of several expert commissions in connection with the project of changing the flow of the northern rivers. It was impossible to prove to the developers that in itself this project was not purely scientific and technical, that it affected millions of people, covered huge territories and major cultural values, for which reason alone it should have been considered above all as a social project. Practical experience confirmed that it was precisely the lack of consideration of this most important component that led to the fact that, in itself, the scientific development of the project proved to be simply groundless.

We have virtually ignored what is known as an alternate trend in scientific and technical progress. There was not even a question of considering the outlays for such purposes as being necessary and part of the development of the technology itself. However, the impeccable nature of modern technology (described as high) can be ensured, let me repeat this once again, only when it is related to man on a high level. We must shift the emphasis in order to put man first, as the main value, not only in words but also in action. Man must indeed and in the real sense of the word become the measure of everything, the measure of all things, as Protagoras said, including the measure of all sciences and all progress.

The distinguishing feature of the socialist system is its aspiration toward the future. However, it does not follow in the least from this that the implementation of humanistic ideals can be postponed "for later," for the distant future. There neither is nor could there be a level of economic development the achievement of which would, in itself, ensure the implementation of such ideals. Humanistic principles and respect for the rights and dignity of the individual and his freedom cannot be brought into social life from the outside. The process of social development itself must, in its essence, to be a process of growth and maturing of these principles, for in the opposite case any consideration of progress becomes

senseless. The time has come also to critically surmount stereotypes according to which the life and dignity of today's person could be sacrificed to the man of the future. And if today by no means have conditions been created which would ensure the comprehensive development and realization of the essential forces of the individual, this does not mean in the least that man should be satisfied with a minimum, for it is everything and only what is being done for the development of man today that will become the asset of the man of tomorrow. It is precisely thus that a potential is created so that tomorrow man could improve on our present standards. Socialist society has no more valuable capital, and the greatest harm to socialism is caused when we allow ourselves to consider man as a means of achieving any, even the best, objectives.

It cannot be said that philosophers have avoided such problems. Many works have been written on the problems of man since the beginning of the 1960s. Paradoxical though this might seem, however, in the case of many practical workers and politicians, philosophy, particularly in such areas, today remains an "unknown." We are probably to blame ourselves for the fact that the broad public has remained unfamiliar with the results of our work, although in this case as well this was substantially due to many of our "trustees." The characteristic of the present situation is the need decisively to address ourselves to the practical side of the matter and start dealing more energetically with specific problems, directly linking them to real life.

Once again, we return to the question: Is a unified science of man possible? During the conference on the comprehensive study of the problem of man we mentioned, a roundtable meeting was held precisely on that topic. What do we have in mind as we discuss it in such difficult times?

Today it is a question of an incentive for making progress in the organization of comprehensive research and organizing interdisciplinary work on this quite complex problem. We must learn how better to understand one another, find a common language, and see what problems can be "encompassed" within the unified science of man. This today is our topical task.

A variety of views exist on which of the scientific disciplines should assume an integrating role, the role of organizer of comprehensive research and the creation of the unified science of the future. One could prove one's position only through action and not through administrative methods or by developing some kind of new structures which, to say the least, would fetter for a long period of time any live and currently developing thought, constraining it within a specific framework. Greater opportunities must be provided for many variants in the structure of this unified science.

I believe that philosophy has the greatest capability for assuming such an initiative role. The three most important functions it performs in contemporary scientific knowledge ensure it, in my view, such a possibility. Philosophy contributes, above all, to the formulation of new problems at the point where various sciences and human culture intersect. Such an integrating, a synthesizing function could be quite pertinent in this case. Philosophy also performs a critical function (i.e., an analytical, a research function) in the broad meaning of this term. In particular, it analyzes the ways of structuring science which, in this case, is of particular interest to us, for here the dialectical method could contribute a great deal. Finally, the value-regulatory function of philosophy, which pertains to correlating objectives and ways of knowledge and action with humanistic ideals in their socioethical evaluation, is assuming increasing significance under contemporary conditions. Today it is very important to combine research with value approaches within a single entity, particularly at a time when science is addressing itself to man.

The 18th World Philosophy Congress will be held in the British city of Brighton by the end of this year. Its main topic will be the philosophical understanding of man. We too have something to present at this congress and say something in opposition to the nonmaterialistic interpretation of man.

I believe that in the age of perestroika, the objective of which is to give a new, a humane face to socialism, one could considerably raise the question of setting up a center for the comprehensive study of man, the Institute of Man. One could imagine in the future such a small association of scientists covering a wide range of specialized areas, well familiar with methodology, philosophy, world outlook, and ethical problems and, at the same time, with specific sciences, clearly oriented toward the essential implementation of the functions we discussed here. The relevance of this task becomes even greater in connection with the development of the "Human Gene" program which is being discussed by many scientists.

Naturally, no one conceives of such an institute or center as a simple combination of representatives of different sciences under one roof or, perhaps, an installation of various laboratories on its various floors, which would pursue their old projects but, this time, in a different kind of institute. This is a rather hackneyed concept, a kind of stereotype which hinders us today greatly, particularly in terms of the discussion of the idea itself. Listening to such considerations and, on their basis, objections, occasionally expressed by some of our respected scientists, one always feels like saying: "True, today the establishment of an Institute of Man is impossible." To create it one needs people with an entirely new type of mentality, with a new understanding of science, including the unified science of man. I believe, however, that nonetheless we should have this as our target. Unquestionably, perestroika could take us closer to this objective and create, both practically and theoretically,

the new features which would be most consistent with the humanistic ideals of our society. We must cultivate the grounds on the basis of which such a humanistic awareness will develop, without neglecting in this case a single opportunity for accomplishing something practical.

A number of topical tasks exist, demanding an urgent solution: the food and housing problems, and others. Everywhere, however, the decisive feature is man himself, his work, culture and morality. Therefore, the problems of man cannot be postponed. They require comprehensive study through science and the arts. One could imagine a center which would combine science with art, aimed at the study, assertion and triumph of the sensible and humane Man. Such a science could also be expressed through suitable architecture. It could be used to train young people, sponsor lectures and exhibits dealing with the problems of mankind, etc. Some of my numerous correspondents, including members of informal organizations, dealing with the problems of man, have even chosen a place for such an architectural ensemble: in Moscow, on Volkhonka, now occupied by a swimming pool....

Naturally, the simplest thing is to consider this as some kind of fantasy in which even serious people could indulge. However, I believe that it is possible to create temples and palaces not only in honor of God-man, as in the past, but also dedicated to the sensible and humane Man, as the symbol of the new and humane socialism, as man's hope for the future.

Everything possible must be done to turn this hope into reality. This must be accomplished as of now, for this determines our very future.

The time of revolutionary restructuring of society and of ourselves, of our thinking and awareness, creates real prerequisites for the humanistic renovation, for a true renaissance of man and the science of man. We must accomplish them both on the theoretical and the practical levels.

The 19th Party Conference emphasized the urgent social need for the study of man. Naturally, this applies to the philosophy of science and the science of man. We believe that all of this is set on a firm long-term basis. It is now up to us. **What** to do is clear and **how** to do it is also more or less clear. There is a great lack of clarity as to **who** will introduce the new features in our science. Yet this will determine everything else. That is why at this point we pay a great deal of attention to work with young people. While maximally harnessing the intellectual potential of contemporary generations of philosophers, we must mandatorily involve in social studies new scientists, those born of revolutionary perestroika, for it is to them that the future belongs. I am pleased that we have been able to enhance the activities of the youth section of the Philosophical Society. This is manifested also in the fact

that for the first time a large delegation of young philosophers will be attending the World Philosophy Congress, where they will establish an international association.

All of us have studied and are learning the difficult art of true philosophical work, which is always critical and self-critical, and inspired by lofty models, objectives and ideals and yet closely related to the realities of the present, to the lives and concerns of millions of people, to intellectual movements in all areas of science and art, and to human culture as a whole. This presumes intensive mental work, extreme intellectual activeness of philosophy as a "spiritual quintessence of its time" (Marx). Naturally, it also requires total and absolutely honest thinking. That is why serving philosophy has been considered morally so high at all times. We shall follow the best examples without forgetting the bitter lessons of the past.

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History Through the Eyes of the Readers; Review of Editorial Mail

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[Survey by Valeriy Gennadiyevich Bushuyev, editor of the department of history, KOMMUNIST, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] Interest in the past, above all in the Soviet period of domestic history, has never been so great and sharp as it is today. The mail which KOMMUNIST receives reflects the intensity of the developed arguments and discussions on historical problems and the frequently almost totally opposite viewpoints expressed by the authors of the letters we receive.

The following question is entirely legitimate: In general, why has such an urgent need appeared for the study of the past and for understanding and objectively assessing its most complex problems?

This need is dictated above all by moral reasons. We need to address ourselves to the past in order to restore truth and justice to their fullest extent. We need the assertion of historical truth also as a lesson for the present and the future.

In the current debates it is less a question of Stalin's personality than of the nature of socialism and its fate. The purpose of these discussions is by no means to determine who is for Stalin and who is against. The task is to shed clarity on the main question: What aspects from the past should we take with us into the future and what part of the legacy should we abandon in order to help our social system regain its revolutionary nature

and historical prospects, unite and consolidate Soviet society and direct it toward perestroika, and successfully advance toward democratization and socialism.

Here is a letter to the editors by 22-year old reader S. **Sharkov** (Chelyabinsk): "Of late people have begun frequently to turn to history, to open the "closed" pages in the history of our country. This is proper. The people must know their history. But why is all of this being done so one-sidedly. Essentially the people are recalling the period of the 1930s and 1940s, doing this, furthermore, in terms of its darkest aspects. And why is it that Stalin alone is being mentioned among all the state leaders of that time. The impression is created that all the difficulties which took place during those years should be blamed on Stalin alone. It was he who created the "cult of personality," it was he who sent bunches of people to be executed by firing squad, it was he who happily destroyed famous people and elevated the talentless. I am unwilling to believe this. Even the greatest of individuals is unable to accomplish this; it would be beyond his power to rule single-handedly a huge country and conduct international policy.... I, and not only I alone, am excited by our history but not in bits and pieces, but in all of it, from 1917 to 1987, for this is our own history, with everything that occurred in the country and its people.

"Were there not errors and excesses before and after Stalin! I am not saying that we should forget this period but I would like to know, in addition to that period, other years which are closer to my own life. There should be no "blank spots" in history and they must be 'filled in' on time."

Naturally, the editors understand the feelings motivating the authors of such letters. No human search for truth can exist without human emotions. Emotions, however, are only the first step leading to knowledge. Unfortunately, those historians who base their work not on feelings but on a strictly scientific analysis have lost the initiative in describing and in their conceptual interpretation of the most difficult periods in Soviet history and, as in the past, continue to owe a great debt to society.

The flood of historical publications and having documents and materials published, after being concealed from the public for many years, the debates which have been started in the press and the novelty and complexity of the problems in all areas of the present stage of perestroika have triggered in some people a certain confusion and mental chaos. This has been manifested in a large number of letters to our editors. Their main postulate is the following: historical truth is perhaps something good but its interpretation requires a feeling of measure, for the full truth would bring about incalculable difficulties and would almost undermine the foundations of our society, leading to a loss of ideals, the ideological disarmament of young people, etc.

What can be said on this subject? On one occasion, R. Strauss-Huppe, the American bourgeois political expert, provided the following interpretation to the freedom of will and to addressing oneself to the past: "History created us. We are inseparably bound to it. However, we are free to decide as to how much of it should be remembered and how much should be forgotten." The Marxists-Leninists reject such an interpretation of history. Unlike bourgeois ideologues, who retain the right to decide what of the past should be concealed from the people and what should be made public, to the communists history, and the remembrance and truth of the past are inseparable. Truth may be too little but one can never have too much of it. "Partial" truth is in itself a distortion of the truth. What we need is the exhaustive truth about anything which occurred in our lives. Truth can never weaken socialism. Socialism can be harmed only by the violation of socialist principles, by the unwillingness to look at truth in the eyes or by conscious hypocrisy. That is what, in fact, has been corrupting public opinion for so many years and undermining the reputation of socialism.

Naturally, we can only agree with readers who consider inadmissible to see in our history nothing but a chain of errors and forget the fact that socialism means the live creativity of the masses which have gained tremendous social experience regardless of anything which may have prevented them from deploying their creative forces as fully as possible.

The main problem is to get rid of simplistic approaches, of squalid one-sidedness, so that we can see the distance we have covered in its entirety, in its dialectical contradictoriness without, consciously or subconsciously, leading to subjectivistic conclusions and arbitrary assessments. In order to be principle-minded, truthful and accurate, we must rely on the totality of facts. We must be systematically guided by Leninist methodology, according to which, in the study of complex problems and periods, "we need first of all and more than anywhere else a depiction of the process in its entirety, the consideration of all trends and the determination of their resultant force or the sum of their result" (*Poln. Soch.* "[Complete Collected Works], vol 27, pp 195-196). Without this no quest and assertion of the truth, including historical truth, would be possible.

A significant majority of our readers realize the pressing need for asserting historical truth in its full volume, with no attempts whatsoever at concealing or semi-acknowledging fact. Truth knows no compromise. Typical in this respect is the letter by Ye. **Ivandikov** (worker at the RSU MGTS, Moscow). "The party," he writes, "may rest easy as far as the workers are concerned: we shall not be moved from the positions of communist convictions even if some of us may not be members of the CPSU. One must not fear to tell us the entire truth, about the past and the present, however hard and bitter it may have been for us. We shall endure the bitterness. What matters is for the truth to be pure and unconcealed. It

can only strengthen our faith in the Leninist Party, its courage and ability to see and honestly to acknowledge its errors and correct them. It is much more terrible in terms of the faith and beliefs of the people when the truth of the past, of the tragic periods in our history, is concealed and distorted to suit the latest leader. That is what can truly turn the people away from socialism. Furthermore, it is only the full truth that will fully deprive our ideological enemies of their weapons against us. The force of truth is working for perestroika, for Lenin's cause."

Similar views are expressed by professor Ya. Askin, doctor of philosophical sciences (Saratov): "The people and the party must be familiar with the basic facts which characterized the cult of Stalin's personality and the difficult consequences it entailed. This will help perestroika. It will have a beneficial impact on the formulation of a new way of thinking. This truth will be one of the guarantees for the irreversibility of the perestroika process, which includes, as one of its important components and a mandatory prerequisite a criticism of the anti-Leninist distortions of socialism. As a VUZ teacher, who is involved with the training and upbringing of young people, I particularly would like to point out how useful it is for the young for the truth about the past to become a reliable base for their correct understanding of revolutionary perestroika."

In his time, F. Engels pointed out the tremendous conservative power of tradition in all areas of ideology (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 21, p 315). It is not astounding in the least that the impact of this power has not escaped us as well. In order to surmount such conservatism and any kind of mythology and fictitious concepts which are incompatible with the revolutionary and critical spirit of Marxist-Leninist outlook, we must extensively disseminate among the masses objective information about the past, which can push aside various myths and illusions. It is difficult to disagree with L. Yermolayev (Belokalitvinskiy Rayon, Rostov Oblast), who writes that "There is no socialist conservatism as such. There is conservatism in political thinking, buried within Stalinism and unable soberly to assess the situation, alienated from society and opposed to society. The elimination of such conservatism is a prerequisite for the success of perestroika."

Naturally, no one could question the fact that, as a whole, Soviet history, with all retreats, losses and failures, is the history of an unparalleled labor and military exploit of the people's masses which, surmounting all the burdens which had befallen on their lot, made the greatest possible contribution to the development and the strengthening of our society and determined its socialist choice and destiny. "Here nothing could be subtracted or added," in the picturesque saying by A. Tvardovskiy. This is the true historical truth. However, this truth would have been and would have remained incomplete had we not honestly and openly acknowledged the fact that the ways and means of implementing

changes in the country, after Lenin's death, were not always and in everything consistent with the principles of socialism and socialist ideology and theory. It is obvious today that our history developed under the strong influence of an entire series of circumstances and factors which by no means proceeded from the nature of the society which was built by the Soviet people, under the party's leadership. The overall low level of culture (including political culture) of the masses, powerfully involved by the revolution into the whirlpool of socio-political life and, as Lenin predicted, inevitably introducing in the process of building socialism "their own prejudices, reactionary fantasies, weaknesses and errors" (op. cit., vol 30, p 55), had an extremely adverse effect. It was this ground, not entirely cleaned of "petit bourgeois slag" (Lenin) that was the nutritive ground for the establishment of a regime of personal power and an administrative-command system, the spreading of the ideology of the leader, simplistic approaches to problems of the class struggle, and various rushes and anticipations in the economic and political areas, which played such a tragic role. An awareness of this provides extensive opportunities for the honest and unbiased study of the way covered by our people, so that, having separated the wheat from the chaff, we can cleanse socialism from anything extraneous, noninherent and alien to it and restore in its entirety the true, the Leninist aspect of the new society, naturally, taking contemporary conditions and possibilities into consideration.

A number of letters express a viewpoint according to which the assessment of the stages in Soviet history we have gone through was made a long time ago, for which reason we should no longer stir the past, disturb our remembrance of people who are now dead and create differences of opinion and shame, as some readers have said, "many generations of people loyal to communism" (M. Novikov, Dolgoprudnyy, Moscow Oblast; D. Yaroshenko, Omsk; Muscovite I. Kislyakov, A. Sapun, Nezhin, Chernigov Oblast; B. Pankratov, Smolensk; M. Bryukhanov, Zyryanovsk, East-Kazakhstan Oblast; A. Pozdnyakov, Korenevo Village, Lyuberetskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast, and others). However, the problem, precisely, is that the truth about the complex and exceptionally contradictory period of 1924-1953, when the great and the base, the heroic and the tragic were interwoven in such a strange fashion, has not been told to the end, while the process of restoration of justice was in fact stopped in the mid 1960s. For that reason, the events of those years did not become history, in the straight meaning of the term, a history which now today could be classified as part of the past. We can only agree with the view expressed by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences P. Demchuk (Kiev), who wrote that "If after the assessment of the cult of Stalin's personality, given at the 20th Congress, we had not limited ourselves to noting the facts, many subsequent negative phenomena could have been avoided."

Indeed, the true and total cleansing of the legacy of the period of the cult of personality and bringing to light its

deep roots did not take place. Furthermore, some features of that period were manifested under entirely different historical conditions twice (at the beginning of the 1960s and in the 1970s and beginning of 1980s), affecting a number of aspects of economic, political and spiritual life. It was precisely the administrative-command management system, which was created in the 1930s, that became the mechanism obstructing our development. To this day we continue to come across vestiges of Stalinism. That is why the CPSU is forced to dedicate today so much effort and energy to the restoration of the Leninist standards of party and state life, the elimination of alienation, formalism and bureaucratism and the rejection of anything which has deformed socialism.

It is only the objective, bolshevik-honest and impartial scientific assessment of all stages in the development of Soviet society that would indicate that this page in our history has finally been turned and that once and for all the distortions of the Leninist ideas of socialism have come to an end. Many letter writers believe that the problem related to defining Stalin's place and role in our history is one of the most important in the process of shaping the scientific historical awareness of the Soviet people. For that reason, they are expecting of the historians a profound analysis of Stalin's activities both in the prerevolutionary period as well as during the revolution and the Civil War. The readers insist on a thorough determination of the circumstances surrounding the appearance of the cult of personality, its start, the reason for its development and the reason for which respect for the leader of the party developed or, more accurately, degenerated into deification, and what were the objective and subjective prerequisites for the establishment of a regime of personal power which, in the final account, had such tragic consequences. "It is important to answer these questions not for the sake of empty curiosity," writes Engineer V. Levitin (Sverdlovsk). "This is needed in order to draw lessons from the bitter experience of the past and take them into consideration in the future." "We must speak of this," believes N. Stulikov, (Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast) "for what guarantee do we have that no such individual may appear in the future, thirsting for personal power, and that no situation which would encourage such thirst be created?"

Many of the letters express the thought of the need for comprehensively indicating in the work of researchers differences in the concepts of Lenin and Stalin on the correlation between morality and politics, nature of relations with fellow comrades in the struggle and ideological opponents in the course of discussions and arguments, the demands facing them in terms of the moral qualities as heads of the party and the Soviet state, means of attaining political objectives, and so on.

Judging by the editorial mail, the readers have a clear idea of the contradictoriness and complexity of Stalin's character and those among his features which played a fatal role in our history. "Stalin's character was

complex," writes R. Zachevitskiy (Leningrad). "On the one hand, he was a strong personality; on the other, he had specific features in his nature which, prior to his assumption of the duties of general secretary, remained unnoticed. Yet a person's character means the way through which the individual maintains his relations with reality and the people, the way he sees them, and his values and motivations. As it subsequently became clear, Stalin was distinguished by a heightened self-esteem along with a paranoiac suspicion of and mistrust toward people, and fear of threats to himself and to the political course he had chosen."

From everything we know about Stalin, we may conclude that he was one of those political leaders whose organizational talent, as well as refined mastery of fierce intrigue making, dictated by the logic of the struggle for power and for preserving it "at all cost," could be manifested to their fullest extent and bring results only under the circumstances of an artificial exacerbation of conflicts and clashes among groups and individuals, in an atmosphere of general suspicion, persecution and account settling, i.e., under the conditions of a kind of permanent stage of siege. The normal, the natural atmosphere of a civil peace, party comradeship and reciprocal trust and constructive collective cooperation, in which a spirit of freedom, democracy and humanism would prevail and the dignity of the human individual be respected, were alien to him. Such a truly socialist atmosphere, which had developed in the party and the country at large thanks to the efforts of Lenin and his fellow workers, proved incompatible with the Stalinist understanding of the laws and methods of political struggle, the relationship between leader and masses and Stalin's inherently distorted concept of socialist society and the role and nature of the Communist Party, and his faith in his own infallibility and inflexible conviction that any social problem can be solved only through administrative and power methods, terror and intrigues behind the screen.

Taking these features of his character into consideration, features which found favorable grounds for their manifestation and influence in the course of events under the conditions which had developed within the party and in the country after Ilich's death, obviously we must consider the question not only of the role of Stalin's personality but also of the alternative which he offered Soviet society as of the end of the 1920s. The need has long come, our readers note, to make a comparative analysis between the Leninist plan for transition to socialism in our country and the actual Stalinist practice of building the new society.

Many of those who, to this day, are trying to find some kind of justification for Stalin's policies, believe that we should distinguish in his activities between the true struggle for socialism and distortions which took the shape of unjustified repressions (P. Kalinichenko, Vilnius, A. Butyrin, Kharkov, A. Sychev, Zheleznogorsk,

Kursk Oblast, N. Chuykin, Travniki Village, Chebarkulskiy Rayon, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Muscovite A. Taymaz, and Ye. Garbuz, Berdichev, Zhitomir Oblast). Such efforts, however, are scientifically groundless. Naturally, if one wishes, sufficient examples of zigzags could be found in Stalin's activities as well as a drastic change in slogans and allies. In one thing, however, he was invariably consistent: building socialism having departed from the Leninist understanding of the humanistic nature of the new system. This was the tragedy of Lenin's fellow workers, who became obstacles on Stalin's way.

The profound study of this problem is a project for the immediate future, which will require extensive scientific effort. For the time being, based on the reader's letters and questions, one can only note the basic problems which historians today must solve urgently.

The thorough study of the situation which was developing in the country led Lenin, at the end of his life, to the conclusion of the need to revise his previous views on problems of transition to socialism and to shift the center of gravity not to the political struggle but to the peaceful organization of "cultural" work (see op. cit., vol 45, p 376). In solving the same problems, Stalin concentrated on the concept of the aggravation of the class struggle in the course of the advance toward socialism.

He also gave a different interpretation to the nature of economic mechanisms in a socialist society. Lenin emphasized economic methods of managing the national economy. Their assertion inevitably presumed the acknowledgment of the existence of commodity-monetary relations under socialism, the preservation and the active role in our industry of the "old specialists," the masters of the organization of production, to the recruitment of which Vladimir Ilich always assigned exceptionally great value. From the very beginning, Stalin emphasized the elimination of commodity-monetary relations and the introduction of administrative-command management methods. The need for them was substantially determined by the fact that the old specialists had been removed from industry through a number of falsely instigated trials, and the abolishment of the NEP economic system under the conditions of that "great leap" to socialism, which was taken in the course of the implementation of the 1st 5-Year Plan.

In the conversion of the countryside to socialism, Lenin contemplated a way of cooperation, preserving the personal interest of every peasant in the results of his toil. Having practically narrowed and restricted the Leninist cooperative plan, Stalin charted a course toward accelerated collectivization, which affected the interests of the toiling peasantry and allowed the exercise of coercion. M. Obutko (Spodobovka Village, Shevchenkivskiy Rayon, Kharkov Oblast) writes the following in this connection: "How did the development of the country proceed after 1927? The Leninist concepts were still in effect until that time. The 15th Party Congress was held in December 1927. One month later Stalin rejected the

resolutions of the congress, which were based on Lenin's ideas. This marked the beginning of rushing, insulting the peasantry and drafting of article 107 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. The result was hunger in the country in 1932-1933."

Whereas Lenin had called for preserving unity in the party's leadership, devoting to such problems a great deal of attention in his last works, Stalin charted a course of dividing this unity, settling his accounts with any dissident who failed to share his own views and interpretations of socialism, and creating of a system of personal power. It is thus that Lenin's concept of collective leadership, which alone could deal with the country's problems and ensure a systematic transition to socialism, was frustrated.

Under our country's specific conditions, when the socialist revolution clashed with the revival and strengthening of bureaucracy, the question of the ways of subordinating the bureaucracy to the policies of the working class assumed a special place. Lenin intended to achieve this by strengthening the economic, "mercantile" economic management methods, which inherently opposed bureaucracy as they fought in defense of the quality structure of the party (the sense of his appeals was not to accelerate the broadening of the party; see op. cit., vol 45, pp 17-21), implementing the stipulations concerning worker democracy, as approved at the 10th RKP(b) Congress. After eliminating economic management methods and rejecting the idea of worker democracy, Stalin tried to solve this problem through authoritarianism, excessive centralization and developing a widespread apparatus staffed by people he had personally selected and who were prepared to obey him unquestioningly.

In his work "The Infantile 'Leftist' Disease in Communism," Lenin had substantiated the need for the party to have authoritative and tested managers—"leaders"—(which would include their testing through democratic and parliamentary methods, i.e., essentially under the conditions of glasnost) (see op. cit., vol 41, p 49). In his final letters and articles he particularly emphasized that the time had come to create within the RKP(b) a situation in which the "leaders" could not rise above the party. It was a question of formulating the principles of activity of the Central Control Commission, extensively involving workers in the Central Committee, and providing conditions under which a general secretary or any other leader would be unable to block to members of the Central Committees or the Central Control Commission access to the full volume of information. Having established themselves in power, Stalin and his closest circle, frustrated, in addition to the NEP, intraparty democracy. They put an end to free debate and glasnost. With increasing frequency ideological differences were discussed not in the course of party debates or in the press, as had been the case under Lenin; instead they were used as a pretext for investigations and punishment by the internal affairs organs which by that time had been placed by Stalin above party and popular control.

In addressing themselves to the situation which was established in the country during the period of development of the cult of Stalin's personality, readers who were eyewitnesses to those events emphasize the difference between it and the atmosphere which prevailed in the post-October years. "The first Soviet years were splendid times," writes N. Khrulev (Bichurino Village, Chuvash ASSR), a labor veteran. "We argued in a human way. Party friendship and unity were not violated by the discussions but were strengthened by them. The falsification of the history of our revolution and of party history began most actively with Stalin's letter to the editors of the journal PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA in 1931. Virtually all of Lenin's and Marx's evaluations were deleted from the *"Short Course of VKP(b) History."* The historical merits of Lenin's closest friends and fellow workers of 1917 and between 1917 and 1924 marked one of the most outstanding pages in the history of our party and country. History will render them their proper due. Those fellow-workers of the leader, who argued and occasionally expressed their disagreement with Lenin, with the Central Committee or the majority of the party, how could they be alien, "foreigners" and enemy agents? This was an immeasurable stupidity. Communism cannot be repelled. It is omnipotent not only in terms of ideas and theories but also with its accessibility and acceptability by all people with reason, conscience and honor. However, this also presumes fraternal, democratic and comradely attitude within the party. Could one find in Marx, Engels or Lenin a full, a radical break caused by tactical differences? To reject people who disagree, who are dissident, and who criticize is easy and no great intelligence is required to this effect. 'Routing,' and police-executioner methods have been known in the world for thousands of years. It is much more difficult to attract, to persuade, to prove the rightness of one's ideas, thoughts and policies. One could attract and prove only on the basis of communist-democratic principles. Such, precisely, was the nature of Lenin's invincible power."

Problems related to the mass repressions of the end of the 1930s and their impact on the political atmosphere in the country and on the course of its further development occupy a special place in the editorial mail.

Some readers believe that the repressions were justified, for they meant "purging society from anti-socialist elements and, on this basis, strengthening the ideological side of our society and the country's defense capability" (Yu. Alymov, Donetsk). Others proceed from the fact that "repressions were the disease of the age and Stalin alone should not be blamed for this. Naturally, he could not see everything, for Beriia was huddling in a corner" (I. Yeremin, Ryazan").

However, the overwhelming majority of letters express an entirely different viewpoint. "How many noted economic managers and most talented engineers of the 1930s turned out to be 'enemies of the people' and 'saboteurs,'" write L. Shokin and G. Reshetnikov

(Moscow). "How many more enterprises like Dneproges and Uralsmash they would have built for us, had they not been killed! For this reason, the industrial giants, however grandiose they may be, are insufficient compensation for our potential losses and they were built more thanks to the mass labor heroism of the people rather than the concern of the leadership. Is it not time to emphasize precisely this circumstance when we recall the past? It is true that we were able to endure and to defeat fascism in the Great Patriotic War. But how many lives were lost, and how much blood was shed from a single major error made by Stalin who, to the very last day and hour considered the growing threat of attack a provocation! Let us not even mention the weakening of the Red Army and the destruction and the repressions against the high command and many managers and engineers in the defense industry. Stalin knew full well what he was doing and was aware of everything happening in the state, including the scope of the mass repressions. Ever new details of Stalin's actions are becoming public, increasingly confirming his lifelong slogan that "the end justifies the means." This was a slogan which, at the 14th Congress, Stalin cleverly reworked in his famous statement on the impossibility of building socialism "with white gloves" (see J.V. Stalin, *"Soch."*, vol 7, p 340). This was a statement which, on the one hand, actually legitimized, for many long years, the selling of alcoholic beverages as one of the major sources of funds and, on the other, which created the terrible alternative of "porcupine gloves." God willing, the damage which was caused by Stalin to the cause of socialism and to the reputation of the party does not prove to be irreversible in some areas and we may fully restore faith in the humane socialist ideals. This is a difficult mission which, probably, is today our highest purpose."

Many authors of letters hold the view that as a result of the actions of the Stalinist leadership, by the turn of the 1930s the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, which had been secured and strengthened through the systematic and painstaking work of the Leninist Party and through the policy of the NEP, was severely damaged. We have still not assessed in its entirety the harm which was caused not only to the national economy, the balancing of its sectors and the well-being of the population and the country's economic and defense potential, but also to the very cause of socialism and its reputation in the eyes of the world public. The economic persecution of the peasantry, the intelligentsia and many members of the working class, which were of unprecedented scale and were not motivated either politically or economically, affected the destinies of millions of Soviet citizens and instilled in the social mentality the image of the "enemy of the people." All of this could not fail but shake up the faith in socialism and in the communist parties among many progressive and democratic people in the world, people who had enthusiastically welcomed the October Revolution, had actively participated in the movement of solidarity with the land of the soviets and who had seen in it the embodiment of the ideals of freedom and

humanism. The division within the labor movement in Western Europe, which was worsened by the instilling of Stalin's politically erroneous left-wing-sectarian formula that social democracy is the "twin," the "moderate wing" of fascism, objectively contributed to strengthening in a number of countries the influence of the extreme right and facilitated the Hitlerite advent to power in Germany.

Like many other readers, **Yu. Chukreyeva** (Belozerka Settlement, Kherson Oblast) has reasons to assume that "with a galaxy of tempered revolutionaries (already after Lenin's death), such as Frunze, Rykov, Dzerzhinskiy, Menzhinskiy, Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Rudzutak, Yenukidze, Kuybyshev, Zinovyev, Kamenev and Bukharin, and with our talented military, who were destroyed in the 1930s, and hundreds of thousands of innocent people who died, we could have 'unraveled' the planet in such a way that the fascist party, headed by Hitler, would have simply not been founded, and millions of human lives on earth would have been saved."

The readers raise and try by themselves to interpret, in the light of historical knowledge, the sensitive problems related to the development of relations among nationalities in our country, and improvements in international education; they offer their own interpretations of remaining problems in this exceptionally important area of life. **R. Eminov** (Tashkent) points out the permanent value of Lenin's letter "On the Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomization'." "Most regrettably," he writes, "the general secretary had his own line which he hastily implemented using all possible means. Stalin turned the interpretation of the national problem away from the Leninist concept. Haste and administrative zeal were the other baneful features of Stalinism. Despite superficially accurate seeming and even Leninist-sounding slogans, the aspiration of urging on, of accelerating processes, which Lenin repeatedly pointed out, created grounds for gross distortions of the Leninist national policy."

The legitimate question asked by the readers is the following: How to assess the activities of Stalin and his circle based on the positions of historical truth and on our present knowledge of the post-Leninist period in the country's development? The authors of these letters differ in their views. "Stalin honored victoriously his oath given at Lenin's grave," believes Candidate of Agricultural Sciences **G. Zaridze** (Tbilisi). **V. Paleshev** (Yefremov, Tula Oblast) is of the opinion that "Stalin was loyal to the cause of Lenin and the socialist revolution but pursued this cause not through Leninist means but means which were anti-people's. The facts prove that collectivization and industrialization were old Leninist ideas and that Stalin implemented them but not through Leninist methods." A similar viewpoint is expressed by **L. Boltovskiy** (Podolskoye Village, Krasnoselskiy Rayon, Kostroma Oblast): "Ignoring Lenin's political testament, Stalin arbitrarily accelerated events. He presented wishes as realities, concentrated in his hands the full power and replaced the dictatorship of the proletariat

with his own dictatorship, firmly relying in this case on the Communist Party, which saw in him the great continuator of Lenin's cause. The party had reasons for this. What is bad is that the Stalinist model of socialism was accepted as the true socialism." Jurist **V. Volkov** (Ulyanovsk) calls for "Repenting and cleansing our souls, and rejecting the crimes of Stalin and telling the entire world: this is not the socialism which Lenin had in mind and had begun to build."

Pain and bitterness imbue the letter of war and labor veteran and old party member **L. Selchenkov**, (Arzamas, Gorkiy Oblast), who tries by himself to determine the results of the activities of Stalin and his circle. "A terrible hunger and empty shelves in stores poured on the Soviet people during the very first steps of this heroic and tragic path. Crowds of goons promoted collectivization in our agriculture. Along the Stalinist way we acquired the baneful tactic of 'at any cost,' with its scorn for people's concerns. Laws which were thorough imbued with mistrust in people entered our practical activities, based on the concept that every Soviet person is a criminal. We acquired an unbalanced, an unrestrained growth of group "A" industry. To this day this group largely works for its own sake. We acquired the notorious 'gross output' with its defective products, figure padding, rotting raw materials and materials, products and equipment. We acquired an administrative-command system of management with a huge apparatus which hinders and complicates the life of the people. The stagnant atmosphere in the country helped the thick curtain of secrecy to conceal the tears of unbalanced production and criminal actions. The most severe blow, however, which Stalin dealt to the Soviet people was to desecrate its bright revolutionary flag, the flag of communism. Having appropriated for himself the right to determine the way of building communism and to assess its results, Stalin deprived the freedom and repressed the communist world outlook and for decades deprived it of the possibility to develop freely."

A large number of such bitter letters have been received by the editors. Readers **V. Togidze** (Kutaisi, Georgian SSR), **M. Polyakov** (Kama Settlement, Kambarskiy Rayon, Udmurt ASSR), **A. Blinkov** (Labinsk, Krasnodar Kray), **D. Kudryashev** (Orsk, Orenburg Oblast), **A. Gnezdukhin** (Volzhskiy, Volgograd Oblast), **S. Krasnopolskiy** and **B. Anayev** (Moscow) and others are trying to find an explanation for what they or their relatives, the entire country, had to experience in the post-Leninist period, and to understand the nature of the policy which was exercised at that time. To sum up the main questions raised in this connection in the letters we received, an entire program of historical research would seem necessary, the immediate implementation of which is expected by a tremendous number of our readers. These problems go far beyond the framework of discussing the personality of Stalin himself, whose role, according to a significant number of authors of such letters, does not cause any particular doubts. They discuss the radical

problems of development of our country and the reasons and consequences of the establishment of what many people describe as the "Stalinist model" of socialism.

The readers are interested in a great variety of problems. Was the establishment of an administrative-command system for party and state management justified for a certain time segment, the kind of inhuman machine which, in the final account, was what led our society to stagnation? Why was it that after Lenin's death there were no guarantees in the party and the state against abuses of power and the establishment of an authoritative regime not controlled by the people? The scientists must also answer the question of the reasons for which the comprehensive activities of the masses, starting with October 1917, which became one of the main motive forces in the development of the new society, were reduced to the level of the type of initiative the manifestation of which was allowed most frequently only within the limits of implementing the instructions of the center? Why were activities formalized and, essentially, the role of the soviets emasculated, reducing their function to the passive and automatic stamping decisions issued "from above" and which could not be critically interpreted and discussed? How could it happen that our world outlook, the spirit of which was revolutionary and critical, was brought just about to the level of sectarian ideology and began to lose its creative nature, and openness to anything new and progressive in the world? Why was it that observing the laws governing the development of the new society, which was so necessary in promoting the success of the socialist cause, was replaced for such a long time with suicidal attempts to squeeze them, almost like life itself, to fit the latest directives of the omniscient "leader and teacher," and why was it that the honest and sober analysis of reality was replaced by glossing it over, report-mania, and open whitewashing, while the working person, instead of feeling himself the real master of society, involved in the solution of all of its problems, was becoming increasingly alienated from it, becoming nothing compared to the omnipotent state, a passive element of the depressing bureaucracy which had been established everywhere? What were the circumstances as a result of which the party and state leadership lost the most valuable tool given to it by the October Revolution—direct contacts and communication with the toiling masses—taking the path of the cynical use of their unparalleled enthusiasm and sincere and occasionally naive illusions? How was it possible for appeals for revolutionary asceticism and universal equalization to coexist perfectly with the most distorted manifestations of social injustice?

What could make a people who rose against tsarism, who overthrew the power of the bourgeoisie and won the Civil War, who lifted the pressure of foreign intervention, to tolerate the criminal activities of the monstrous conveyor of political persecutions and account settling, and accept on faith the ridiculous but nonetheless terrible accusations addressed at a tremendous number of people, including people who had been tested in action,

revolutionaries, and communists, who had worked side by side with Lenin, of treason, espionage and sabotage? What made them shut their eyes to the raising of an entire army of parasitical labor, consisting of rightless slaves-prisoners, the destruction of the flower of nations and ethnic groups of the country, of thousands and thousands of people who were distinguished by outstanding talent, independent judgment and a critical set of mind, for which reason, one way or another, they opposed the authoritarian-bureaucratic distortions of socialism, scholasticism and dogmatism promoted in all areas of social life and the rule of the lie, of double morality standard and militant lack of spirituality and ignorance? Why was it that working people who, in revolutionary battles, had attained true equality and freedom tolerated for many decades the establishment of two truths: one for the elite and the other for the masses which, for the sake of superior considerations, "were not supposed" to know too much and to express their views? Why was it that in post-Leninist times the criterion for the promotion of leading cadres increasingly became not talent and ability, not mastery of the heights of knowledge and not the depth of the creative assimilation of Marxist-Leninist ideas, but the thoughtless hysterical loyalty to the "brilliant leader of all times and nations," and servile readiness to identify him with the party, the cause of socialism and the achievements of the people? What forced the people to agree with the "penalizing" of entire nations, the autocratic manipulation of politics, economics, culture and social consciousness, and the scornful attitude of big and small "leaders" toward the honor and dignity of simple working people, reducing them to the status of rightless "cogs?" What force made it possible to believe (by some people, to this day) in the inevitability and the necessity of the course pursued by the Stalinist leadership, to tolerate depriving the masses of their historical memory and the defiling of the high morality embodied in the socialist revolution? All of this, like much other, demands the honest, scientific, party-minded explanation. It is awaited by the readers, and our journal intends to participate in this work most actively.

However different the assessments of the activities of the Stalinist regime may have been, we must always bear in mind one most important circumstance: neither Stalin's crimes nor the severe consequences of his policy cast any even the slightest aspersion on the generations of Soviet people who, through their heroic toil and military exploits, ensured the building and defense of socialism in our country. We honor them and they will enjoy the eternal glory and gratitude of their descendants! The entire complexity and dialectical contradictoriness of the post-Leninist period in the development of our society is found precisely in the fact that the impetus provided by the October Revolution turned out incomparably stronger than any distortions and corruptions which were introduced in the building of socialism by the forces which came to power, with their concepts of socialism distant from those of Lenin and his ways, means and

prospects of building and developing it. Despite everything, the Soviet people worked with dedication and selflessness. They built a new society and retained inflexible loyalty to the ideals of the revolution and believed in the triumph of justice. However, they were forced to live and work under the situation which had objectively developed as a result of the severe blows which had been dealt by the turn of the 1930s at the economic foundations of the country, the physical destruction of a large number of cadres loyal to the party cause and the establishment of an inhuman regime of personal power.

We can only agree with the readers who believe that the question goes far beyond Stalin's personality. In the final account, however twisted the paths of history determined by the influence of individuals or the will of circumstances may have been, sooner or later the objective law leads the historical process back to the high road although, naturally, at an entirely different point and in an entirely different turn of the spiral in social development. What matters most is the legacy left to the people as a result of the activities of one personality or another. We believe that reader **G. Pleshakov** (Saratov) is right by pointing out in his letter that "Stalinism is not focused exclusively on Stalin's personality. It was embodied in the huge widespread administrative network which could not surrender its positions unconditionally. Another 35 years of waiting had to pass until its main units began to go to their 'deserved rest.' Today, however, particularly needed are legal guarantees which would prevent the possibility of such an antidemocracy in the future."

Nor can we understand the reasons for the failure of the economic reforms of the end of the 1950s and the mid 1960s, the appearance of negative trends and phenomena, which began to poison our lives in the period of stagnation, without profoundly mastering the lessons of the distance we have covered.

The overwhelming majority of our readers feel the ripe need for a critical analysis of these lessons. "Many roots of this situation which made us slide downwards and against which perestroika was initiated, stem from the period of the cult of personality (it seems to me, sometime around 1929)," writes thermoelectric engineer **M. Vitkin** (Petropavlovsk, Kazakh SSR). Obviously, equally right is philosophy teacher **B. Ergashev** (Bukhara, Uzbek SSR), who believes that "The criticism of Stalinism must be based on the criticism of bureaucracy. The main way to achieve this is by strengthening the dialectical understanding of continuity within the CPSU. We must not fall into another situation: the full and courageous admission that "stagnation" was a stage of Stalinism, a Stalinism on a higher, more 'respectable' extent of its development, and a negation of the negation of Stalinism. Is the all-embracing avalanche of corruption during the years of 'stagnation' (particularly in Uzbekistan) so insignificant compared to the illegalities of the end of the 1930s?! The CPSU Central Committee began the struggle by replacing with accurate economic thinking the

verbal nonsense, applying accurate political thinking to replace imaginary collectivity and using a dialectical understanding of continuity against settling down in party and state jobs; it applied an accurate national policy in ensuring proportional representation on the higher levels, and so on. This means a resumption of the struggle against the vestiges of the cult of personality."

The readers write with unconcealed alarm about the fact that one of the most dangerous results of the implementation of the repressive policy of the period of the cult of personality and, subsequently, the advent in a country fraught with social crisis of an atmosphere of stagnation, was the weakening of the attractiveness of the ideas of scientific socialism throughout the world. According to **M. Moskovkina** (Moscow), "The Stalinist repressions frightened the proletariat in the developed countries away from socialism. We see on television columns of strikers but no slogans about socialism. Not only the bourgeois fear the loss of their property and unearned income but the proletariat as well: in their minds as well socialism is perhaps conceived as being repressive-bureaucratic and undemocratic! That is the origin of the so-called Soviet threat. The Brezhnev socialism of stagnation also frightened and is still frightening others with the lack of proper housing, food, clothing, shoes, services, with communist boastfulness, the veneration of false gods, the leader-principle, the impoverishment of spiritual life, etc."

Having seen in the assertion of historical truth one of the efficient ideological means of supporting perestroika, the readers share their thoughts on the ways, in their view, to mobilize the working people actively to participate in the process of renovation of Soviet society, initiated by the party. "Today," writes **A. Kirsanov** (Moscow), an electrician at the Remtorgtekhnik Plant, "we must shake up, we must revive our people and make them express their very own and independent, albeit erroneous views, for, as we know their errors we can absolutely accurately, reflecting history from the positions of Marxist-Leninist theory, influence such views. This is the job which we must assign to people who, not through their words but through their actions, will be putting perestroika to practical use."

The characteristic feature of many letters is the fact that their authors soberly assess the entire tremendous difficulty of the problems which face the country today, difficulties which are both objective and subjective and which are encountered on its way by perestroika. "There can be no doubt," notes **G. Zapolyanskiy** (Nikolayev), "that certain conservative and, let us frankly say, influential forces are interested in a variety of extremist recurrences, which lend strong proof to how dangerous and untimely democracy can be. 'Under Stalin there was order, no one dared budge!' Many people are still dreaming of such an ideal political system."

Nonetheless, the overall mood of our readers in their assessment of today's reality and the future of perestroika is, unquestionably, optimistic. Without belittling

in the least existing difficulties, they emphasize the tremendous significance of the changes taking place in the country. They point out the positive changes which have taken place in the minds of the working people and the appearance in them of entirely new interests and requirements. In this connection, they express their wishes to our journal and to scientific thinking. Typical in this sense is the letter by N. Yatsunov (Motor Vehicle Enterprise No. 3, GUV D, Moscow). He writes: "We, party organization secretaries and I, as a secretary of a primary party organization for more than 10 years, find our present work extremely interesting. The people are asking questions, organizing debates which are sometimes impartial. The people who argue have few materials at their disposal, and argue on the basis of conjectures. It is very needed to have accurate information on various events. Noteworthy for this journal was the publication of Bukharin's speech. The journal must continue to publish such materials from our political legacy. Naturally, today it is very difficult for historians to catch up and it is such publications that could be of great help to them in interpreting our past. Enough rehashing the truth. Today the truth must be born in the course of debates and arguments. We must learn how to conduct them. It is precisely such publications that would help in this case. Today it is difficult for us, very difficult. It is always difficult to get rid of something which has endured, which has become customary and it is very difficult to create something that is new and unusual. However, such is the dialectics of life and we cannot avoid it. It is so good that life has become so interesting, that such difficulties have appeared and will appear, about which we do not know as yet, and the surmounting of which will also mean our progress."

The party has called for a systematic and purposeful study of the accomplishments of the Soviet people, and for the elimination of anything which holds back the development of socialism. The science of history must establish what in this case was the result of difficult objective circumstances and what was the consequence of gross subjective errors, and selfish considerations, dictated by the logic of the struggle for power; what was the result of lack of theoretical knowledge and what of delusions and the inability or unwillingness to abandon them.

The fact that today's level of critical writings and the increased number of publications aimed at filling the "blank gaps" in our history, the unusual processes occurring in the spiritual sphere, occasionally encounter lack of understanding and even trigger in some people moods close to panic, is largely the result of the fact that the cleansing truth has been all too long concealed, suppressed and pushed back. Had everything which is now coming out in the press been subject to free public discussion and scientific analysis 20 or 30 years ago, today we would not have had to talk in general about "blank spots," and turn again to pages of our past which, incidentally, are by no means the most inspiring. They would have long been clarified and the lessons of history

mastered, instead of remaining a factor which is still exciting the people, frequently triggering mutual misunderstanding and fierce arguments. Actually, in this area as well we are only paying today for what we failed to do yesterday or the day before.

An alternative to perestroika and, judging by the overwhelming majority of letters, something which is well realized by the readers, could only be stagnation and a crisis, which conceals a threat to the very destiny of socialism. The renovation of Soviet society and the emancipation of the independence of the individual, awakening his interest, civic feelings and civic stance, and support of the people's initiatives and creativity, enable us to bring to light the potential of socialism and socialist democracy, and to lead our society to qualitatively new heights. It is only thus that socialism can become the embodiment of the people's expectations and of the ideas of progress and humanism, and lead mankind into the next century. The course and resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, aimed at intensifying perestroika, ensuring the comprehensive and revolutionary renovation of Soviet society, accelerating its socioeconomic development, implementing a radical reform of the political system and reviving the Leninist traditions and criteria of spiritual life, provide real prospects for the assertion and progress of a democratic, a humane socialism.

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Under the New Economic Management Conditions

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[Article by Boris Georgiyevich Saltykov, candidate of economic sciences, department head, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress]

[Text] The attitude toward science as the basic source of economic and social progress has become a major element in the new strategy for the development of the national economy, formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress. In our view, this is related not exclusively to the customary hope that the technical retooling of the national economy would enable us to reach new levels in labor productivity. The main thing is that today the role and place of science in society has changed in a truly radical manner. The new role was particularly emphasized at the 19th Party Conference.

In most industrially developed countries science has reached the scale of a large sector and turned into a powerful structure-shaping economic factor. Today the

role of outlays for scientific research and experimental design (NIOKR) accounts for 5-6 percent of the national income of the USSR, the United States, the FRG and Japan.

It is not only technology and economics that are directly related to the level of the scientific potential, for most economic, social and political problems today require scientific solutions. However, we must note that, although in terms of the overall scale of scientific activities (more than 1.5 million scientific and scientific-education workers) the USSR has come close to the United States, the economically most developed country in the world (where it is assessed that there are between 1.7 and 2.0 million similar specialists) the quality of domestic scientific potential, its structure and technical research facilities are substantially behind those in the most developed capitalist countries (in the United States science outlays in 1987 totaled \$125 billion, compared with 31 billion rubles in the USSR).

In our view, the main reason for the current alarming situation in domestic science lies not only in the shortage of material resources and skilled cadres but in the total exhaustion of the possibilities provided by the administrative-command system efficiently to manage this specific area of human activities.

Yes, the production of new knowledge has become industrialized. This does not mean that science can be managed like other economic sectors. Priority in science is assumed by features such as the very undetermined nature of the interrelationship between outlays and results and the time needed for obtaining the latter; the tremendous role played by the subjective factor and the moral climate in the collective; the special system of values; the universal nature of science; the "noncommodity nature" (in terms of essence and not form) of the results of scientific activities. All of this erects natural boundaries to administrative procedures and calls for the search for adequate methods for influencing the intensiveness and direction of research.

This is particularly important today, when a number of decisions have been made, which radically change the prevailing relationship between science and the state and consumers. The need for radical change here is more than timely, for any stagnation in science and the erosion of its values turn not only into an unproductive waste of material and intellectual resources but are dangerous above all in terms of "wasting the future," for today's research is expanding the limits of public production and consumption and shaping the cultural standards of future generations.

The changes which have been initiated in Soviet science are of a revolutionary nature also because never before in its history has it been managed through economic methods. Neither experience nor forgotten traditions may be found in this area. In many decades of the existence of the administrative-command management mechanism,

a mechanism which was shaped in the age of industrialization of the 1930s and which was strengthened after the failure of the reform of the 1960s, an integral and, in its own way, logical system of managing the country's scientific potential developed.

Officially, the establishment of the Scientific and Technical Department (NTO) of the VSNKh, in 1918, could be considered the official time of its birth. Its main task, as P.A. Bogdanov, the then RSFSR VSNKh chairman noted, was to "bring closer abstract science to the requirements of technology and, on the basis of technological requirements, to provide an impetus for the development of science in areas needed by the proletarian state." It was realized even then that finding essentially new means of production can be achieved "in a laboratory or institute of central importance, placed **outside any dependence** (emphasized by the author) on any given industrial organization. The role of the institute or laboratory under the jurisdiction of an individual trust must necessarily be reduced to carrying out almost exclusively a daily control work to meet the needs of the enterprises within that trust." Initially, the possibility of exercising a unified state technical policy was ensured through the significant share of budget financing of research and development by sectorial institutes (accounting for more than 50 percent of the total in 1924-1925) as well as direct subordination of the basic scientific potential in industry to the superior economic authority of the country.

The further development of the adopted management system followed the path of increasingly directing science, including academic and VUZ science, toward meeting the needs of expanding industry. At the start of the 1930s, when the VSNKh had already 86 scientific research institutes and 47 branches, the leadership of applied-work institutes became decentralized and transferred to the associations in charge of managing the individual industrial sectors, replacing the syndicates. It was thus that the departmental organization of sectorial science began to take shape.

By the end of the 1930s the main features of the administrative-command system for managing the national economy had assumed their final shape; their structural frame was a multiple-step centralized organizational structure. What was very important was that all reproduction, i.e., strategic decisions, including problems of the development of the NIOKR and capital construction, were removed from the jurisdiction of the basic economic units (the enterprises) and placed under the upper management echelons. All that remained for the "lower levels" were, essentially, the functions of managing the current production process.

A subsystem of official control over enterprise activities, which subsequently were to attain a gigantic size, was created to ensure the centralized management of the growing economy; this control was both systematic and

sporadic, and took place essentially by following consolidated production indicators. Gradually, the indicators themselves turned from means of control into the purpose of the functioning of the entire economic system.

However, in an economic system in which production becomes the absolute dominant feature of economic management (whatever else may happen and at all costs), science becomes not only unnecessary but also an obvious hindrance to the economic well-being of enterprises. Actually, its interference, i.e., the application of progressive technologies which ensure the reproduction of the system on a qualitatively new basis, always and inevitably worsens current production indicators.

Such a clash of interests was anticipated more than 50 years ago by the first organizers of the centralized system for managing technical progress in the country. Thus, as early as the creation of the NTO of the VSNKh, it was noted that in the absence of competition "the main factor of development in our country can be only state and social influence.... The state power should motivate, from above, the industrial organizations to introduce new methods and new production facilities." Unfortunately, history proved that such instruments of technical progress turned out inefficient and the question of applying the results of scientific and technical progress in production remains just as topical today as it was during the period of the first technical reconstruction.

Therefore, within an administrative-command economy, with a clearly emphasized production motivation governing managerial decisions, science assumed a subordinate, a secondary role. This was manifested in its formal application in the nonproduction area and its low ("residual") priority in the appropriation of resources. The production dominant in the ruling hierarchy also led to the fact that the organizational structure and methods of scientific planning and management were almost entirely borrowed from the material production area. Furthermore, all relations among subjects and creators of new knowledge and the remaining national economy, to this day, are still regulated by an economic mechanism of an administrative-command type. Its main features are the departmental organization of research and development; the absolute dominance of power relations in management; planning and control of scientific activities on the basis of formal indicators; "physical" (funding) allocation of resources, including, partially, manpower. Also typical of this mechanism are outlay principles in pricing NIOKR products and the subordinated (essentially accountability) role of financial indicators. Despite an apparent variety of forms, the system of financing science was reduced, essentially, to allocating funds for the upkeep of a network of scientific organizations.

As it were, in such a super-centralized management system no truly efficient instruments for the exercise of a uniform state policy could be found. The reason is that "departmental ownership" of science, as a resource for

reproduction, was almost legislatively codified. Problems related to its utilization and development were almost entirely based on the decisions of the departmental apparatus (including the scientific apparatus itself). This situation has been retained to this day: for example, the 1988 document which regulates the activities of scientific institutions of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, openly states that they operate "under the overall management of the deputy chairmen of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology."

Such a management system excludes the participation of the scientific community and the consumers of scientific and technical products in accessing the results of the work of departmental research collectives (in science, however, they alone can be its real "appraisers"), preventing them from the opportunity to influence the choice of areas and amount of financing of one type of NIOKR or another. The existing system creates for departmental scientific research institutes prerequisites for economic protection, allowing the department to keep "its own" science at whatever quality level it wishes. Exceptional but isolated cases of closing down a number of sectorial institutes, based on results of investigations conducted by the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and other supervisory authorities, merely confirm the lack of a normal mechanism for a natural selection of efficiently working collectives.

This type of organization of research and development triggers "departmental patriotism," distorts objective (including purely scientific) criteria and logic in scientific development, and leads to the appearance of "ballast" organizations, which are virtually uninvolved with scientific activities. A departmental organization entails the violation of the natural structure of scientific communities which are formed on the basis of the unity of research problems; it divides the scientific potential of the country into isolated departmental groups.

Departmentalism in science cultivates monopoly, which is the main reason for the low standards of scientific and technical progress in the national economy.

This drastically restricts direct relations outside "one's own" scientific complex, which forces ministries and departments to engage in their own unspecialized NIOKR and leads to the creation of underpowered research groups. Functional specialization in science is not developed. A "scientific barter economy" is stimulated both within the departmental complex and the individual organizations. This is manifested also in the appearance of surplus funds and resources, and the fact that the most widespread form of organization of scientific and technical activities in our country is the general-purpose scientific research institute, which combines the entire variety of functions of creative work and scientific services.

The administrative-command mechanism holds back, not to say paralyzes, the development of auxiliary scientific and technical activities, "considered unnecessary," particularly those which ensure the link between science and economics: analysis of demand, study of the market for scientific and technical output, comparing and testing competing analogues, etc. For the same reasons the area of servicing science itself has been extremely neglected: gathering, storage and analysis of information, forecasting, etc.

For a number of years, unsuccessful efforts have been made to use program-target planning and management methods as the main instrument in the struggle against departmentalism in science (and not only in science alone). Unfortunately, this is a typical example of the desire to patch a system without affecting its structural supports. A positive experience in the use of such methods in the solving of scientific and technical progress in the United States, for example, precisely proves that they can be effective only under the conditions of a mechanism in which relations among the individual co-performers of the program are based on economic independence, economic responsibility and interest.

Departmentalism, combined with the administrative-command management system, does not allow us to use even a single one of the theoretical advantages of this system: the possibility of engaging in large-scale structural maneuvering with resources on a centralized basis, favoring priority areas of scientific research. In practice, the priorities set by the departments within the national economy have much greater weight, so that the possibility of developing topical trends of science depends, to a decisive extent, on the type of ministry (department) to which resources have been allocated. In other words, state priorities become "dissolved" within departmental priorities.

Furthermore, priorities which were set in the past within this rather inflexible and conservative system, become obstructions on the way to converting to a new type of scientific and technical production, characterized by the fast expansion of the variety of new goods, materials and services. Since the main incentive of development is the need to ensure gross production indicators rather than conquer a consumer market by supplying new types of goods, both production units and the management system try maximally to rely on already extant research and engineering accomplishments.

The unreliability of cooperative relations among production subjects leads them to the development of general-purpose and functionally unspecialized equipment and instruments. At each level of the production structure of the national economy and in all its sectors, from the timber and chemical industries to all types of machine-building, the "main product," the "main link" remains an overt and covert priority. This system reduces to naught appeals for a comprehensive approach in the formulation of complex technological systems and

encourages low and formal (accountability-statistical) requirements concerning the efficiency and quality of the equipment. In other words, we can assert that in the administrative-command system a special type of scientific and technical progress, inherent precisely in our economic mechanism, has developed: "the gross-output" scientific-technical output. Its characteristic feature is the aspiration to ensure the growth of technological efficiency almost exclusively by increasing the unit capacity of the existing models of equipment and to increase the scale of output, frequently beyond the limits of economically (and ecologically) justified boundaries.

The "gross output" type of scientific and technical progress distorted the structure of the scientific potential. As a result of obviously insufficiently developed supporting "peripheral" NIOKR, on which today the consumer qualities and efficiency of integral technologies and machine systems depend to a rather large extent, there is very little backup in the development of nonresource-intensive ("unsuitable" to the present mechanism) technologies and types of equipment. Conversely, the research and design backup (at least in terms of the volume of applied resources) in the traditional areas of science and technology or in areas related to the "main link" of integral systems (tractors in the system of agricultural machinery, earth moving equipment in the system of construction machinery, computers in the information-computer complexes, and so on) have become relatively inflated.

Along with external attributes of the administrative-command mechanism, the corresponding standards, values and concepts entered the scientific management system. Thus, the domination of the "gross output" category within the planning system entailed the shifting of criteria in assessing scientific activities to the strictly utilitarian area. From the viewpoint of planners and managers on all levels, the most important and useful are applied projects, oriented toward direct use in economic sectors. This concept led to a drop in the prestige and, as a consequence, in the level of basic research and the need of those engaged in such work, from the very beginning, to look for possible practical applications (which, in some cases, are obviously far-fetched). It is precisely this circumstance that supports the steady trend of reducing the share of basic projects in the scientific institutions of the academic sector.

This is aided by the practice of the full pressure applied by the apparatus of all departments on institutes engaged in basic research, with a view to planning for them a mandatory economic effect (in rubles).

Equally unnatural are efforts to force research groups, which have obtained interesting applied results, or even laboratory prototypes, mandatorily to put them to practical use themselves. Examples of successful actions on the part of individual joint collectives of scientists and production workers have not confirmed the efficiency of this method for putting scientific results to practical use.

The main argument in favor of the creation of specialized application structures, which is the method followed by most developed countries, is the essential differences in the motivations of researchers and production workers. As a rule, a true scientist has no "entrepreneurial" motivations and will carry out such a project far worse than would an interested economic manager.

The ideology and practice of scientific and technical progress, which proclaimed as their main target the growth of specific quantitative indicators in the development of science and technology, were sooner or later forced to clash with the historical inevitability of the conversion to intensive economic management. However, the "gross output syndrome," which hit science, succeeded in causing it great damage.

By the end of the 1950s and beginning of 1960s, during the period of tempestuous growth of scientific potential, a stereotype developed: "the more, the better." From 1955 to 1965 the number of scientific workers nearly tripled (from 223,900 to 664,000 people); in 20 years it more than quintupled, reaching 1,223,400 people by 1975.

Such a policy and a corresponding dynamics of growth could not fail to lead to loss of quality in the scientific potential. Metaphorically speaking, they created the "mass scientist," the person with any kind of diploma, equally adapted to be used by any organization for any type of work other than creative.

The consequence of this gross output approach in regional politics was pursuit of average-Union standards of quantitative characteristics of the scientific potential (such as the number of scientific workers per 1,000 people employed in the national economy). As a result, in a number of less developed parts of the country there was a severe devaluation in the quality of research. A large number of scientific collectives appeared, which duplicated the work which the best domestic and world schools had completed long before them. As investigations conducted in 1986 and 1987 indicated, such a situation, which could be considered a waste of scientific resources, turned out to be typical of a number of institutes of academies of sciences and VUZs in Kazakhstan and the Uzbek, Kirghiz and Azerbaijan SSRs.

Science is suffering tangible losses as a result of the spreading in management practices of formal evaluations of scientific activities. Whereas the use of the "gross output" in material production planning creates the "heavy" product, in science, conversely, the product becomes meaningless if high indicators of activities of scientific research institutes or design bureaus exist while no real results are found. Long practical experience has proved the absolute senselessness of assessing creative activities on the basis of the number of articles, inventions, reports, printer sheets and other official characteristics of the work. However, such assessments

were the basis for the "objectivizing" of decisions concerning the allocation of resources, bonuses, and so on. This also distorted the system of values of scientific workers; entire areas of pseudoscientific activities appeared and a process of bureaucratization of science took place.

Let us note that in the 1960s, when the number of scientific workers was increasing by 8-10 percent annually or more, while outlays reached even a higher rate, the possibility existed of rapidly broadening the research front and developing a backup in all most important areas. Management was reduced to the simple principle that a "new problem requires a new laboratory" (and, frequently, a new institute). As a result, at that time the level of domestic research in the majority of most important areas could be considered as setting a world standard.

At the start of the 1980s, the economic situation in our science underwent a radical change. The growth rates of cadres dropped several hundred percent and the dynamics of outlays came close to the drastically slowed down dynamics of the national income; plans for the construction of scientific projects remained systematically unfulfilled; the development of scientific instrument manufacturing fell behind inadmissibly. All of this led to a substantial "aging" of the main components of scientific potential—cadres, instruments and facilities for scientific research. The result was a drastic decline in the speed of topic updating: our science began rapidly to lose its positions in areas in which it had enjoyed unquestionable priority in the 1960s, and was unable to develop a backup in a number of entirely new areas of research. By the mid-1980s the situation had become so critical that it was no longer possible radically to improve it with the help of the customary measures, which could be reduced to organizational rearrangements, addition or deletion of individual indicators and titles, and so on.

A new and more comprehensive approach to improvements in the NIOKR area began to be implemented after the 27th CPSU Congress and the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. A series of major steps was taken, such as a conversion to a new wage system, the reorganization of a large number of sectorial scientific research institutes into scientific production associations, the creation of more than 20 MNTK, and the conversion of scientific organizations to cost accounting. The trouble, however, was that based on the resolutions, the new practice included, in its essentials, the attributes of a cost accounting economy (of the "commodity is the product of science and technology" type). The basic principles of scientific organization—departmental subordination and command management methods—remained untouched.

Furthermore, zealous officials swung the pendulum to its other extreme: the real threat appeared of converting to self-financing and self-support institutes engaged in basic science. The errors of the past should constantly

remind us of the fact that the cornerstone in the restructuring of scientific management should be the specific nature of this area of human activities.

Yes, basic research, together with education, is today the most advantageous area for capital investments, advantageous to the entire society, for which reason society as a whole must meet the cost of such work out of "its own" funds, i.e., out of the state budget. It is stupid to demand that results of basic research be efficient in the area in which they have been obtained and, furthermore, that this take place immediately! Today, however, the thinking of those who control science is moving precisely in that direction: if one cannot ask of every institute within the USSR Academy of Sciences to be self-supporting, one should at least establish for all the same mandatory "quit-rent:" 30 or, even better, 50 percent of their budget must be earned by them through economic contract (i.e., strictly applied) projects.

We must firmly instill in the minds of such managers the idea that basic science is not a commodity but a most important strategic resource of modern society.

The main purpose of perestroika in the organizational structures, planning methods and financing of science should be achieving essentially greater mobility of our scientific potential and its ability quickly to react to changes in the needs of society and of science itself.

This can be ensured only by creating an economic and social mechanism of rotation, i.e., of initial creation, efficient selection and timely replacement of cadres who have become unproductive and of primary research groups (laboratories, sectors). In this case, the struggle against departmentalism, which is the main obstacle along this way, should be waged simultaneously in two areas: strengthening the national principle in the formulation and implementation of scientific policy and, at the same time, increasing the autonomy of research collectives.

Legislative guarantees must be provided for supporting within science an atmosphere of unlimited creative exploration and democracy. Conditions must be created for the appearance of new structures (rather than the immediate destruction of existing ones, which is characteristic precisely of the administrative-command mechanism).

One such prerequisite is to organize a system of independent sources of financing: state (including regional), public, and mixed target funds. We could include among them state fund for basic research; target (including international) funds for work on individual scientific problems and sectors; a state fund for intersectoral scientific and technical problems (under the State Committee for Science and Technology, for example), and others. One of the advantages of such funds is that they finance specific projects and not organizations, as a

result of which the allocated funds do not have mandatorily to be spent during the fiscal year. Any juridical person should be given the right to set up a target fund.

At the same time, it is necessary to guarantee the right to create scientific and technical organizations, based on the initiative of any economic subject, including enterprises or associations of citizens (cooperatives), and granting the performers the right to draw on any source of financing. The real assessment of the results of scientific activities must be made by the scientific community (with the help of certain expertise mechanisms), and the decision on the allocation of funds (resources) by the state for a respective project to be made precisely on their basis.

Accepting the principle of paying for new knowledge and granting all potential customers, including state management authorities, the necessary funds and the right to choose performers, must become one of the real consequences of the conversion to economic management methods.

All such measures will provide the economic foundations for the appearance of scientific potential structures independent of the department. It is only then that we can convert from appeals "to carry out scientific research on a competitive basis" to real competitiveness in the NIOKR area.

Incidentally, it would be easy within such a system to legalize that which is known in modern terminology as individual labor activity in science. A number of scientific areas exist in which the most fruitful form of work is the labor of a single scientist or a small group of scientists. This includes mathematics, the social sciences, some areas of physics, biology, etc. Under present-day conditions people who tend to engage in such work are frequently forced to work in nonspecialized laboratories or institutes or else, in general, cannot apply their potential.

In the United States, for example, in 1986 the National Science Foundation met 13,980 (out of 36,600) such requests, totaling \$174 million. The funds allocated for such target subsidies and grants made possible the work of 14,819 leading researchers (almost as many as are working in the scientific institutions of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences).

The role of the state in the management of scientific and technical progress can be ensured by changing the functions of the state science and technology plan. According to the old system, it officially included the sum total of assignments of ministries and departments, regardless of ways of financing, scale of influence of the respective projects on production and science, and so on. Under those circumstances, the plan could not become a real instrument in the state management of science.

Under the conditions of the new mechanism, we should convert to the type of planning system in which each subject of management will formulate a plan only within the limits of his real economic possibilities. For example, on the level of the national economy as a whole, the following should be defined: a list of the most important areas of scientific research, i.e., the state priorities; the size and basic proportions of the state science budget; the structure of the state orders, including general state scientific and technical programs; the amount of budget support provided by state, intersectorial and other funds of NIOKR; the sum total of steps for indirect supervision of scientific and technical activities for the planned period. The main target of state financing and form of state order should be research and development of essentially new technologies, materials and machine systems. This area of science, which is closely related to the implementation of state priorities, requires quite substantial outlays which can be recovered only in the long term and cannot be developed on the basis of self-financing. Furthermore, mandatory state support is needed in research which leads to meeting the social objectives of society, such as projects in the area of health care, education, culture, ecology, etc.

Applied research, oriented toward updating existing products and technologies, should be financed out of enterprise and ministry funds.

State budget financing of basic research should logically take place as state subsidies. In such a case there would be no strict requirements concerning future results and all that would be regulated would be the area in which the research is being done.

The state management of NIOKR should be expanded with indirect instruments, such as a respective taxation, credit and amortization policy. Furthermore, in our view the specific nature of scientific activities enables us to try a conversion from legal regulation to regulation through taxes before this can be achieved in the production area.

The introduction of the new economic mechanism shifts to the practical level yet another problem which until now has been quite abstract: the right of ownership over the results of scientific and technical activities. The a priori national ownership of any product of such activities, which exists in our country, leads to the fact that new knowledge cannot be used in the course of economic exchanges. This situation distorts the true value of NIOKR results. It fetters the potential of material incentive and is one of the reasons for the worsening of the moral atmosphere in science. To us a natural way of solving this problem is the clear juridical regulation according to which the right to results belongs to the state, the enterprise or the individual, with a subsequent introduction of the worldwide mechanism of domestic patents and licenses.

Extending economic relations to science would lead to substantially broadening the range of potential customers for NIOKR, including all-Union and regional management authorities, public organizations, collectives and individuals.

Noteworthy changes will take place in the legal status of performing organizations and in their structure. The extradepartmental sector will grow rapidly, especially in nongovernmental (cooperative) organizations engaged in science and in providing scientific services. Currently, if we stretch the point, it is only the MNTK that can be classified as belonging to this sector.

The variety of scientific and technical organizations will be expanded significantly and new and currently domestically undeveloped forms will appear. In particular, there will be an increase in the network of cost accounting (state and cooperative) centers for the collective utilization of instruments and equipment, marketing organizations, information and analytical centers, and so on. We should expect the appearance of a significant number of consulting and even a variety of intermediary organizations. In all likelihood, "small" organizations will appear and the economic autonomy of temporary (contract) scientific and technical collectives will strengthen.

Under the new economic management conditions there will be an "erosion" of the boundaries of traditional scientific sectors. Thus, a conversion to the financing of basic research out of target funds, on a competitive basis, will lead to the fact that some strong VUZ collectives will work in basic research, alongside groups working within the present academic sector. At the same time, a number of institutes of republic and sectorial academies, engaged in applied research, will be reoriented toward financing from other funds—sectorial, regional, and so on.

The relative decentralization of control under the conditions of the gradual strengthening of economic interest and responsibility of customers and performers of NIOKR should bring about the growth of the efficiency in the utilization of resources (cadre above all). However, we must realize that this will be accompanied by an increased differentiation among research collectives based on the level of their potential, shifting some scientific workers to other areas of activities, which will lead to an aggravation of social problems, and to an increase in regional disproportions and a surplus availability of scientific labor. In this connection steps will have to be taken to ensure a significant increase in the territorial mobility of individual scientific workers and research groups, providing social guarantees to temporarily unemployed scientists and engaging in the systematic retraining of scientific cadres.

In conclusion, let us note that the measures we have discussed, which are necessary from our viewpoint in order to upgrade the productivity of domestic science, are consistent with the requirements formulated in

accordance with the revolutionary renovation of our society. It is a question of the economic and legal mechanisms for involving the interest of research collectives and individual scientists in this important project, and stimulating independence, initiative and mobility. However, in this case success depends not on them alone. The most important prerequisite is the establishment of the type of economic situation which would ensure high level demand for new developments and motivate the continuous improvement of the production process and the quality and renovation of output. Therefore, the pace of development of science and its transformation into an efficient foundation for socioeconomic progress will be determined also by the extent to which we shall solve this problem as well, efficiently and rapidly, in the course of perestroika.

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05003

Song of Labor and Struggle

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[Article by Professor I. Krivoguz, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] For the past 100 years this song has been heard on streets and squares, at solemn ceremonies and mass meetings, in huge halls and small cells. It is sung alone or in chorus, when the awkward voices of a few or a hundred or even many thousands of people amazingly blend within a single powerful voice. It is the great song of the fighters for social justice, known as the "Internationale." Even the most beautiful revolutionary songs can hardly be compared to it in terms of expressiveness, scope and power of its social impact.

The birth of the "Internationale" and its march over countries and continents, was legitimate. One hundred years ago the world witnessed a powerful upsurge in the labor movement, on the crest of which labor parties and trade unions were born and developed in many countries. Marxism became widespread and assumed leadership in the International Workers Movement. The solidarity among working people, which led to the creation of the second International, was born and strengthened.

One year later, for the first time, the working people celebrated May Day as their international holiday. This marked the beginning of a new higher stage of the International Labor Movement. Its essential feature was the development of the already appeared shoots of a proletarian socialist culture, one of whose noted representatives was the poet and singer of the Commune, Eugene Pottier (1816-1887). He was known among the socialists as the "soldier and poet of the revolution," or the "disturber of the end of the 19th century." Laura Lafargue, Marx's daughter, translated Pottier's songs

into other languages and wrote to Engels that they were "the best and even the only revolutionary songs of which the French people of our generation could boast."

The "Internationale," which was written in June 1871, immediately after the defeat of the Paris Commune, turned out to be the most outstanding and popular of his works. The song was published only in 1887 in Pottier's book "*Revolutionary Songs*." It asserted the commonality of interests of all exploited and oppressed people and their right to freedom, to the means of production and to the means of existence. The pathos of this poem was an appeal to mount a decisive battle for the expropriation of expropriators and the triumph of justice. It expressed confidence in the victory of the International, with which mankind would rise. The vivid and clear presentation of the fundamental ideas of justice and cohesion and deep conviction in the victory, passion and talent drew the particular attention of the popular masses to this work.

The music, which was composed in 1888 by Pierre Degeyter (1848-1932) gave powerful wings to the poem. The torch which was lit by the socialist poet was taken up and raised high by the socialist composer. The Belgian P. Degeyter was a worker and a member of the socialist movement. The power and spirit of the Commune, which he had tried to help by going to Paris in the spring of 1871, came out of the poem "The Internationale," he had read in Pottier's recently published booklet. The hymn was composed in 2 days. Subsequently, the author of this historical song became a member of the left wing of the SFIO (the French section of the Workers International); in 1920 he became a member of the French Communist Party. He visited the USSR in 1928.

The first time that the new anthem was sung was in the summer of 1888, at the festival of printing workers in Lille. Performed by a worker chorus conducted by P. Degeyter, the "Internationale" met with success. Furthermore, the printing workers published it in an edition of 6,000 copies. This marked the beginning of the headlong dissemination of this anthem. As early as July 1889, at the International Congress of the "United Socialists," which marked the beginning of the second International, the French socialists acquainted with it the members of the congress. Despite judicial persecution instigated because of the fifth verse, which contained the antimilitaristic call: "War On the Tyrants! Peace For the People! Strike, Blue Armies!," in 1896 the "Internationale" was performed by an orchestra of wind instruments in the city hall in Lille. It was sang by participants in labor demonstrations and meetings and May Day demonstrations. In 1899 it thundered at the joint congress of the French socialists.

The "Internationale" victoriously crossed boundaries. The popular simplicity and power of that music helped to popularize the great ideas and fired the feelings of the revolutionaries. The lyrics of the anthem were translated into nearly all languages of the peoples of Europe and it

spread over other continents. In the year 1900 its translations were distributed among the delegates to the 5th Congress of the Second International, meeting in Paris. It is thus that it became the universal proletarian song, the revolutionary anthem of the International Labor Movement. It was performed at congresses of labor parties and of the International. In 1913 V.I. Lenin wrote that "in whatever country a conscious worker may find himself, wherever he may be cast by fate, however foreign he may feel, not knowing the language, not having acquaintances, away from his homeland, he could find comrades and friends by singing the familiar "Internationale."

It is noteworthy that in its first issue Lenin's ISKRA printed the refrain of the "Internationale" in French, with a translation: "This is the last struggle. Let us join and the International Association of Workers will tomorrow spread over all mankind." It was thus that the Russian proletariat found out for the first time about this song of struggle and toil.

During the 1905-1907 revolution, the "Internationale" with the music was repeatedly published in Russia as the international anthem of the workers. At that time it thundered at demonstrations and barricades. It was sung like an oath of the inflexible in jails and by revolutionaries in exile or doing forced labor.

After the February 1917 Revolution, in the period of preparations for and making of the October Revolution, the "Internationale" definitively became the anthem of the most revolutionary forces, the bolsheviks. PRAVDA published its texts and called upon the workers to learn how to sing it in chorus.

It was virtually from the unforgettable days of the October Revolution that the "Internationale" became the state anthem of the first socialist state in the world, until it was replaced by a new anthem in 1944. It remained the anthem of our party and of all communists the world over. The CPSU has always been and will be on the side of its class comrades in the capitalist world.

Delegates to Comintern congresses sang the "Internationale" with tremendous inspiration, for it led them to believe in the seemingly eminent victory of a world socialist revolution. It expressed the thoughts and feelings of the progressive fighters for the revolution in 1918-1919, of many demonstrators and strikers in the 1920s and the most firm participants in the antifascist and anti-imperialist struggle of the 1930s and 1940s. It inspired the soldiers of the Chinese Revolution, the defenders of the republic of Spain, and the vanguard of the resistance to fascism from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It was the anthem of the victorious socialist revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries. The development of the International Communist Movement into an influential ideological and political force of our time contributed to its increased popularity. It

blended with the global revolutionary movement, embodying the link among its different stages and the vitality of its prime sources.

The conditions of the struggle for social liberation have changed profoundly over the past 100 years. This great movement achieved significant successes. A universal historical process of social liberation, initiated by the Great October Revolution, became widespread. Countries covering 26.2 percent of the earth's territory and with a population in excess of 1.5 billion—33.1 percent of the global population—put an end to the exploitation and oppression of man and are building a socialist "our own, new world." Their working people achieved their liberation "through their own hand," and the "restoration of everything lost through plunder."

The labor movement in the capitalist countries, involving the participation of more than 300 million working people, has become a powerful booster of social progress. Mass democratic movements have appeared and strengthened, for the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, protection of the environment, and defense of the rights of women and the young; alternate movements have come to life opposing various negative aspects of capitalism. The peoples of the liberated countries are opposing with increasing resolve neocolonialism and promoting the economic independence and solution of their own socioeconomic problems. The meeting of members of parties and movements, held in Moscow in November 1987, opened new opportunities for interaction among these forces in the defense of peace and ensuring social progress. The main prerequisite for the implementation of such a prospect, as well as for the survival of mankind as a whole became the elimination of the threat of nuclear catastrophe and the solution of other global problems of mankind.

The experience which was gained and the advancement of our theory contributed to updating concepts on the specific ways, means, aspects and times for profound social change. It is clear today that the destruction of the world of violence and putting the power and the wealth in the hands of the people are only the very start of this difficult path which requires great efforts and a considerable amount of time and not one final battle but many social battles. Although the inflexible aspiration for justice, firm confidence in the victory and conviction that "mankind will stand up with the International," have remained unchanged and confirmed by the entire 100 years of experience, the antiwar appeal "peace for the people!" has become particularly relevant and profound today. The communists, who have always been the most consistent fighters against social and national oppression are today in the front ranks of the struggle for the preservation of peace on earth and for the right of people to life. Mutual support and unity of action in the International Workers Movement and among all working people in the struggle for their common interests, and

for a lasting peace and security of the peoples, and for national independence, democracy and socialism are major factors of social progress.

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05003

Universal and Class Foundations in World Politics

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[Article by Igor Grigoryevich Usachev, doctor of historical sciences, professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations]

[Text] Lenin forged and led our party toward revolutionary accomplishments for the sake and of and in the name of man. The Great October Socialist Revolution was, in its essence, the greatest humanistic action of social and spiritual liberation, which opened a wide path to saving the world from the exploitation of man by man, political oppression and national enslavement. Faith in man and in his capability to do good and to change relations among people and nations, based on the laws of justice, was, and remains, the distinguishing feature of Marxist-Leninist outlook.

These same ideas were, from the very beginning, laid by V.I. Lenin in the foundations of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy. "Soviet diplomacy," noted G.V. Chicherin, who worked in close touch with Vladimir Ilich, "always and in everything supports all that may contribute to universal peace, reduction of armaments and the tax burden, the settling of global antagonisms and conflicts, the satisfaction of the vital interests of the toiling masses of all countries, the development of economic relations and the easing of the painful global crisis." It was thus that in the 1920s the state of workers and peasants defined the purpose of its efforts in the international arena. Today our party and country are going back to the pure source of Lenin's thoughts. The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference confirmed in its resolutions that only a political approach to solving the contradictions in global development and settling conflict situations provides the USSR the opportunity to play its assigned historical role in ensuring the survival of mankind and its further progress.

Perestroika needs a foreign policy which would adequately reflect its humanistic nature, the conference emphasized. In recent years the Soviet state has firmly taken the path of pursuing a policy based on a new political thinking which reflects the realities of the contemporary world, which is varied and contradictory and which presents global threats to the very existence of the

human species but, nonetheless, is an interrelated, an interdependent world with a tremendous potential for coexistence, cooperation and finding a political solution to accumulated problems.

Today we see more clearly that perestroika requires the all-round development and maximal utilization of the intellectual and spiritual potential of our society. This applies to foreign policy as well, where errors and blunders were also made and occasionally decisions were made without comprehensive consideration and study. The scale of the tasks which are facing us in this area at the present time and the dynamism of international life call for the free, extensive and interested discussion of the entire array of problems related to the development and intensification of the new political thinking.

The arms race, which has been disturbing the world for the entire postwar period, has found itself in an impasse, at the end of which lies the "black hole" of nuclear catastrophe, which can absorb all life in our planet. That is why the problem of survival has become a universal problem which rejects the old approaches to international affairs. It demands the motivating force of interaction among countries to be not fear or greed but a feeling of common responsibility and a universal duty of preventing the threat hanging over the world and a honest awareness of the fact that only one choice is possible: either living together, honoring agreed-upon standards of relations or else common death and disappearance from the face of the earth.

The scientific and technical revolution highlighted the significance of the struggle and the unity of opposites, as a source of development of contemporary society, with inordinate emphasis. This age-old truth obtained its most convincing confirmation when man discovered the laws of the connecting links within the atomic nucleus. The fiery mushrooms of explosions, which rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, proclaimed that mankind had acquired a means of self-destruction. Ten years later, at the first international conference on problems of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, scientists reached the conclusion that atomic and, subsequently, thermonuclear sources of energy are so inexhaustible that nothing else would be required for centuries in terms of solving the energy problems of mankind.

Thus, on one end we have unlimited means of destruction and, on the other, an inexhaustible source of energy for the progress of mankind. The development and resolution of this contradiction do not take place in a vacuum but in the real world, overburdened by other contradictions as well. The first and most important group of such contradictions involves relations between countries belonging to the two socioeconomic systems, expressing the interests of two state-shaped classes: the monopoly bourgeoisie and the working class. There also are contradictions between imperialist and developing countries, within the developed capitalist system and among the developing countries.

Despite their entire variety, such contradictions have class roots. International relations have always been and remain class relations. However, sociopolitical development and changes in material conditions of life in the global community introduce new aspects into these relations. Our party is constantly measuring the pulse beat of international life, sensitively reacting to changes occurring within it and rejecting obsolete dogmas. Thus, a popular concept in the past claimed that peaceful coexistence is a form of the class struggle and that it contributes to the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries. However, in analyzing the contemporary condition of world affairs, and summing up actual historical experience, the 27th CPSU Congress reached a conclusion which led it to abandon this concept. Peaceful coexistence, which applies exclusively to the realm of intergovernmental relations, implies the strict observance of the principle of nonintervention in reciprocal domestic affairs. As to the class struggle, that is a matter for the nations within the individual countries. This must be especially emphasized, for the problem of the survival of mankind gives priority today to the task of establishing the type of correlation between class and general human factors which would be consistent with requirements of ensuring survival and continued social progress.

I

The approach itself to the study of the correlation between class and universal human factors in the contemporary world demands, above all, a scientific definition of these categories. As we know, bourgeois science laid the foundation of the theory of classes and the class struggle. D. Ricardo and A. Smith, the representatives of classical bourgeois political economy, identified the class structure of the bourgeois society. French historians F. Guizot, A. Thierry, A. Mignet and others continued the studies started by the English political economists. In his letter to J. Weydemeyer, Marx pointed out that long before him bourgeois historians had "described the historical development of this struggle between classes, while the bourgeois economists had provided the economic anatomy of the classes" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 28, pp 424-427). In analyzing "the class struggle as the motor of events," V.I. Lenin defined as Marx's great contribution his "brilliant and profound models of materialist historiography, the analysis of the situation of each individual class," and the identification of why and how "any class struggle is a political struggle" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," [Complete Collected Works], vol 26, pp 59-60).

The objectives of the socialist revolution do not reflect exclusively class values, such as the transfer of power to the working class and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man, but also universal values. The very first foreign policy document of the Soviet system—Lenin's Decree on Peace—called for "liberating mankind from the horrors of war and its consequences." Nonetheless, it

so happened historically that the tasks of building socialism in our country, in the specific conditions which prevailed in the first decades after the October Revolution, inevitably gave priority to the defense of the class interests of the proletariat, which won initially in a single country and, subsequently, in a group of countries. The conversion of the contradiction between the two basic classes in contemporary society into the main contradiction in international relations introduced new qualities in these relations. Henceforth there were two opposite classes which interacted in the international arena, with radically different ideologies, views and concepts on the world, politics and social problems. One could say that the "ideologization" of international relations took place.

This circumstance not only intensified the differences between countries belonging to different socioeconomic systems. Imperialism charted a course of strangling the Soviet republic. This policy, however, which brought about World War II, did not yield to the reactionary forces the results they were trying to achieve. Nonetheless, in subsequent decades as well ideological differences among countries belonging to the opposite systems were applied by the aggressive imperialist circles in their use of a distorted form of struggle, such as "psychological warfare." The aggravated ideological and political confrontation in the international arena distorted the views which either side had about the other. It led to forgetting the fact that parallel, partially coinciding and even shared intergovernmental interests could exist.

Even under those circumstances, however, the CPSU did not ignore the fact that socialism is called upon to fulfill not only class but also universal functions and that the latter increase in significance with the development of the socialist society. Suggestions related to disarmament and ensuring peace, submitted by the Soviet Union in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and subsequent years, for discussion by other states, the nuclear powers above all, and in the United Nations, were a continuation of the Leninist Decree on Peace. They suggested specific measures aimed at eliminating war from the life of mankind. It was legitimate for the political report submitted by the Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress to stipulate that "we are realists and fully realize that a great deal and profound divisions separate the two worlds. However, we clearly see something else as well: the need to solve the most vital universal problems should motivate them to engage in interaction and to awaken as yet unparalleled forces for the self-preservation of mankind. This is the incentive for finding solutions consistent with the realities of our time." It was thus that our party formulated the question of the place and role of the universal factor under the specific circumstances of contemporary global politics. It formulated it on a principled as well as a specific practical level, as is confirmed, in particular, by the repeated emphasis on the part of the Soviet Union that it does not claim to hold the final truth and is ready closely to consider ideas and proposals formulated by countries with a different social system.

It would be an unforgivable error to deny the fact that the bourgeoisie has not accepted certain universal principles. Is it not true that when the bourgeois system was established, the slogan of the 1789 French Revolution "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity!" reflected universal values? It is clear that any revolution, i.e., the assumption of power by a front-ranking class, progressive under given historical conditions, is a revolution which opens the path to the further development of society and works for all mankind and its future.

Equally obvious, however, is something else as well. The growth of 19th century capitalism into monopoly capitalism and imperialism triggered an increasing withdrawal by bourgeois society from an orientation toward universal human values. The once progressive slogans were emasculated and converted into a propaganda screen for a self-seeking stagnant policy. Indeed, what could be the real value of promises of "liberty, equality and fraternity" in statements by members of the ruling class of any country pursuing a policy of neocolonialism? Another example of the this is found in statements by governmental leaders of Western countries, who refuse guest workers equal rights with native working people. Finally, does racism, in all its forms and manifestations, not act as a denial of universal human values?

This is one side of contemporary capitalist reality which we have no right to forget. However, that society is by no means homogeneous: it has democratic traditions and democratic forces. They may vary in terms of social composition and hold a variety of convictions; they may differ from each other in terms of conceptual views and may be disparate in terms of the firmness with which they oppose antidemocratic trends. Nonetheless, the weight and influence of these forces must not be ignored. They also need support in the struggle for the assertion of universal human principles in global politics. Incidentally, this conclusion is supported by real historical experience. Let us remember, for example, the bylaws of the United Nations, drafted in the period of the upsurge of the struggle waged by the peoples against fascist Germany and militaristic Japan. The influence of the progressive forces was expressed in the adoption of the text of the bylaws, which is imbued with a democratic spirit, and which begins with the following words: "We, the peoples of the United Nations, are fully resolved to protect future generations from the calamities of war which, twice in our lifetime has brought mankind incalculable grief...."

The problem of the universal human factor and its correlation with the class struggle became aggravated and advanced to the proscenium of world politics in the 1980s, above all in connection with the threat caused by the stockpiling of huge arsenals of nuclear weapons on earth, when studies independently conducted by scientists in a number of countries highlighted the alarming truth that the use of even part of these arsenals could turn our earth into a dead radioactive desert.

The initial warning that nuclear weapons are threatening the survival of man was heard in the mid-1950s, in the familiar Russel-Einstein Manifesto. This manifesto, which was drafted after a hydrogen bomb was exploded on the Bikini Atoll, and which inflicted casualties to Japanese fishermen, pointed out the following: "In this case we speak out not as representatives of one country, continent or faith or another, but as human beings, as members of the biological species of man, the continued existence of which is now becoming questionable.... We must learn how to think in a new fashion...."

Political forces in the West, interested in the arms race and in the use of military coercion and the threat of use of force for the sake of achieving their selfish objectives, prevented this warning by the scientists to reach the broad public. As a result of blocking actions on their part, it was only by the end of the 1960s, within the United Nations, that a study was conducted of the consequences of a nuclear war. Today's conclusions of United Nations experts are unanimous: a large-scale nuclear war would mark the end of human civilization.

Such a war would be not only a form of human suicide. Essentially, it would be also an extreme form of the conflict between man and nature, which is developing in front of us. Recent decades have brought about a number of confirmations of the danger presented by this conflict to the future of civilization, including the accidents at the nuclear electric power plants at Three Mile Island in the United States or Chernobyl, as well as a result of the aggravation of the ecological problem. It is a question of an increasingly tangible degradation of the natural environment as a consequence of the uncontrolled development of industrial output, which ignores the finite nature of all resources on earth.

The current production system is structured essentially as an open system, starting with the time raw material is extracted. No more than a small part of the raw material extracted by mankind is utilized. The rest goes into dumps, polluting the environment. Such type of production inevitably clashes with the continuous wasteless cyclical process of reproduction on which life is structured. Alarming signals to the effect that in this contradiction as well a critical point is approaching and, in some areas, has already come, are more than sufficient.

Until very recently, observing the requirement aimed at studying nature, assimilating it and influencing it, man actually put himself outside nature. He did not consider himself an inseparable part of a single entity which had complex yet strict internal relations which define the nature of the interaction among its components. At a certain stage of development, such a view could have seemed natural and was, essentially, considered such, because of the incomplete nature of available knowledge, particularly in the area of the biosphere. Today, the human habitat has become a single planetary entity in which natural and social factors closely interact. That is why the unprecedented growth of opportunities for a

deliberate catastrophic influence on the part of man on natural processes—such as unleashing a nuclear conflict—and, at the same time, the uncontrolled influence on such processes involving economic and other human activities, metaphorically speaking deprives mankind of the right to be wrong. Wars were fought in the past and a variety of ecological crises occurred. However, despite the entire severity of their consequences they did not halt the overall development of life on earth. Today an entirely different picture has emerged: the world has reached a line which cannot be crossed.

II

What is included in the concept of universality and can it be reduced to strictly biological factors, taking into consideration that the problem of universality itself appeared in connection with the threat to the survival of man as a biological species? In our view, such a narrowing of the concept would be erroneous and extremely wrong, for the reason alone that it would ignore the social factors which, unquestionably, are determining in solving the appearing problems.

Man is an inseparable part of nature and, at the same time, a particular, a unique product of its evolution. In speaking of the highest value of the thinking human brain, today we deem necessary to emphasize also the existence of an inverse connection between man, as a biological species and creator of social development, and the rest of animate nature and other biological species. In the course of millions of years natural evolution created a rich variety of species and if we are right in terms of assessing the human intellect as the supreme creation of nature, we are also right in concluding that this entire biological wealth is the common property of mankind and is directly related to universal human values. We find a confirmation of this thought in the way of thinking of ancient civilizations, the Indian for example, which reveres anything alive on earth; we find this in the feelings of respect and compassion for animals, which are inherent in a person raised under normal circumstances.

These are not feelings coming from higher up. They concentrate within themselves the age-old practical experience of man, reflecting his individual and social needs. Cave drawings of primitive hunters confirm not only the birth of graphic art by man but also his realization of the importance of the animate nature surrounding him, in terms of his own life. It is possible that one day the development of microbiology and genetics will enable us to unravel the genetic code of all organism living on earth. At that point, perhaps, it may be sufficient to develop some kind of central reservation, for all species, and with its help restore, as we wish, necessary biological species. For the time being, we must protect the genetic stock like the apple of our eye, as represented by actually existing populations. The disappearance of any biological species means the impoverishment of nature and robbing mankind.

Since we are touching upon problems of morality, let us emphasize that it is precisely morality that is the nucleus, the pivotal aspect of the concept of universality. Morality reflects the standards of community life and human behavior; it defines their obligations and their relations toward one another and between them and society. In its totality, it is one of the forms of social awareness which, naturally, is shaped by society and within society, for which reason it is of a certain class, i.e., of a historical nature. Consequently, with changes in the social system there also are corresponding changes in moral standards. In emphasizing the class-historical nature of morality, it would be erroneous to ignore the fact that society, in the final account, does not delete or faultlessly reject what is universally significant and what has developed and endured in the behavior of previous generations. Hence we see certain elements of commonality of moral standards shared by different nations and different ages.

Let us cite as an example the aspiration to join forces and engage in collective actions which, as F. Engels pointed out, has compensated for the scarcity of resources on the part of the individual in terms of self-defense and contributed to the transformation of the animal into man (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *op. cit.*, vol 21, p 40). The feeling of belonging to the single human species is a great feeling. A class-oriented society, structured on the basis of the exploitation of man by man, had done everything possible for centuries to eliminate this feeling. Not so long ago Kipling claimed in his poetry that East is East and will never meet with West. However, despite his prophecies, understood in terms of its national and cultural aspects, in terms of the interpenetration among the elements of contemporary technological civilization and in the area of global information, East has met West not only, let us say, within the multinational Soviet Union but also on a planetary scale.

The universal human factor is not reduced to what is inherent in man himself, in his nature. It also includes anything created over the centuries through the human intellect and hands. It is the historical vital experience of all nations, concentrated in human wisdom. It is the tremendous and steadily growing sum of scientific knowledge which leads man to the realization of the urgent need to settle his current contradictions with nature, which reached the stage of confrontation, and successfully to solve global problems. It is the richest possible treasury of a variety of cultural values created by the masters of all ages, of all nations and in all areas.

By virtue of its peculiarities, art has blended to a much greater extent with moral problems, for which reason it is easier to see in it the universal human principles and the need for joint efforts in the preservation of artistic values. Notre Dame in Paris, the Milan Cathedral in Italy, the Taj-Mahal in India, and Kizhi in the north of Russia belong to their own countries and peoples. However, they are also universal properties and the cultural gains of all mankind.

We would be unfair not to mention science, which is broadening our horizons and forcing us to look at the world from a new, a broader point of view. Furthermore, fiction and general educational works in our own practical experience have taught us to consider "nature" and "homeland" as something related to our native home, our neighboring little river or forest. Henceforth, however, man can not only in his dreams but in reality see our entire planet from outer space orbit. Therefore, the angle from which the world is viewed has sharply broadened in the individual and in mankind as a whole. In a few hours a modern jet plane can fly us to any continent and even to the other side of the globe. Contemporary means of communications enable us, in a few minutes, to establish telephone connections with those who are "upside down in terms of us."

We already consider space flights as something ordinary, habitual. We read without amazement about plans for man's flight to Mars or the study of more distant planets in the solar system. The "ordinariness" of our perception of something which, only 25 years ago, was science fiction, is another typical acknowledgment of the increasingly broad and profound penetration of universality in our life and awareness.

III

In his book *"Perestroika and New Thinking For Our Country and For the Entire World,"* M.S. Gorbachev wrote: "Until very recently the class struggle remained the pivot of social development. It remains such to this day in societies divided into classes. Correspondingly, Marxist outlook was dominated—in terms of the main problems of social life—by a class approach. The concept of universality was considered a function and as the end result of the struggle waged by the working class, the ultimate class which, as it liberates itself also liberates the entire society from class antagonisms. Today, however, with the appearance of mass, of universal destruction weapons, an objective limit has appeared for class confrontation in the international arena: the threat of universal annihilation."

Therefore, the appearance of an objective limit to class confrontation in the international arena is noted. The question, however, arises: Is this limit a barrier which can reliably protect mankind from self-destruction?

The deliberate outbreak of a nuclear war today would be the equivalent of a deliberately made decision to commit suicide. This step can be taken by someone who is either mentally ill or unstable. However, history has not recorded examples of a social class, represented by all of its members, that ever decided to commit suicide. The most extreme example known is that of group self-consummation by fire by religious fanatics. All classes which have abandoned the political stage have desperately fought for their lives. In the final account, however, the specific individuals of which they were composed, entered or adapted to a new life.

Naturally, in this respect historical experience cannot serve as grounds for relaxation, or for the decision to swim with the current, passively observing the continuation of the arms race. The high standard of military-political confrontation today and the size of the nuclear arsenals on both sides are fraught with the threat of an accidental outbreak of war as a result of a miscalculation, human error or equipment malfunction. Therefore, in addition to a consistent and persistent promotion of the idea of universality, which helps us to become aware of the responsibility of one and all for the preservation of peace and the universal duty to promote a cessation to the arms race, nuclear above all, and to reduce such armaments, it is often necessary to struggle for a just solution to local conflicts which are sources of tension and nervousness in international relations.

K. Marx pointed out that "the struggle of class against class is a political struggle" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 4, p 183). The range of means used in that struggle is as broad as political life and reality are comprehensive and varied, something which we note every day. The extreme form of solving contradictions—a frontal military clash—is by no means a mandatory component of this range. In his letter to Konrad Schmidt, dated 27 October 1890, Engels noted that "In the real world....metaphysically opposite contradictions exist only during times of crises, and the great course of development takes place in the form of interaction...." (op. cit., vol 37, p 420). This thought is important to us for it brings to light Engels' view on the internal law of dialectical development, social development included, in which crises, which express direct and open confrontation, alternate with relatively "calm" periods, when in addition to confrontational elements, there is interaction which includes different forms of struggle or, rather, a competition between opposite factors. Let us immediately emphasize, in terms of the current condition of social relations, that there neither is nor could there be any question of "class peace," for such a peace is impossible. Indeed, the politically conscious working class cannot abandon its ideals and remain true to itself. The bourgeoisie as well is unable to accept the type of "class peace" which would demand of it excessively radical concessions and the abandonment of its ideological views.

Engels' thought is important also because it emphasizes the significance of the interaction between contradictions in terms of the great course of development. This leads to another conclusion of basic significance, according to which the efforts aimed at the prevention of the crisis do not eliminate or restrain in the least the development process, including that of society. Under contemporary conditions a situation has developed in which the prevention of a military clash between the two social systems has become not only necessary but also a mandatory prerequisite for the preservation of the possibility of progress itself.

The natural question which arises is the following: Is it possible, in our complex world, with countries with a

class division and countries in which the working people are in power, an interaction within it between the two opposite classes without military confrontation or nuclear crises? The positive answer to this question is based not on speculative elaborations but on clear historical experience.

Let us recall above all the example of the anti-Hitlerite, antifascist or "above-system" coalition, which developed during World War II. The differences in the socioeconomic nature, ideology and even personal dislike between Churchill and Stalin did not become insurmountable barriers to the organization of interaction and cooperation. A realistic, a sober approach to the vitally important problems which faced the members of the coalition and an awareness of the scale of the danger which was threatening them and the entire world, cleared the grounds for resolving differences among the allies and contributed to the creation of corresponding cooperation mechanisms.

The period of World War II also brought examples of interaction and cooperation among different social strata in class-oriented countries. For example, members of different classes and political parties, although holding antifascist views, interacted and directly cooperated in the resistance movement in France and other countries occupied by the fascists. Thus, in the Paris uprising of 1944, which saved the French capital from destruction, communists, Gaullists and members of other parties acted hand in hand.

The national liberation movement, which radically changed the political face of the world in the postwar decades, enriched historical experience in social development with new specific forms of interaction among different socioclass strata in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. The interaction among social groups, noted in countries which struggle for national independence, groups which, in many cases, were still in the process of class formation, contributed to the development of the class awareness of the toiling masses and, at the same time, to the broader awareness of national tasks.

Interaction and cooperation, both within the framework of the "above-system" anti-Hitlerite coalition, as in other cases, became possible above all thanks to the fact that the individual sides realized the need for mutual compromises, without which no agreements whatsoever are possible in general. The inevitability of compromises, when imposed by circumstances, was noted by V.I. Lenin. "The task of a truly revolutionary party," he emphasized, "is not to proclaim impossible the rejection of any compromise but **through all compromises**, in as much as they are inevitable, to be able to remain loyal to its principles and its class...." (Op. Cit., vol 34, p 133).

Is a compromise an acknowledgment of the primacy of the universal over the class factor? Unquestionably, it is, for it implies the obligation to abandon some extreme

means and ways of struggle—in this case in the area of international relations. It is entirely admissible, as will be indicated by the further actual course of international life, the existence of mutual self-limitations not only in the military-political but in other areas as well. The logical idea that comes to mind is that restrictions are possible, let us say, on the level of agreements on the rejection of means of "psychological warfare," the strict observance of agreed-upon ethical standards in defending and promoting one's ideas and, in general, ascribing a moral dimension to international relations.

The question is, would this lead to a withdrawal from class positions? In our view, it would not. Conversely, the positions of the different sides would be made clearer and, one could say, cleaner, for both a calm atmosphere and time would remove the current accretions consisting of various myths and ossified concepts which are hindering today state and political personalities, who understand the need to undertake as soon as possible the solution of the global problems facing our world, social circles which are aspiring to the broadening of international relations and many, many others. We should not look too far for examples. The long experience gained in Soviet-American discussions convincingly proves how important it is accurately to understand and appreciate the conceptional foundation or, as is usually said in the United States, the doctrine on which the approach to talks is structured.

In one of his works on dialectics, F. Engels pointed out that theoretical thinking in each separate age is a "historical product which, at different times, assumes quite different forms as well as quite different content" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 20, p 366).

Our time, which is a time of transition and sharp turns in all areas of human life and activities, has demanded its own "historical product" in the guise of a new political thinking. The Great October Revolution provided a powerful impetus to the revolutionary creativity of the toiling masses. It formulated new principles governing relations among countries and nations and contributed to the unparalleled acceleration of the process of social development. One of the most important consequences of this was involving all nations in energetic political activities. There no longer are God-forsaken corners or peoples outside the high road of world politics. This complexly varied world is becoming increasingly interdependent and integral. Problems which only yesterday were considered a matter for the individual countries or groups of countries today affect practically everyone. This motivates or, rather, shapes the vital need to think no longer according to stereotypes based on past concepts but in a new fashion, on a global scale, in accordance with the requirements of our time.

Making a turn in the way of thinking is no simple task. The scientific and technical revolution, the pace of which is not abating, is changing at a headlong pace our way of life hurling at mankind a flood of new discoveries

and broadening the horizons of science. It is extremely important, therefore, to master axiomatically the main feature, which must remain unbreakable in the hierarchy of values: man, human life, and thinking, as a unique creation of nature. This leads to the other fundamental truth: that the security of the peoples is indivisible. It can only be equal for all and the rights of all nations and their interests must be respected equally. It is precisely this that determines the dialectics of the universal and the class principles in contemporary international politics.

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Intensifying Cooperation

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[Article by Vasilii Vasilyevich Mikheyev, candidate of economic sciences, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, and Marina Yevgenyevna Trigubenko, candidate of economic sciences, head of the Department of Socialist Countries in Asia and the Republic of Cuba, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System]

[Text] The documents of CEMA single out as one of the most important tasks of the socialist community the formulation and implementation of special comprehensive programs for multilateral cooperation between European CEMA members and Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia. This is part of the concept of the International Socialist Division of Labor for 1991-2005, which was adopted at the 44th CEMA session.

This task became particularly topical in the 1980s, when it became clear that bilateral relations in this area are ineffective and that CEMA lacked an overall concept for cooperation with said group of countries. The existing forms and mechanisms of cooperation insufficiently help Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia to resolve their economic difficulties which intensified in the 1986-1988 period: compared with the previous 5-year period, the economic growth rates and the population's living standard declined; sectorial imbalance worsened and the burden of debts weighs heavily. For example, according to Cuban data, at the beginning of 1988 Cuba owed the West \$5.5 billion.

Economic underdevelopment and the unfinished nature of the transitional period may be considered a conventional overall feature of the non-European CEMA countries, although there are great differences among them in this respect. Thus, Vietnam is at the very start of the transitional period although in 1985 production socialization had reached the 67 percent level. Mongolia is at a higher stage but the Mongolian comrades believe that

they were too hasty with the conclusion that they were nearing the end of the building of socialism and that two or three 5-year periods would suffice to this effect. Cuba has announced a course toward completing the laying of the material and technical foundations for socialism.

For the time being, the contribution which the non-European countries are making to the economic potential of the community is greatly inconsistent with their labor resources. Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia account for about 8 percent of the territory of the community and 16 percent of its population (73 million, 61 million of which in Vietnam) yet in 1987 they accounted for 2.4 percent of the national income of all CEMA members, 1.4 percent of its industrial output, 7 percent of its agricultural output and about 6 percent of reciprocal trade. In terms of the averaged level of the European CEMA members, per capita national income is 50-60 percent in Cuba and Mongolia and their gross industrial output is 20-30 percent; the corresponding figures for Vietnam are 5 and 2 percent.

The existing disparities aggravate the problem of equalizing the levels of the individual countries and complicate the formulation of a collective approach to cooperation within CEMA for the solution of this problem. Until recently a simplistic quantitative approach predominated in defining ways of solving this problem in countries with an undeveloped economy, according to which absolute priority was given to pace to the detriment of national economic balance and quality. It was believed that "promoting a pace" required the use of all possible sources of growth, including external ones. A high pace was equated to an automatic guarantee of equalization of economic levels with the more developed members of the community.

The economic strategy based on such concepts supplied the relatively dynamic development of the non-European CEMA countries with an economic strategy based on such concepts, which ensured the relatively dynamic development of the non-European countries within CEMA in recent years. Growth was achieved with the help of extensive factors and increasing aid on the part of the USSR and the other CEMA members. Meanwhile, the growth rates were unstable and did not facilitate the solution of the vital tasks of today, above all those of upgrading the living standard, accelerating scientific and technical progress and enhancing the human factor. Furthermore, the growth rates in industry, based on extensive factors and the aid of the fraternal countries, led to increased economic imbalance and unpaid foreign debts. In a number of cases (Vietnam) the content and the pace were determined not by new but by traditional production sectors and types which received virtually no aid from the state. The dynamics of the economic development of Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia is characterized by an acceleration in the last 5-year period and another slow-down at the start of the present (see table 1).

Dynamics of Basic Economic Indicators in Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia (in percentage figures)

Indicators	1976-1980			Average Annual Growth 1981-1985			1986-1987		
	Vietnam	Cuba	Mongolia	Vietnam	Cuba	Mongolia	Vietnam	Cuba*	Mongolia
Generated National Income	2.5	3.0	5.5	7.1	8.4	6.5	3.1	-1.9	4.5
Gross Agricultural Output	3.5	2.6	-2.6	5.1	1.7	7.1	-0.2	-2.1	0.2
Gross Industrial Output	2.4	3.4	8.4	14.9	9.0	9.4	4.0	-3.7	6.0

* Increase in 1987 compared to 1986.

The regular congresses of the ruling parties in Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia were held in 1986 (3rd Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, 19th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and 6th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party). An objective and, in frequent cases, critical assessment of socioeconomic policy was made at these congresses. Thus, the VCP subjected to a principle-minded condemnation the haste in engaging in socialist changes and related bureaucratic centralism in the management of society and underestimating commodity-monetary relations, the role of petty artisan production and the agroindustrial area, combined with an unjustified favoring of building heavy industry projects without firm economic grounds. The MPRP particularly emphasized and drew particular attention to the stagnation which had developed over the past 15 years in animal husbandry, a traditional Mongolian economic sector. The Cuban Communist Party expressed serious concern about the poor utilization of the advantages of the country's participation in socialist economic integration and the slow development of the export sector, the traditional sugar production sector in particular.

The congresses defined the basic trends in the development of these countries for the current 5-year period and, in some cases, for a longer period of time. Vietnam set for 1986-1990 the task of stabilizing its socioeconomic situation and creating material and organizational prerequisites for socialist industrialization. The main attention was concentrated on the development of three comprehensive target programs: food, consumer goods and exports. The implementation of these programs will be consistent with the vital requirements of the current initial stage of converting unified Vietnam to socialism, for it would make it possible to enhance the human factor and provide an impetus to the growth of labor productivity. It will contribute to the creation of a necessary minimum of internal accumulations and lesser dependence on foreign aid, particularly in terms of food.

The process of industrialization is continuing in Cuba, with an emphasis on increasing import substituting output. At the same time, the question has been raised of ensuring a more efficient solution of agrarian problems, including the country's self-support with food. The

republic is actively drafting a program for the comprehensive enhancement of farming with increased production diversification despite quite modest domestic investment possibilities.

Priority is being given to the development of the sugar-agroindustrial, food-agroindustrial and ore-mining metallurgical-machine-building complexes. Many types of production, new to the Cuban economy will become possible, such as electronics and electrical engineering and biotechnology. Obviously, the successful development of such capital- and science-intensive sectors and production facilities will become possible with the efficient combination of domestic with foreign sources for growth and the use of international assistance.

Mongolia's structural policy is also directed above all toward continuing the "industrial revolution:" the fuel and ore-mining sectors will be developed further; new deposits of cokable coal and phosphorites will be developed. The question has been raised of developing new production facilities in the areas of metal processing and some machine building sectors. Major industrial centers are being established, such as Ulan-Bator, Darkhan, Erdenet and Choybalsan. This marks the charting of a course toward the establishment of an industrial-agrarian structure. By the year 2000 the share of industry in the generated national income will reach 50 percent. A breakthrough is planned in agriculture through the implementation of a target program for agricultural intensification and improving population food supplies. This program emphasizes the accelerated enhancement of animal husbandry and its commodity processing sectors. Such a policy is consistent with the satisfaction of the growing needs of the population and the interests of other CEMA members in obtaining animal husbandry goods from Mongolia. Currently the Mongolian share on the CEMA market for meat and meat products is about 2 percent, whereas the country's potential in this area is significantly higher.

The dynamics and quality of the pace of economic development of these three countries over the next 10 to 15 years will nonetheless be determined essentially by capital- and labor-intensive sectors. In other words, the primarily extensive type of reproduction will be preserved. According to forecasts, the pace of progressive changes in the economies of these countries until the

year 2000 will be higher by a factor of approximately 1.3-1.5 compared to the European CEMA members (between 1986 and 1990 the average annual growth rates of the national income will be 7-8 percent for Vietnam, 4.5 percent for Cuba and 5.2 percent for Mongolia which, nonetheless, remains somewhat lower compared with the European CEMA members in the 1950s

(between 6 and 11 percent). As a result, economic levels will come somewhat closer, although the gap, as in the past, will remain significant. Furthermore, the active involvement of intensive factors in the development of the European CEMA members could amend these forecasts and make the pace of such gap closing minimal, for in this case the effect of the current extensive factors for equalization for "catching up" countries will be small.

Correlation Between the Development Levels of Vietnam, Cuba, and Mongolia and the Average Level of European CEMA Members (Per Capita, in Percentages, Average Mathematical Sign = 100)

Indicators	1980			1985			2000		
	Vietnam	Cuba	Mongolia	Vietnam	Cuba	Mongolia	Vietnam	Cuba	Mongolia
National Income	4	50	45	7	60	50	6-8	65-70	55-60
Consumption Fund	4	45	35	4	50	35	6-8	50-55	45-50
Social Labor Productivity	6	75	65	7	70	60	8-10	70-75	63-65
Gross Industrial Output	1.5	25	20	2.0	30	20	5-7	35-40	25-35

Based on computations from national statistics and long-term national forecasts.

The possibility of Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia to reach the level of the more developed countries in the community requires refining the tasks and conditions for this process. To the less developed socialist countries such a closing of the gap means a gradual advance toward the level of the European CEMA countries in terms of the extent of meeting social and individual requirements and the existing production structure, including sectors involved in scientific and technical progress. Obviously, these countries will have to cross at least these two stages of the process. During the first stage the gap in the levels of satisfaction of the prime needs of society and its members will be eliminated (in terms of food, clothing, housing, medical services, education, etc.); on the next stage the emphasis will be on providing more complex and better quality consumer goods and means for their production.

The first stage will be covered if within it a mechanism of economic management is formulated, which will ensure in practical terms the stable growth of output and consumption, which is a necessary base for subsequently coming closer to the progressive part of the community. A simple increase in capital investments will not greatly contribute to this matter if the economic management mechanism remains inefficient.

The accelerated development of non-European CEMA members through the utilization of so far uninvolved reserves for extensive growth will lead to closing the gaps under conditions in which the European countries have not completed their production intensification. Naturally, the successful completion of such intensification could worsen the lag of Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia, particularly in science-intensive sectors and in meeting the new social needs related to the utilization of scientific achievements in industry and daily life. Consequently, it would be difficult to expect any equalization of standards without the creation of a scientific-intensive type of production and the use of the latest technologies in the priority economic sectors of all countries, not only developed ones.

In the course of their development, Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia inevitably clash against the contradiction between accumulation and consumption, which is particularly grave in their case. They are facing a dilemma: either channel funds into satisfying the various needs of their citizens as of now, or else invest in the creation of means of production for the subsequent satisfaction of needs on a higher level. The solution of this contradiction can be accelerated or facilitated through a more efficient utilization of the external factor: the internationalist aid provided by the more developed members of the socialist community.

The common line adopted in the documents of CEMA countries toward less developed members of the community is that it is necessary to convert from primarily bilateral forms of cooperation and free aid to multilateral and mutually profitable assistance. It is important in the preparations for and implementation of this transition to create a truly efficient mechanism of cooperation, taking into consideration the actual differences among CEMA members.

So far the basic form of cooperation with the less developed CEMA countries was that of economic and technical aid in building new and reconstructing existing projects. Such aid has accounted for 60 percent of capital investments in the Vietnamese economy, about 20 percent in the Cuban (excluding the effect of the preferential prices), and 70 percent of capital investments in the Mongolian economy.

It was with the decisive assistance of the USSR that 228 national economic projects were built and commissioned in Vietnam, 360 in Cuba and 650 in Mongolia. They account for as much as 50 percent of the gross industrial output of those countries. The USSR is currently assisting in the construction of more than 50 projects in Vietnam, 130 in Cuba and 100 in Mongolia.

Some 300 industrial and other projects, which are also making a noticeable contribution to strengthening the material and technical base of Cuba, Mongolia and

Vietnam were built or reconstructed with the participation of the European CEMA countries. Beneficial cooperation conditions have been established for them: low-interest loans, preferential prices for some commodities (such as Cuban sugar or Mongolian animal husbandry products), aid in training national cadres, etc.

Scientific and technical cooperation plays a special role in relations with Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia. Of the 93 problems singled out in the comprehensive program for scientific and technical progress, Vietnam will participate in 35, Cuba in 58 and Mongolia in 41. Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia have been granted facilities for using the results of the implementation of the program.

Therefore, the aid provided by the socialist partners is of tremendous importance in shaping the contemporary economic structure of these three countries and the acceleration of their industrialization.

The objective needs of CEMA and the level of assistance reached in aiding the less developed members of the community raise the question of the search for new forms and structures for economic interaction between these two groups. In this area success is related to solving the contradictions in cooperation among countries functioning on different levels. An objective contradiction exists between the international duty of the more developed among them in helping the less developed ones, and the commercial, the cost accounting interests of enterprises and associations participating in this process with their own resources. The factual elimination of the practice of establishing direct production relations between enterprises and their partners in non-European countries triggers their indifference toward the end results of providing assistance. That makes urgent the need to upgrade the role of enterprises and associations in planning the trends and forms of cooperation with less developed CEMA countries and broadening their cost accounting and legal rights.

However, the establishment of direct relations leads to the display and strengthening of the contradiction between the economic interests of less developed members of the community and crediting enterprises and enhances the requirements regarding the mechanism of coordinating interests, necessitating its change and improvement. The cost accounting associations in the European countries must find profitable the efficient and uninterrupted work of enterprises created with their participation. The commissioning of such projects creates a permanent need for practical support which, in converting to direct contacts, assumes the form of stable and efficient relations between enterprises participating in a joint project, in terms of renovation, reconstruction, procurement of spare parts, development of new models, training skilled cadres, etc.

The realistic and efficient way leading to further economic cooperation between CEMA European countries and Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia is the following: without lowering the level of efficient centralization in

the management of foreign economic relations—coordinated basic trends of economic policy within CEMA, coordination of national economic plans and granting state loans for building the largest projects—making maximal use of cost accounting forms and methods. It is precisely they that will ascribe to such aid and cooperation the nature of partnership and develop mutually profitable relations not only in the future but right now.

A major step in this direction would be to set up a fund controlled by CEMA for aid to less developed countries within the socialist community, based on withholdings of an equal percentage of national income quotas by the European countries. Such a fund could be used, on the one hand, to provide centralized aid on the state level and, on the other, for purposes of stimulating (through domestic credit systems of the European CEMA countries) cost accounting enterprises to participate in the development of the Vietnamese, Cuban and Mongolian economies, granting such enterprises financial, credit and other facilities. This would make it possible to turn aid provided by the developed CEMA countries, which for the time being is economically unprofitable to the individual states, into a profitable operation for the European cost accounting enterprises and, through their profitable work, to ensure the repayment of invested funds.

In the light of the possibility of expanding direct relations, forms of cooperation on the sectorial and enterprise level could be differentiated on the basis of sectorial profitability.

In the production infrastructure, including the power industry, the traditional aid on the governmental level could be quite efficient: intergovernmental agreements concluded between respective foreign economic ministries and committees in the socialist countries.

In the extracting industry, it would be expedient to make more extensive use of a method, such as setting up joint enterprises on the basis of the share participation in the allocation of raw materials or opening enterprises with concessionary rights. The CEMA members have already gained experience in the work of joint enterprises in the ore-mining industry in Mongolia, and oil drilling in Vietnam. The popularization of the positive content of this method is a major reserve in cooperation.

In agriculture, this could apply to concessions or joint enterprises which strengthen the specialization of Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia in agricultural commodities supplied to other CEMA members. In this case the active use of the contemporary achievements of science and improvements in selection work, which substantially upgrade production quality, could assume particularly great importance.

The coordination of the cost accounting interests of lenders and borrowers in the processing industry, on the enterprise level, contributes to broadening cooperation

through the contribution of raw materials or the creation of joint enterprises, including branches of large cost accounting associations and enterprises of European CEMA countries, on the basis of contracts among individual enterprises and associations. Cooperation in machine building is carried out through international production specialization and cooperation in individual sectors, primarily labor-intensive ones (Vietnam) and science-intensive areas (Cuba), taking into consideration national and regional demand.

The development of multilateral forms of interaction could become an efficient means of joining efforts by CEMA members. For the time being, however, there is no mechanism which could reliably meet the cost accounting interest of enterprises and organizations in multilateral cooperation with non-European countries. This shortcoming can be surmounted by drafting reciprocally complementary programs for economic and scientific and technical cooperation between the European CEMA countries, on the one hand, and Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia, on the other and, specifically, adding them to the already functioning long-term programs for cooperation between these three countries and the USSR. The coordination of long-term programs would accelerate improvements in the quality of collective assistance given to less developed members of the community on the governmental level.

It is also possible to develop multilateral cooperation on the enterprise level, through joint activities in the export economic sector of non-European CEMA members. In this type of mechanism, leading organizations are appointed for each sector of cooperation and other interested economic targets are linked to them through direct production, scientific and technical and investment ties.

The traditional nature of the structure of economic assistance of non-European CEMA countries is increasingly clashing with the new concept of industrialization under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution and the increased role of the social factor in economic strategy. The real danger of preserving the ideas and actions of the past is real, for in the case of the less developed countries the present and even yesterday's equipment and technology of the advanced CEMA members are considered progressive. Nonetheless, in order to ensure the active involvement of those countries in the process of socialist integration and in order to narrow the gap in development levels, the exclusive use of such equipment is no longer adequate.

However, the question of whether to preserve the "traditional" model of industrialization or to orient it toward latest technological achievements has not been worked out completely. Thus, Vietnam supports both viewpoints and each one of them is sufficiently justified. What is objectively needed is the fast upsurge of production forces, a revolutionary leap which will take these countries to the cutting edge. However, equally objective

real conditions require an evolutionary development, making use of accessible ways, means and systems, thus laying the necessary foundation for the subsequent mastery of the latest technologies. No alternatives exist here but a problem of combining different approaches: society as a whole cannot immediately reach a superior level of output, whereas this is entirely within the reach of individual collectives, enterprises and sectors.

The latest scientific achievements can be mastered by these countries only through cooperation in the implementation of the comprehensive program for scientific and technical progress and facilities in the use, initially, of the achievements of other countries. The program makes it possible for Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia to enter a new stage of development, when scientific and technical cooperation does not simply help to improve the efficiency of traditional output but ensures a substantial leap forward, which qualitatively changes the production structure.

Also pressing and demanding a solution is the contradiction between the achieved and the necessary degree of "readiness" on the part of the non-European CEMA members to assimilate most usefully the assistance offered to them. Practical experience indicates that with a great demand for investments, channeled into new construction, the high percentage of unfinished production capacities remains. For example, enterprises built in Vietnam, Mongolia and Cuba with the help of the USSR in key areas of heavy industry frequently work at 50 percent of capacity or less.

The reason for the idling of capacities and, consequently, the incomplete use of the manpower, includes an inefficient structure of such aid and its inefficient utilization, the low level of economic responsibility for its use, the domestic economic management mechanism based on outlays, which has still not been eliminated even in the developed countries, and the low level of development of the social infrastructure.

Steps taken to improve the mechanism of interaction between CEMA members, on the one hand, and Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia, on the other, must be closely linked to the current restructuring of the domestic economic mechanisms and mechanisms for managing foreign economic activities in all CEMA members, with a view to the economic utilization of the resources of the socialist community. Expanding the practice of creating in less developed CEMA members joint enterprises and establishing direct production relations will have a positive impact on overall economic life in these countries and on the utilization of economic management methods and the interest on the part of the Vietnamese, Cuban and Mongolian working people in upgrading labor productivity and improving production quality. This will unfailingly have a positive impact on the mechanism and the quality of cooperation among socialist countries.

The clear definition of priorities and economic and differentiated approach to giving aid to the non-European CEMA members, taking into consideration the various aspects of their economic situation and political condition and the use of a more efficient mechanism will make it possible to determine the strong aspects of the cooperation between developed and less developed members of the socialist community.

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Short Book Reviews

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[Text] "Rasprostraneniye Marksizma-Leninizma v Afrike (Voprosy Istorii, Teorii i Praktiki)" [Dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in Africa (Problems of History, Theory and Practice)]. Nauka, Moscow, 1987, 333 pp. Reviewed by S. Buryak, candidate of historical sciences, and G. Fokeyev, doctor of historical sciences.

This book was produced through the collective efforts of scientists from the USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute and is a first attempt at a comprehensive study on the problems of the dissemination of scientific socialism on the African continent. The monograph describes the propagandists of socialist ideas, analyzes the historical conditions which shaped Marxist trends during the colonial period and considers the characteristics of the activities of revolutionary forces at the present stage.

Having gained political independence, the African countries are engaged in a stubborn struggle to eliminate backwardness, poverty and, in some cases, desperate deprivations, or otherwise the entire difficult legacy of the slavish past. The socioeconomic and political aspects of the young liberated countries are characterized by their variety. They have different orientations and very disparate readiness systematically to defend anti-imperialist and democratic positions in the struggle for true national liberation.

All in all, this is a successful attempt at describing the revolutionary-transforming role of Marxist-Leninist theory on the continent through the activities of revolutionary parties. Historical development proves that introducing scientific socialism into the awareness of the participants in the revolutionary liberation movement is a lengthy, complex and conflicting process. The representatives of progressive revolutionary forces in Africa must surmount a great deal of obstacles and difficulties along this way. Thus, as early as the 1960s, it became clear that the implementation of the ideas of scientific socialism in socioeconomic changes presumes the painstaking and systematic search of ways and means of creative application of revolutionary theory under the specific conditions of African countries with a socialist

orientation. As reality proved, here hasty, unexamined and stereotyped approach and subjectivism are very harmful. We must also take into consideration the fact that imperialist circles and domestic reactionaries try to distort the nature of Marxist-Leninist theory, to discredit countries with socialist orientation and the revolutionary parties and, in the final account, to undermine the alliance between global socialism and the national-liberation movement. Unfortunately, the monograph does not explain in depth the roots of the difficulties and contradictions which arise in the course of the implementation of the course of socialist orientation by the vanguard parties of the working people.

The monograph analyzes the various types of bourgeois, petit bourgeois and social-reformist concepts in the development of the liberated countries. The sympathy of the broad nonproletarian masses for scientific socialism contributes, to a certain extent, to the elimination of obstacles on the way of its establishment as a practically applied ideology, such as the small number and insufficient maturity of the African proletariat, which is the main social bearer of Marxist ideology. According to the researchers, the weakness of the working class, although a serious negative factor, nonetheless cannot be considered an insurmountable obstacle to the dissemination of the ideas of scientific socialism on the African continent. The authors openly state that under specific African conditions the process of perception and practical implementation of the ideas of scientific socialism is fraught with numerous violations and distortions.

The book under review is a meaningful study which, however, does not cover all aspects of the problem. Unquestionably, this book will draw the attention not only of specialists but also of a wide circle of readers. An extensive number of factual materials and original sources were used in the writing of this monograph, including documents from African progressive parties and organizations. The participation of African Marxist scientists in writing this work is of noteworthy scientific and political interest.

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Meetings with the Editors. Chronicle

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[Text] The editors met with Moscow journalists writing on ideological problems. The creative discussion on the topic of "Public Opinion In the Pages of the Press" involved the participation of representatives of KOMMUNIST, POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE, VODNYY TRANSPORT, TREZVOSTE I KULTURA, YUNOST and other newspapers and journals.

The journal was visited by a group of Czechoslovak journalists including M. Podzimek, member of the editorial board of the newspaper RUDE PRAVO, O. Foglarova, deputy editor in chief of the newspaper PRATSA, and V. Vladikova, contributor to the journal LIFE IN THE COUNTRY. The discussion centered on the results of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

KOMMUNIST was visited by A. Murgas, senior member of the Czechoslovak embassy in Moscow. The discussion dealt with problems related to the implementation of the resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on the reform of the political system, the establishment of a socialist state of law, profound democratization of intraparty life, perfecting relations among nationalities and struggle against bureaucratism.

In accordance with the plan for interparty relations, senior associates of ERA SOCIALISTE, the theoretical and sociopolitical journal of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee, L. Melzer and A. Cioabe, visited the Soviet Union. The guests had a talk with the editors of KOMMUNIST on problems of developing cooperation between the journals; they attended a discussion at the Sovetskiy CPSU Raykom in Moscow on restructuring of party work in the light of the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The guests visited Rostov Oblast where they studied the experience of the oblast party organization and toured industrial and agricultural enterprises.

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